

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

ROBERT J. ART looks at the Defense Department's experience with a biennial budget. He argues that biennial budgeting will produce better defense planning and program evaluation and will lead to significant savings in defense spending.

CHARLES L. KADES, from the perspective of a participant observer, tells the story of the drafting and enacting process after World War II of Japan's current constitution. He suggests that the constitution was not simply imposed but resulted from a joint enterprise of two former enemies working together.

GEORGIA DUERST-LAHTI discusses an underexplored aspect of the women's movement in the United States. She argues that governmental bodies played an instrumental role in the resurgence of the women's movement by providing resources critical for mass mobilization.

ALEXANDER J. MOTYL argues that the view of the Soviet Union as being in an insuperable crisis suffers from the conceptual confusion surrounding the word "crisis." By distorting concepts, by projecting current trends into the future, and by overlooking the international context, many scholars and other commentators skew their understanding of Gorbachev's Soviet Union.

DEBORAH A. STONE builds a theory of problem definition to explain how social conditions are transformed into problems on a community's policy agenda. She shows how causal stories are central to this process and examines political strategies for manipulating the stories.

MARC TRACHTENBERG examines how basic ideas on nuclear strategy took shape in the United States in the aftermath of the thermonuclear revolution. He explores the competing strategic theories that were pursued and tries to explain why it was that strategic thinking reached a kind of dead end by the late 1960s.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Pentagon: The Case for Biennial Budgeting

ROBERT J. ART

If a nation is to have a sound defense policy, it must do three things. First, it must devise a military strategy that properly supports its foreign policy goals. Second, it must create a defense organization that is conducive to producing the types of fighting forces that its strategy calls for. Third, it must construct a resource allocation mechanism that enables its defense establishment to translate efficiently the raw materials of military power into the requisite fighting forces. The strategy must set the goals that the nation's military forces should serve; the defense organization must foster the types of political expectations and incentives that in turn should create beneficial actions by the personnel who comprise the forces; and the allocation mechanism must provide the means to convert as efficiently as possible the resources of personnel, materiel, and monies into the programs that support the strategy. A sensible strategy, a proper set of organizational and political incentives, and an efficient resource allocation mechanism—these are the three ingredients of a sound defense policy.

By the mid-1980s in the United States significant changes in each of these ingredients had taken place. First, the decline of American economic power and the waning of the Soviet threat set in motion a reassessment that still continues of what strategy the United States should pursue and of what global military forces it could and should sustain. Second, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 substantially changed the military structure of the Defense Department by creating a more powerful chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) than had hitherto existed and thereby reduced the autonomy and power of the

ROBERT J. ART is Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and a research associate at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. His most recent book (edited with Vincent Davis and Samuel P. Huntington) is *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace.*

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individual military services. And, third, in its defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1987, the Congress mandated that the Department of Defense alter its method of resource allocation by switching from an annual to a biennial budgeting cycle, from presenting a new budget request each year to presenting one every two years to cover a two-year period.

In this article I examine the Defense Department's experience with biennial budgeting. I shall make four arguments. First, for a long time the Defense Department's central resource allocation mechanism – the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) instituted by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1961 – has been plagued by two deficiencies: poor planning and inadequate evaluation. Second, these deficiencies have contributed to defective resource allocation decisions and must be rectified if defense resources are to be allocated more effectively and efficiently. Third, these deficiencies can be more easily rectified if the Defense Department will budget biennially rather than annually because such a change, which at first glance seems marginal, in fact can have powerful effects by freeing up considerable time for the Pentagon's top level management to plan and evaluate. Finally, the potential benefits of the Goldwater- Nichols reorganization of the Defense Department, as well as certain other management changes instituted by the Department itself in the last four years, cannot be fully realized without the continued use of biennial budgeting.

In order to make these arguments, I shall look at the following: first, the price that annual budgeting exacted on PPBS, in order to show why the deficiencies in planning and evaluation persisted for so long; second, the political impetus for a two-year budget, in order to lay bare the political conditions that are required if this innovation is to continue; third, the Pentagon's experience with formulating its first biennial budget (for fiscal year 1988/89), in order to assess the initial performance against the potential promise of biennial budgeting; and fourth, the likely range of benefits that biennial budgeting can yield, in order to show why two-year budgeting is helpful to attaining the full benefits of the other organizational and management reforms of the mid-1980s.[1]

The focus of this article is, therefore, not on the criteria by which to judge good from bad decisions, but rather on the criteria by which to judge good from bad decision-making procedures; it is not on what are intelligent decisions, but rather on how intelligently to reach them. Good procedures will facilitate the gestation and implementation of good ideas. Bad procedures will either thwart the emergence of good ideas or else subvert them if they do emerge. If properly conceived

[1] The information for this article is based on eighteen interviews that I conducted with the top echelon of the Carlucci Defense Department in April 1988. Among those interviewed were all the service comptrollers and directors of their programming divisions, the under secretary of defense, the comptroller, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, the director of defense guidance, and the director of program, analysis, and evaluation. I would like to thank each of them for the time they took from their hectic schedules and for their candor and insights. I shall not attribute specific thoughts to a given individual, except where I was given explicit permission to do so. Unless directly attributed, therefore, I simply note the day on which the interview took place.

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and employed, a biennial PPBS can support the organizational reforms recently instituted, with less waste of resources. The end result should be a significant improvement in America's military strategy.

The Price and Demise of Annual Budgeting

How can we judge whether a given set of procedures to allocate resources are worth employing? There are two tests that such a set of procedures must pass: they must be effective in producing the intended results and they must do so in an efficient manner.

Effective procedures to allocate resources are those that enable top level decision makers to do three things: first; develop a medium- to long-term planning framework to guide their decisions; second, make intelligent trade-offs in how resources are allocated among the multiple objectives that they have set; third, evaluate the results of their trade-offs and incorporate those evaluations into the next set of trade-offs they must make. Ideally, then, in making current decisions, managers have a strategic vision of where they want to go; they make the necessary trade-offs to get there; they evaluate the results of their trade-offs; they alter their strategic vision and subsequent trade-offs in light of the evaluations of their previous ones. In the ideal process, evaluations of past decisions are fed back into the planning phase. The ultimate virtue of this feedback process is that it enables resource allocators to learn from their experience with previous decisions. And presumably, the more careful the evaluations, the more informed and, therefore, the better are the subsequent plans and decisions.

The Price of Annual Budgeting

Efficient procedures are those that enable managers to perform these three tasks—plan, trade-off, evaluate—with a minimum of wasted effort. The emphasis must be on a minimum of wasted effort, not on its elimination. Efficient procedures cannot end all the waste because in any bureaucracy, and especially in one as huge as the Pentagon, there is an inevitable level of "decision-making friction" (or waste) below which it is not possible to go. The efficiency of any procedure should be measured by how close to that minimum level of inevitable waste it can come. Efficient procedures can also enhance effectiveness if they help managers to strike the proper balance among the tasks of planning, trading off, and evaluating. Thus, resource allocation procedures are effective if they aid managers in making the trade-offs necessary to attain their multiple objectives; they are efficient if they waste a minimum of the time and attention of all those involved in this effort.

By these two criteria, the Defense Department has not had a fully effective and efficient resource allocation mechanism. It has not realized the full potential of the PPBS procedure, largely because it has spent too much time trading off (programming and budgeting) and too little time planning and evaluating. The

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front and back ends of the resource allocation process were given short shrift because the middle had expanded to fill nearly all the available time. Planning and evaluation in the PPBS system were notably deficient.[2] Long- or even medium-term planning, continual oversight, regular monitoring, careful evaluation, selective implementation studies, systematic learning from prior decisions—all these have been in short supply within the Pentagon.

The reasons for the slighting of planning and evaluation are several. The services do not like planning and evaluation if that means—and it usually does—greater intrusion into their affairs by the secretary of defense and his top-level management team. As a consequence, the services will resist any process that gives greater weight to planning and evaluation from above. The secretary and his associates will favor planning and evaluation only if they are fully prepared to fight the continual bureaucratic battles necessary to meld the priorities of the services into a coherent and integrated defense posture. This is a tough job and requires a determined secretary and an equally determined staff. The president must back his secretary of defense fully in order to give him the necessary political clout, both within the Pentagon and with the Congress, to produce a viable defense posture. This requires a president who cares not only about how much money goes to defense, but also about how it is spent. And, finally, the Congress, too, must be willing to take the longer-term view, to require the Pentagon to articulate fully the planning bases for its budget requests and to undertake its own selective evaluation of Pentagon programs and policies. This requires that members of Congress partially extricate themselves from what has been their overweening preoccupation with the details of defense policy, from programs and budgets, and focus more on the broad contours of defense policy.

To list the conditions necessary to achieve better planning and evaluation within the Defense Department is to show why planning and evaluation have not been permanent fixtures there. With the services resistant to any efforts at planning and evaluation that threaten their autonomy, presidents and secretaries of defense must be prepared to exert a huge effort to prevail. Past administrations have varied considerably in their commitment to, and success in, this enterprise. During the Reagan administration, the war was over before it began, because the first essential ingredient for success was absent. Neither President Reagan nor Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was serious either about planning or evaluation, or even about trading off. They were serious only about obtaining from the Congress huge sums for defense and giving them to the services to spend largely as they saw fit. If planning and evaluation are not taken seriously by the secretary and his associates, there is not the remotest chance that they will take place.

But even if Weinberger had taken these two functions seriously, annual bud-

[2] The crowding out of planning and evaluation in PPBS has been noted by every serious study of the Pentagon since the late 1970s. See, for example, *A Quest for Excellence; Final Report to the President by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management* (The Packard Commission) (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, June 1986), 7-33.

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geting would not have facilitated his task; rather it would have made it more onerous. Intelligent planning and evaluation require not simply the determination to do them, but also two other ingredients—sufficient time and an institutionalized procedure that systematically produces them. Annual budgeting did not facilitate planning and evaluation, simply because it had the perverse effect of crowding them out. In the last ten to fifteen years, defense budgeting in both the Congress and the Pentagon has become more complex and, according to the testimony of participants in both institutions, more burdensome and time consuming. As a consequence, because it has been overly preoccupied with the annual budget wars at home, the Pentagon has not been in the best position to prepare for the potential real wars abroad.

Annual budgeting is not the sole cause of the slighting of planning and evaluation, but it is one of them. On this point the opinion of top management was unanimous, even within the Frank Carlucci Pentagon, which was more receptive to planning and evaluation than its immediate predecessor. Witness their testimony:

> We tie and untie our shoes yearly. We just did these things a year ago. Why do it again? We have valuable people and their time is valuable. They are absorbed with this annual exercise. (General Robert Herres, vice chairman of the JCS)
>
> We don't do as good a job as we should on program execution. We consume a lot of time making trade-off decisions. We are literally on the verge of choking now. (A service comptroller)
>
> The inherent advantage in biennial budgeting is that it frees up time for efficient and effective management of resources. With annual budgeting, we use all the time we have for resource allocation. Where is the exam time around here? If we devote twelve months to allocation, there is no time for exams (review and assessment). (Clyde Gleyster, principal deputy secretary, comptroller)
>
> With biennial budgeting, we would have more time for financial analysis, oversight, program execution review. We don't get time today to do that. We don't get tough analysis to bring to bear. (Undersecretary of the Army Michael Stone)
>
> As it is now, we are always budgeting—we have biweekly budgeting. (Deputy Secretary William Taft)[3]

The cost of annual budgeting, then, was to devalue the planning and evaluation phases of the resource allocation process. Annual budgeting led to a short term focus by all concerned. Only the first year of the Pentagon's five year defense program (the FYDP), which lays out defense spending estimates five years into the future, was taken seriously. The other four years of projections (the outyears) were not taken into sufficient account because not enough serious planning was done on them; there were not strong enough political incentives to do it. Systematic evaluation was not done because there was not sufficient time to do it. Hardware and programs are the constituent units around which the budget is constructed. Pentagon energies were consumed with the annual battles to review and fund them.

[3] Interviews conducted, respectively, on 28, 7, 4, 13, and 5 April 1988.

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More systems were begun than the budget could have supported. Consequently, programs had to be cut back in the quantities purchased, with attendant increases in cost per unit and decreases in program stability. The annual scramble to find the funds to pay for more systems than the budget could support was partially resolved by taking monies from the readiness and sustainability accounts. Mission duplication and weapon redundancy happened because top-level managers expended most of their energies fighting for or against weapons and programs with the military services and congressional committees. Not the enemies without, but the "enemies" within consumed top management.

For many years, then, resource allocation had occurred along predictable lines and within predictable confines. Too many battles were waged over the numbers of weapons that were to be bought; too few over the types of weapons that ought to have been bought. Too much attention was given to incremental trade-offs among existing missions; too little to far-reaching alterations among those missions. Clearly, annual budgeting did not create all the ills in defense budgeting. But because it took increasing amounts of time and attention away from the planning and evaluation phases, annual budgeting certainly did little to ameliorate them. Indeed, the ultimate irony of annual budgeting is that this yearly exercise in resource allocation degraded the entire resource allocation process.

The Political Impetus for Biennial Budgeting

Had the Pentagon switched years ago from annual to biennial budgeting, the gains in both effectiveness and efficiency could have been considerable, simply because considerable top-level management energies would have been freed to do more planning and evaluation. Instead of expending the lion's share of its time on the preparation of the yearly budget, top management could have prepared the budget for two years in one year and then in the second year have had the time to plan and evaluate. With these evident advantages, why was biennial budgeting not an enduring feature of postwar defense policy making?

The reason is clear. Annual budgeting is a product of two powerful sets of political forces in the American political system: on the one hand, the rivalry for power among congressional committees and, on the other, the struggle for power between the Congress and the presidency. Since the early 1960s, annual budgeting has been the mechanism through which all congressional authorizing committees have gained power at the expense of the Appropriations Committees. In their quest for greater control over defense and in their belief that control over money is control over policy, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees became more like budgeteers and less like policy setters and policy overseers.[4] And since the

[4] See Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Enchancing Policy Oversight," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Summer 1985): 227–249; and Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: New Procedures and Old Realities" in Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lynn, eds., *Towards a More Effective Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishers, 1985), 125–167.

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founding of the Republic, annual budgeting, through the device of annual appropriations, has been the mechanism by which the Congress has preserved its power vis-à-vis the presidency and through which it has remained the world's most powerful legislative body. The device of annual appropriations has enabled the Congress to exercise close and continuous control over national policy and thereby to keep the executive on a short leash. The annual budget wars within the Pentagon, therefore, were products of both the continual committee wars inside Congress and the long-running war between the Congress and the president. Not efficiency, but power were the goals of the important political actors.

These powerful political forces notwithstanding, a first attempt at a two-year budget was made in 1986. In that year, in an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1987, the Congress mandated that the president submit a biennial defense budget for fiscal years 1988/89 and gave the secretary of defense one year to report "on the implications of moving to a two-year budget."[5] The Congress, however, did not require itself either to authorize or appropriate the two-year budget. In fact, the Congress subsequently authorized only part of the two-year budget and appropriated only one year of it.

A unique window of political opportunity produced the first two-year defense budget. The Congress and the Pentagon each favored it, but for different reasons. By the mid-1980s, Congressman Les Aspin and Senator Sam Nunn, chairs, respectively, of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, had become convinced that Congress needed to do a better job of overseeing national defense.[6] Aspin instituted a Defense Policy Panel of the House committee in order to provide an institutional mechanism through which the committee could take a broad purview of the nation's defense posture and also examine selected policy issues in detail. Nunn had developed a firm view that the congressional authorizing committees had become consumed with budgeting to the neglect of larger policy issues. When he became chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1986, he took a number of steps to enable the committee to assume a more forceful and deliberative policy role. Among these were a restructuring of subcommittees along more functional lines, the holding of hearings on administration strategy, more extensive use of multiyear authorizations on major weapon systems, and the push to adopt both milestone budgeting and a biennial budget. In short, both Aspin and Nunn reasoned that a two-year defense budget could help the authorizing committees get out of the details of budgeting and into the larger contours of policy.

[5] The requirement for the two-year budget is in Section 1405 of Public Law 99-145; see U.S. Senate, The Committee of the Conference, *Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986*, 99th Congress, 1st sess., Senate Report 99-118, 484.

[6] The material about Aspin and Nunn is based on twenty interviews I conducted with professional staff members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in July 1986. For more on congressional treatment of national security, see also Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget, 1975-1983" unpublished ms.; and Barry M. Blechman, *The Politics of National Security: The Congress and U. S. Defense Policy from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf* (forthcoming, 1989).

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For Congress to oversee better, it, too, needed the time that a two-year budget could provide.

For its part, in its first two years, the Weinberger Pentagon had initially favored a two-year budget, in part as a way to lock Congress into the Reagan defense build-up. Studies were done within the comptroller's office on how to institute a biennial budget, but languished because Weinberger succeeded in obtaining the large increases he sought through the annual process. In 1985/86, however, faced with a congressionally mandated end to his large yearly increases and, in fact, with negative growth in defense spending when inflation was taken into account, Weinberger came once again to favor the two-year budget, but this time as a means to limit congressional cuts in defense spending. His top level staff—Deputy Secretary William Taft, Comptroller Robert Helm, and Director of Program, Analysis, and Evaluation David Chu—came to favor a biennial budget for what they saw as its inherent managerial advantages: program stability and more effective oversight of program execution. What finally resolved Weinberger's ambivalence about the two-year budget and pushed him to favor it was the argument by his staff that a two-year budget was a means to get nine years of Reagan defense budgets out of an eight-year administration. That is, the fiscal year 1988/89 budget would constrain the incoming administration through most of calendar year 1989. With a possible Democratic victory in the 1988 presidential elections, and with a likely Democratic assault on the defense budget in the election year, a two-year budget passed in 1987 would, as the last effective budget of the Reagan Administration, protect defense from cuts through October 1989 by insulating it as much as was politically possible from the 1988 presidential elections. What he had once favored, but decided was unnecessary in order to lock the Congress into huge increases, Weinberger later resurrected in order to fend off large congressional decreases. What the Congress had mandated in 1986, Weinberger was more than happy to provide.

The Pentagon's First Two-Year Budget

Political Struggles and Budgetary Action

The Pentagon's experience with the fiscal year 1988/89 budget was a product not only of what the department did with it, but also of what the Congress did not do with it. The two-year budget that the Pentagon submitted in January 1987 became enmeshed in a partisan struggle between the Democratic Congress and the Republican President over national priorities. The partisan clash between Congress and President, which was eventually resolved by the budget summit of December 1987, reduced dramatically the size of the President's defense spending request. As a consequence, the Pentagon was not able to reap the advantages that a biennial budget could have brought for program stability. A stable level of funding for individual programs was not achieved, because in December 1987 a total of $53 billion was cut from the two-year request that the Pentagon had submitted the previous January.

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The Pentagon was more successful with a second potential advantage of biennial budgeting—oversight of program execution. Even though Congress failed to appropriate the biennial request, the Pentagon had prepared one and was therefore able to use the time freed up from having to go through another PPBS cycle in order to conduct what it called an Implementation Review. In the fall of 1987, this exercise engaged the energies of top management both in analyzing selected issues that cut across the services and in focusing, not on the resources to be allocated to future programs, but rather on the effectiveness of programs already underway. The Implementation Review was retrospective, not prospective. It was not a budgeting exercise, even though some participants wanted to view it that way, but rather an evaluation exercise, albeit one that could be crucial for future resource decisions.

The Pentagon began work in January 1986 on a budget for fiscal years 1988 and 1989. Because it had only a few months to prepare it, what the department did was to take the first and second year of the five-year defense program and give them to the Congress as a package of two one-year budgets.[7] With the practice of annual appropriations, the Pentagon normally planned, programmed, and budgeted in detail for only the upcoming fiscal year, even though in principle it developed budget figures for four additional years. The FYDP was thus a rolling document; in any given calendar year, it projected five fiscal years out. It was (and still is) constantly being revised and updated. The first year of the FYDP was the most realistic and fiscally accurate of the five years, because it represented the appropriation request for the upcoming fiscal year. The second year out (or second outyear) was a bit hazier, but still had a respectable degree of accuracy. The third, fourth, and fifth years did not go so far as to be numbers pulled out of thin air; but they were not viewed as realistic by budgeteers and, consequently, were not taken seriously either within or without the Pentagon. What the Pentagon did, in essence, was to take advantage of the reasonableness of the second outyear figures in order to produce quickly a two-year budget request. By simply adding detailed justification documentation for the second outyear, documentation that had always accompanied only the first outyear (the upcoming fiscal year), it made good use of the planning tool readily at hand.

The Pentagon completed work on the fiscal year 1988/89 budget in December 1986 and presented it to the Congress in January 1987. By 1 October 1987 (the beginning of the 1988 fiscal year), however, because the President and the Congress were still locked in an intense struggle over national spending priorities, the Congress had not yet passed a defense appropriations bill, or any other appropriations bill for that matter. So, in December 1987, in order to reach a political agreement on taxing and spending, the President and the leaders of Congress held a budget summit, the purpose of which was not only to reach agreement on the federal budget for fiscal year 1988, but to do so in a way that could best position politically both Democrats and Republicans, the Congress and the President, for

[7] Interview with a service comptroller, 7 April 1988; and with Robert Helm, comptroller, 4 April 1988.

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the 1988 presidential and congressional elections. Both the Republican and Democratic parties wanted to run against the deficit in the 1988 elections. Both wanted to show progress in reaching the Gramm-Rudman targets for deficit reductions. Both wanted to show that they were reacting responsibly to the October 1987 crash in the stock market. Neither wanted to shoulder the blame for failure to reach agreement on a federal budget. Where the two parties differed was on the priority to be given to domestic versus military programs.

The Democratic Congress thought the President's economic assumptions and deficit reduction targets too optimistic and his defense request too large. Moreover, even though they had mandated it in 1986, in the fall of 1987, the congressional Democrats saw a potentially fatal political trap in a biennial defense budget. With the biennial defense request, Ronald Reagan was asking a Democratic Congress to accept defense commitments for two years, while at the same time binding himself on domestic programs for only one year. This presented a political problem because estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) showed that the President's federal budget for fiscal year 1989 fell short of the Gramm-Rudman targets by $20 billion; and CBO's reestimates of his fiscal year 1988 submission revealed that even in that year the deficit would fall short of the reduction target.[8] In effect, as John Hamre has perceptively put it: "the President was asking the Congress to accept a binding target for defense for fiscal year 1989 while refusing to identify program cuts for the remainder of the Government that would be needed in order to reach the Gramm-Rudman ceilings."[9] No Democratic Congress, and especially one confronting a popular Republican President and an upcoming presidential election, would give him a blank check for defense, knowing full well that the domestic programs that benefited Democratic constituencies would have to take the hit for the $20 billion shortfall projected for fiscal year 1989.

The budget stalemate was broken in December, when the summiteers reached agreement on the size of the overall federal budget, on taxes and the deficit, and on the level of defense spending. The summit specified reductions, respectively, of $20 billion and $33 billion in the President's defense requests for fiscal years 1988 and 1989. The summit thus required the Pentagon to redo the fiscal year 1989 budget in the space of six weeks and to cut $33 billion from it. In order to help break the political stalemate, the Pentagon in effect had to submit a new budget for fiscal year 1989.

During 1987, Secretary Weinberger had not permitted the Pentagon to develop any contingency plans whatsoever for cutting the fiscal year 1989 request. He took the position that such plans would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Contingency cutting within the building, he maintained, would leak to Congress and would

[8] John Hamre, "Congressional Experience with a Biennial Defense Budget" in Blechman and Blackwell, eds. *Making Defense Reform Work*, 5. The Presidents's 1988 budget document predicted that the federal deficit for fiscal year 1988 would be $107.8 billion; it ended up at $155.1 billion. *New York Times*, 13 January 1989.

[9] Hamre, "Congressional Experience with a Biennial Defense Budget," 5.

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become the basis for congressional cuts. Weinberger departed in November as secretary of defense. Frank Carlucci took over and ordered implementation of the cuts that were mandated by the budget summit. Carlucci did not permit the services simply to cut 10 percent across the board; rather he wanted real trade-offs to be made. He insisted that the readiness and sustainability of the forces be protected by taking the cuts in force structure and by killing rather than stretching out some modernization programs. As a consequence, sixteen navy frigates were retired from the active forces, two air force tactical fighter wings and one and one-half army brigades were cut, 36,000 military personnel were cut, and eighteen development and procurement programs were terminated.[10] In just six weeks the Pentagon was able to reformulate the fiscal year 1989 budget, to engage in the $33 billion "bloodletting" as some of the Pentagon participants described it, because it had already formulated a budget for fiscal year 1989.

The cuts in the fiscal year 1988 request were disruptive to major weapon programs, because that budget also incorporated a 4.3 percent salary increase for military personnel and a restoration of training levels for the ground troops and for the air force. The advantages for program stability with a biennial budget were thus not realized. Over this two-year period, the summit reduction of $53 billion, or nearly 9 percent of the approximately $600 billion that the Pentagon would spend, together with the salary and training level increases, necessitated severe reductions in the quantities of weapons that could be bought and hence wreaked real havoc on procurement plans. In view of the congressionally-mandated, real reductions in defense spending for the previous two fiscal years (-4.2 percent in fiscal year 1986 and -3.3 percent in fiscal year 1987), the Weinberger Pentagon had been unrealistic in planning for three percent real growth in the defense budget for the 1988 and 1989 fiscal years. Weinberger's "planning" had made a bad problem worse.

The Implementation Review and Use of the Off Year

In its first biennial budget, the Pentagon had more luck with program oversight than it had with program stability, largely because events in the former area were directly under its control. With the new biennial process, the Pentagon entered an on-year and off-year cycle. In the on year, it would prepare the two-year budget; in the off year it would review the defense program. The centerpiece of the on year would be the regular Summer (or Program) Review of the PPBS – the months of June, July, and August, when the Defense Resources Board (DRB), the Pentagon's corporate decision-making body, reviewed the services' detailed statements of what they wanted to do for the upcoming fiscal year and how they planned to do it – what are called the Service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) and

[10] See News Release (No. 81-88), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 18 February 1988, 3-4.

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which contain the Pentagon budget's several thousand program elements. The centerpiece of the off year would be the Implementation Review (or what is now called the Execution Review). Having prepared its first biennial budget during the on year (1986), the Pentagon proceeded in the off year (1987) to conduct its first Review, an exercise that top management billed as integral to, and a principal feature of, the biennial process. With the Implementation Review, then, top management intended to conduct serious oversight of its policies and programs.[11] One year they would budget; the next they would evaluate. In turn, the next two-year budget would be informed by the results of the prior evaluation. In this way, biennial budgeting would free management's decision-making resources, redeploy them to the planning and evaluation phases of PPBS, and thereby strengthen them.

The DRB oversaw the Implementation Review. Participants in the review—the service chiefs and service secretaries, the chairman of the JCS, the commanders in chiefs of the unified and specified commands (the CINCs), and the several under and assistant secretaries from the office of the secretary of defense (OSD)—prepared issues that they wanted examined. During October, about fifty issues were dealt with, ranging from the more mundane (Depot Maintenance Programs, Human Immunodeficiency Virus, and Management of Military Retirees) to the more consequential (Strategic Command, Control, and Communications Modernization; Follow-on Forces Attack; and CINC Capabilities to Participate effectively in the PPBS).[12]

Opinions differed on the success of the entire exercise. In general, the top civilian management was satisfied. It had deliberately structured the review to be a time to evaluate how the department was doing in meeting its objectives in selected areas, not an opportunity to change programs or budgets. It was an opportunity to step outside the regular programming and budgeting cycle and focus on issues that cut acrosss the services and that normally would not come up in the regular PPBS process.

In selected areas, this had great merit. In one area, for example—planning for withdrawal from Panama under the terms of the treaty negotiated by the Carter administration—no planning had begun for the redeployment of the forces that would be withdrawn and for the relocation of the headquarters of the Southern Command. As a result of the Fall Review, planning began earlier for that contingency than it otherwise would have. In another area—pilot retention—all the services chiefs were brought together and quickly realized that each had the same problem. When service budgets were not directly at stake and not in competition with one another, and when a problem was perceived to be common to them all, the chiefs were able to compare notes and devise a program based on their collec-

[11] *Memorandum of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Members of the Defense Resources Board and Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands; Implementation of Biennial PPBS*, 6 April 1987.

[12] *Tentative Defense Resources Board (DRB) Agenda, October 14–22, 1987*. The agenda is unclassified, but obviously the discussions were not.

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tive wisdom to deal with it. Perhaps this was the greatest benefit of the review; it opened up matters for consideration that the regular PPBS process did not permit to be examined. As Deputy Secretary Taft put it:

> It [the Implementation Review] had people addressing things outside the requirement to fund or not to fund. So often in PPBS, we have at the end of the day to decide to buy or not to buy and how much. That exerts some sort of discipline on the subject, but it also prevents consideration of other aspects of the subject.[13]

What OSD saw as beneficial, however, the services viewed warily. They were much less enthusiastic than OSD, precisely because areas normally not considered in detail by OSD during the regular PPBS process were dealt with in the Implementation Review. Two types of concerns were expressed. One saw the exercise as useless:

> The Implementation Review was a waste of time. It had a high tone, to look and see how we are doing in implementation, but the building sees that as potentially a reallocation of resources. But the Implementation Review was not to be such. If you don't reallocate monies, you are wasting your time. Nothing of value was added to the process, but it took a lot of work. By definition, there was no bottom line. *No money moved.* The Implementation Review was invented to keep unemployed people busy.[14]

Another saw the process as one that potentially could have turned into an OSD micromanagement exercise:

> We were concerned with what mischief they [OSD] could create. Oversight can easily turn into micromanagement. An OSD review can easily slip into micromanagement, bureaucracy being what it is.[15]

In general, attitudes within the Pentagon toward the Implementation Review, and the cleavage in views between superiors and subordinates, are what should have been expected. If top managers use such a review to look at issues department-wide, if they focus on areas where problems are occurring and where progress is slower than expected, if they produce evaluations of programs and policies that are critical of them, then what these managers find useful will be viewed as dangerous by those whom they manage. The off-year execution review will allow the top echelon to delve more deeply into service activities than hitherto was possible. The charges of "micromanagement" and "a waste of time" must therefore be viewed as euphemisms for the potential danger that subordinates see when top managers are systematically unleashed on them. Even though the Implementation Review is not a programming or budgeting exercise, it cannot but have significant consequences for both. Better evaluation of on-going programs and policies must affect the future allocation of resources. Retrospective evaluation will lead to prospective reallocation.

[13] Interview with William Taft, deputy secretary of defense, 5 April 1988.
[14] Interview in the Pentagon, 12 April 1988.
[15] Interview with a service comptroller, 7 April 1988.

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Although the services had an understandable ambivalence toward the institutionalization of every-other-year oversight by OSD, they had none toward the oversight *they* could do of their own programs. Opinion among the service programmers and comptrollers was unanimous: biennial budgeting gave them the time to do the things they should have been doing but never could do because of the ratrace of annual budgeting. The services programmers, in particular, found the off year of great benefit:

> On an annual cycle, we were always building the next five-year program before we understood what the current budget was doing to us. I was always building a POM without knowing what the budget decisions in the building had done to me until the very end of the annual cycle. The major decisions on the budget are always held to the last possible minute because they are the hardest to make. A programmer was always chasing his tail with one-year budgeting. I was always running to catch the next train. I never had time for analysis. With annual budgeting, we were always on a dead run, always chasing programs. With biennial budgeting, I can actually go out and do some analysis and evaluation of programs, instead of chasing the next POM.[16]

Appreciation of the full import of this view requires a clear understanding of the plight faced by the service programmer, which worsened with annual budgeting. With the PPBS process run every year, the programming cycle began in July of the year preceding the April presentation of the service POM to OSD. In July 1985, for example, the service programmers would begin the process of preparing their POMs for fiscal year 1988, the final version of which would be submitted to OSD in April 1986. The Summer Review of these POMs would occur during June, July, and August of 1986; the budget, or comptroller, review would occur in September and October. Final decisions on the fiscal year 1988 budget would be made in November and December 1986, and in January 1987 the President would present his fiscal year 1988 defense request to the Congress. To prepare a budget for fiscal year 1988, then, the PPBS cycle begins a full eighteen months (in July 1985) before the fiscal year 1988 budget request is submitted to the Congress (in January 1987) and twenty-six months before the fiscal year begins (on 1 October, 1987).

The fiscal year 1988 POM construction began during the summer of 1985, when the service components began surveying their needs. The components then sent their requests to their respective service headquarters by the end of the 1985 calendar year. But initial POM construction for the 1988 fiscal year (which lasted from July through December 1985) could not but have been affected by the last minute decisions being made on the fiscal year (FY) 1987 budget (which took place in October, November, and December 1985). In other words, service components' program requests for fiscal year 1988 arrived for review at about the same time that final decisions (usually cuts) were being made on the fiscal year 1987 budget.

[16] Interview with General Stephen R. Woods, director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, 26 April 1988. General Woods had five years experience as director of the army's programming process.

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Whether a bottom-up or top-down approach is used in POM construction, then, the building of the POM for the next fiscal year is well along before the services know what will happen on the POM that they have just finished. In short, in an annual budgeting cycle, at some point service programmers will always be putting the components of their next POMs together without knowing what the final budgetary actions on the previous POMs will be, even though those actions will affect the POMs that they are in the midst of putting together.[17]

Coordinating, trading off, readjusting—these are the essences of building a unified program that encompasses a myriad of elements. Annual budgeting magnified the complexity of building POMS, because the next POM was always in the process of being built before final action on the previous one was completed. This required even more readjustment than would otherwise have been the case, and this is one sense in which the service programmer meant that he "was always chasing POMs." The other sense in which he meant it was that annual budgeting left no time to examine the individual programs that were being implemented. The impossibly crowded calendar of annual budgeting left precious little time for careful oversight of how well the myriad programs upon which service POMs were built were being executed by those within the services who were building them. Under annual budgeting, a gross deficiency in overseeing was as true for the services vis-à-vis their components as it was for OSD vis-à-vis the services.

Because of the complexity and intricacy of the POM process, it is easy to understand why the service programmers found biennial budgeting so worthwhile. First, it could ameliorate, even if it could not eradicate, the sequencing problem provided by the overlap between POM construction on the second outyear and budgetary action on the first outyear. With the Pentagon on biennial budgeting, this problem would occur only every other year rather than every year. The problem would not be solved, but it would occur with less frequency. A monstrous headache every other year is better than one every year.

Second, and more beneficial, the off year of biennial budgeting gave both service programmers and comptrollers the respite from the POM mill to engage in the type of retrospective analysis and future planning they felt they should have been doing but never could, so as to evaluate how well they were doing what they had intended to do. One service programmer used the off year to update his data bases, the quality of which had been quite weak. Another never had had the time in the planning phase to do the net assessment that ought to have preceded the building of programs and was finally able to do it. The navy used the off year to conduct a set of truly long-range planning studies: anti-submarine warfare into the twenty-first century; surface ship operating characteristics twenty years into the future; the needs of naval aviation and anti-air warfare twenty years out.[18]

[17] For a clear description of the phasing complexities of PPBS, see *A Primer: the PPBS*, January 1987, prepared by the Directorate of Programs and Evaluation, DCS/Programs and Resources, Department of the Air Force.

[18] Interview in the Pentagon, 12 April 1988.

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Representative of service comptrollers' opinions about the value of the additional time freed up by biennial budgeting are these:

> We don't do as good a job as we should on program execution. We consume a lot of time making trade-off decisions. When this past summer [1987] we went without a POM process, we had much more time to review our program execution. We should be doing more of that. We could do a better job of monitoring program execution, perhaps with fewer people, if we went to biennial budgeting.[19]

In summary, the Pentagon's first experience with biennial budgeting yielded no payoff for program stability but a great deal for programmatic and policy oversight. The vagaries of deficit reduction and electoral politics subverted the former; the free time provided by the off year made possible the latter. The Pentagon's first biennial budget was a half success.

The Benefits of Biennial Budgeting

Better evaluation of policy execution, more effective long-range planning, less turbulence in weapon programs through more stable funding levels, increased savings in procurement contracts through better deals with contractors – these are the four specific benefits that can be realized with biennial budgeting. The first two must be seen as the fundamental management prerequisites to better resource allocation within the Pentagon; the latter two can be viewed as the specific savings that will occur if the prerequisites are put in place. None of these benefits are trivial, even if we cannot specify with precision the exact dollar gains from each. The first three can materialize if simply the Pentagon remains on a biennial cycle. The fourth will not. For that benefit to occur, the Congress itself must adopt biennial appropriations, or else substitute some other functional equivalent of biennial budgeting for the procurement title of the defense budget. If all or only some of these benefits accrue with the assistance of biennial budgeting, then the Pentagon cannot help but make better use of whatever resources the Congress gives it. That is the fifth and the ultimate benefit of biennial budgeting: better quality decisions and more efficient use of resources.

Better Evaluation and Planning

The case for better evaluation and planning, and how biennial budgeting can create the preconditions to make both possible, should be clear. If top management is given the time and energy to focus on reviewing the effectiveness of its on-going programs and policies, then better evaluation of them should result. In turn, that cannot but make future trade-off decisions better. The Implementation or Execution Review of October 1987 was a step in this direction. It should continue in one form or another, but only will if the department remains on a biennial cycle,

[19] Interview in the Pentagon, 7 April 1988.

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with the review coming in the off year. Done properly, the Execution Review takes as much thorough preparation and consumes as much of top management's time as does the Summer or Program Review. The department, therefore, cannot both budget and review annually, or, if it does, as Clyde Gleyster put it: "you can do both at the same time but you will do both poorly. An implementation review will always be iffy if you don't have an adequate time slice."[20] Biennial budgeting can yield that time slice.

The benefits of better planning are also obvious. If top management continues to be freed from the tyranny of annual budgeting and, therefore, has more time to think about where it wants to go, then it has a better chance of getting there. Biennial budgeting can provide the time to plan, but cannot guarantee that high quality planning will take place. Additional steps are needed, and the Pentagon has already put many of them into place.[21] First, in the last four years, the department has taken great strides in strengthening the links between the planning phase of PPBS on the one hand and the programming and budgeting phases on the other. This has been achieved by instituting certain changes in the Defense Guidance (DG), a document that sets forth the major goals the Pentagon aims for and that represents the major planning tool of the department. To be of real import in programming and budgeting, the DG must set the general direction and specific goals that the department can *realistically* hope to attain. This means that the DG must also be subject to fiscal reality, to be constrained in its goal setting by the amount of resources that are within reasonable reach for the Pentagon.

In budgeting, the desirable will always exceed the possible. In planning for the future, which is what budgeting is about, that is not a bad thing per se, because some amount of stretching is useful to raise sights, to stimulate better performance, to push beyond merely the easy to obtain. What is pernicious, however, is when the gap between the desirable and the possible becomes so large as to render the former totally irrelevant. To set goals without attention to their affordability is simply to make them into wish lists that no one takes seriously. Goals that are perceived as totally unobtainable rarely inspire. For too long, both the Defense Guidance and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) were viewed as wish lists; their relevance to the PPBS process was tenuous at best. The Pentagon's programmers and budgeteers consequently found them of little value. As General Robert Herres, vice chairman of the JCS, put it:

> In the past, serious people could easily ignore the DG and not be criticized for ignoring it, because the services could not comply with it. The reason was that the DG always

[20] Interview with Clyde Gleyster, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense, comptroller, 4 April 1988.

[21] Many of these were recommended by the Packard Commission and were implemented by National Security Decision Document # 219 of 1 April 1986. Although NSDD 219 is classified, a public version, which is quite close to the classified one, can be found in the White House Press Release of 2 April 1986, entitled *Summary of a Directive Implementing the Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management* [the Packard Commission].

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asked them to do far more than they could. Hence the services could pick and choose according to what they wanted most.[22]

For the first time, in 1982 the Pentagon subjected the DG to fiscal constraints. Each year the process has gotten better, but more needs to be done. In particular, the Midterm Objectives of the DG, which set forth the top management's goals for the next several years, are more ill defined and tenuously related to the program elements of the FYDP than need be. Several steps have been taken to strengthen the links between these objectives and the program elements and should be pursued further.[23] Another step to tighten the link between planning and programming, and to make certain that the former guides the latter, has been to issue a schedule for preparation of the fiscal year 1992/1993 budget that requires the issuance of a draft of the Defense Guidance before the services begin constructing their POMs.[24] In the past, because the services began POM preparation long before the DG was issued, they could too easily make certain that what they had already put into their POMs was required of them by the Defense Guidance simply by getting those elements put into the guidance. In this fashion, the POMs drove the guidance, not the guidance the POMs. Reversing the sequence of preparation will not guarantee that the guidance directs the POMs, but it will make it easier for future secretaries of defense who take planning seriously to hold the feet of the services to the fire by first issuing a guidance and then requiring that service POMs adhere to it. In this manner there will at least be a guidance of the secretary's to which the services can be held accountable.

Finally, for the first time, in 1987 the Joint Chiefs prepared a JSPD that was resource-constrained and that contained a range of military options, though it considered only a narrow set of choices. A greater range of choices, one that sets forth alternative mixes of forces, all of which are fiscally constrained, will aid the secretary of defense in allocating the department's scarce resources.[25] Further improvements in both the Defense Guidance and the Joint Strategic Planning Document, which represent, after all, the Pentagon's major planning exercise, will tighten the links between planning on the one hand and programming and budgeting on the other.

A second set of steps, having to do with strengthening the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands in the Pentagon's resource allocation process, are already in place. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 enhanced the general powers and responsibilities

[22] Interview with General Herres, vice chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1988.

[23] Interviews in the Pentagon, 4 April 1988. See also *The Department of Defenses's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System*, A Study by the Joint DOD/GAO Working Group on PPBS, September 1983, GAO/OACG-85-5 (General Accounting Office, September 1983), 31-55.

[24] See *Memorandum for the Members of the Defense Resources Board on the PPB Schedule* by Deputy Secretary Taft, 14 July 1988.

[25] The Project on Monitoring Defense Reorganization, *Making Defense Reform Work*, Final Report (Washington, D. C.: Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, November 1988), 43.

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of both the chairman and the CINCs. Even before that legislation, Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft took the important step of including the needs of the CINCs in the services' POMs by establishing what is called The Integrated Priorities List (IPLS). These are attached as separate annexes to the service POMs and are now the largest element within them. They set forth the CINCs' requirements and show how the services are, or are not, meeting them. The IPLS are an invaluable tool to inject the perspectives of the users of the Pentagon's resources (the CINCs) into the master plans of the providers of those resources (the services). Too often in the past, the providers had determined what the users had available, should war come, without the latter having had any say in what the former had provided. The chairman of the JCS and the CINCs are two of the three elements within the Pentagon, the other being the secretary of defense, that take a department-wide or cross-service view of matters. The stronger all three are, the more efficiently defense resources will be allocated.

Clearly, then, the recent wave of defense organizational reform has vastly improved the planning phase of the PPBS cycle and tightened its links to the programming and budgeting phases. Biennial budgeting can make these recent changes even more effective than they would otherwise be, simply by giving the PPBS participants adequate time to employ them. Improved planning tools have little value if planners have little time for them.

Increased Procurement Savings and Less Program Turbulence

Increased savings in procurement contracts can also result from biennial budgeting. The Congress appropriates most of the monies for defense in four titles: personnel, operations and maintenance (O&M), research and development (R&D), and procurement. Biennial budgeting will produce the greatest dollar savings in the procurement title because two years of dollars up front will enable program officers to bargain better with contractors. They could realize savings from buying in greater bulk, from setting prices that lock in two years instead of one and thus mitigate the effects of inflation in the second year, from being able to bargain for lower prices by promising two years of orders instead of one, and so forth. Biennial budgeting may not produce large savings in the other three accounts, because the advantages of having two years of monies up front in those titles are not so great. The procurement title is akin to a capital budget and, as with all capital budgets, the savings from bulk buys are potentially large because capital projects generally take many years to complete. The bigger the number of dollars that can be put down initially, the larger are the potential savings.

Biennial appropriations are not the only way to achieve the equivalent of bulk buying in the procurement accounts. Multiyear authorizations, with which the Pentagon and the Congress have been experimenting recently, are another way. With multiyear authorizations, the Pentagon enters into a contractual arrangement with a defense firm that commits the Pentagon to buy from it a given number of a weapon system over a fixed number of years. In return for that commitment,

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the firm will give the department a better price because the firm, in turn, will have greater leverage in negotiations with its subcontractors and parts suppliers and can thereby strike more advantageous deals with them. The Congress still has to appropriate the funds each year, but the contractual commitment to buy a given amount in each year has so far been honored and is perceived by defense firms as having been committed for the specified number of years, even though the funds still have to be appropriated annually. If the Congress fails to adopt biennial appropriations for the entire defense budget, or even for the procurement section of it, more extensive use of multiyear authorizations could achieve the same effect. Biennial procurement appropriations or more extensive use of multiyear authorizations promise significant savings in procurement, an area that constitutes at least one third of the entire defense budget.[26]

Finally, more stability in the funding levels for weapon programs should lead to less program turbulence and hence greater dollar savings, because instabiity in programs clearly costs money. To say that a program is unstable is to say that it experiences turbulence in its rate of production. Program turbulence results from a host of factors, both internal and external; but one of the prime is the stretching out that occurs in production rates when the annual budget is insufficient to support all the programs at the quantities preferred. Program managers refer to this as "budget whiplash."[27] To stretch out a program means to produce the desired number of units over a larger number of years than was originally planned, thereby reducing the number of units that will be bought per year. Such reductions usually bring about increases in per-unit cost because they lead to uneconomical yearly rates of production. The services have calculated, for example, that a 50 percent decrease in the annual rate of productlon for aircraft, not an uncommon occurrence, increases the real unit cost by 7 to 35 percent. The comparable figure for tactical missile programs are 8 to 69 percent.[28] If the per-unit cost increases and if the size of the program remains constant, then the total cost of the program grows; and fewer dollars are available for other programs.

Stretch outs are not the only thing budget whiplash leads to; permanent reductions in the quantities of a system produced also occur. That, too, will increase the system's per-unit cost, because its research and development expenditures are now spread over a smaller number of units. In this case, even if total program costs do not increase, another type of inefficiency in resource allocation results. A given weapon system's effectiveness is a function of both its quality and its quantity. Reduce the number of systems available and you produce effectiveness inefficiencies simply because reductions in quantity cannot be made up for by enhance-

[26] See Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990*, 85.

[27] The authors of the 1979 RAND study on weapons acquisition attribute most of the turbulence in the programs they assessed to externally-induced changes (budget cuts). See Edmund Dews and Giles K. Smith, Allen Barbour, Elwyn Harris, and Michael Hesse, *Acquisition Policy Effectiveness: Department of Defense Experience in the 1970s*, RAND R-2516-DDR&E (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, October 1979), 71-76.

[28] CBO, *Effects of Weapons Procurement Stretch-Outs on Costs and Schedules*, November 1987, xiii.

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ments in quality, if the quantity reductions are severe enough. If not enough of the weapons are available for the task at hand, no matter how good each of them is, resources have been poorly allocated because effectiveness has been reduced. Either way, whether stretch outs lead to reduced effectiveness or to an increase in total program cost, resources have been allocated inefficiently.

The Pentagon has blamed the Congress for both stretch outs and quantity reductions, because it did not allocate enough monies for defense. For its part, the Congress has blamed the Pentagon, either because the department was not honest in its estimates of ultimate costs, or because it did not do realistic outyear planning, or both. The Pentagon has charged the Congress with niggardliness and micromanagement; the Congress has accused the Pentagon of incompetence and dissembling.

Whatever the accuracy of these charges and countercharges—and there is some merit in each view—the point is that the system has been partially at fault. Under annual budgeting, with the prime focus put only on the first outyear, neglect of the subsequent outyears made dissembling and incompetence easy to get away with; and micromanagement and yearly budget cutbacks necessary to do. If no one in the Congress took the budget future seriously, why should anyone in the Pentagon spend the time trying to be accurate about it? If no one in the Pentagon planned for the budget future seriously, then why should the Congress not alter innumerable individual items in the budget and cut them back in order to fit them into an affordable package? The Congress and the Pentagon had become locked into a cycle of mutually reinforcing patterns of behavior because these served each institution's respective political interests. But such patterns did not serve the interests of efficient resource allocation.

The Limits of Biennial Budgeting

Biennial budgeting per se will not eliminate these strategems of Pentagonal dissembling and congressional micromanaging; the political incentives for both are too powerful to eradicate. But biennial budgeting will make it more difficult to employ them as frequently and effectively as they were under annual budgeting. The Pentagon will always dissemble to a point, if that is the correct term; as is the case for all institutions that must budget, it always wants to do more than it has the resources to do. Because it will always strive to do more than it can afford, its budgets will always have a strain of optimism (or unrealism) to them. The Congress will always interfere in defense matters, if for no other reason than that there is a lot of constituent pork at stake. The spreading of defense dollars around the nation is too important politically to be left solely to the discretion of a non-elected defense officialdom.

Biennial budgeting, however, will tack against these strategems, because if they are to be credible, biennial defense budgets will require more truth in packaging. Longer-range planning is likely to be better, if only because better longer-range planning is both required and expected under biennial budgeting. The more realistic

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and coherent a budget the Pentagon puts together, the less likely the Congress is to alter it. The two thus go hand in hand: the degree of congressional interference hangs heavily on its gut sense of how well the department is being run. The greater its sense that the Pentagon is managing its affairs well, including its budgets, the less congressional interference there is likely to be. The Pentagon's top managers hoped that biennial budgeting would lead to less congressional micromanagement. Their not-too-hidden agenda for biennial budgeting was to get Congress off their backs. Only if biennial budgeting leads to more effective resource allocation within the Pentagon, however, is this likely to happen and then only to a degree. The annual cycle clearly made poor planning and unrealistic budgeting easier to engage in; the biennial cycle should make them harder to employ.

Biennial budgeting, therefore, is not a panacea and must not be viewed as such. Good procedures can never substitute for good ideas and in themselves can never guarantee good outcomes. But good procedures are not irrelevant to good outcomes. Bad procedures can subvert good ideas; good procedures can facilitate the gestation and implementation of good ideas. Because biennial budgeting is a beneficial procedure, it can add significantly to the other recent improvements in defense decision making. Taken together with the enhanced authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the greater involvement of the CINCs in resource allocation decisions, and with a tighter link between planning on the one hand and programming and budgeting on the other, biennial budgeting can free up the psychic energies of top managers and provide the time for them to do better planning and evaluation.

To the extent that biennial budgeting is a good procedure, it will aid the Pentagon in discovering what is the right thing to do. It will also help the Pentagon to implement it by translating strategy into the specific programs that support it. And, in the process, it will save money. In an era of huge fiscal deficits, ever-increasing claims on the federal budget, and constant or declining defense spending, that is essential.*

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The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution

CHARLES L. KADES

Unlike the constitution of the Empire of Japan, commonly called the Meiji Constitution after the Meiji emperor, the current Japanese constitution was not produced by an elite group of clan oligarchs and then octroyed or issued in 1889 by the emperor as a *fait accompli*. Neither was the current constitution produced by a learned constitutional commission or a national or constituent assembly convened as a result of a popular vote or otherwise selected for the purpose of drafting a constitution, submitting it to the electorate for ratification, with or without power to govern in the meantime, and then dissolving when and if the new constitution was approved by the electorate. On the contrary, the national legislature that adopted the current constitution consisted of one house chosen under the Meiji Constitution by direct popular vote and another house composed of nobles, peers, and persons appointed by the emperor and others elected by the biggest taxpayers. The legislature continued to sit with an equally obsolescent privy council for the primary purpose of enacting a series of vitally important statutes designed to conform the law codes of the land to the principles of the new fundamental law.

Men of letters, journalists, and one national commission of inquiry have concluded that the current constitution was imposed by the Americans upon the Japanese, and have condemned the constitutional process that was followed as coer-

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cive and undemocratic.[1] For example, such a scholarly historian as Ray A. Moore of Amherst College has written:

> In revising the constitution . . . SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers] committed flagrant violations of normal democratic procedure, imposed stringent controls on discussion and revision of the American draft, and intervened actively in the Japanese political process, all the while professing complete commitment to democratic principles. SCAP rejected Japanese efforts to rewrite their own constitution, ignored arguments that a new constitution, to be sound, should be based on achievements in democratic government since the Meiji period, and imposed radical ideas copied virtually verbatim from foreign constitutions that reflected personal concerns of their authors.[2]

This article merely revisits the extraordinary process by which the current constitution came into being and in the light of that process examines briefly why it has continued to exist without formal change. Nothing herein is not already known, but the circumstances are viewed by the somewhat different and possibly biased perspective of one who shared in the process.[3]

The Unilateral Making of the Model for a Constitution

In mid-July 1945, the American, British, and Soviet leaders met for the last of their World War II conferences in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam. It was President Harry Truman's first meeting with Marshal Joseph Stalin and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Churchill departed during the conference for the British general election and did not return because of the defeat of his Conservative Party; his

[1] See Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, *The New Japan* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), 94; Edward McWhinney, *Constitution-making: Principles, Process, Practice* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 62–64, 114; Kazuo Kawaii, ed., *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), chap. iv; *Japan's Commission on the Constitution, The Final Report*, John M. Maki, trans. and ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980), 375.

[2] Ray A. Moore, "Reflections on the Occupation of Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 38 (August 1979): 727.

[3] The pioneer account is Alfred R. Hussey, "The New Constitution of Japan," *The Political Reorientation of Japan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, undated but 1949), Sect. III. This official Report of the Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, September 1945 to September 1948 consists of two volumes with consecutively-numbered pages, vol. I to 399; vol. II contains documentary appendices. (Hereafter cited as PR.) Memoir accounts are Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), chap. 3; Alfred C. Oppler, *Legal Reform in Occupied Japan, A Participant Looks Back* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 5; and Justin Williams, Sr., *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur, A Participant's Account* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979), chaps. 6 & 7. Other revealing accounts by political scientists are Robert E. Ward, "The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution," *The American Political Science Review* 50 (December 1956): 980; Theodore H. McNelly, "'Induced Revolution': The Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Japan" in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 76; and "The Japanese Constitution: Child of the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 69 (June 1959): 176.

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place was taken by the new Prime Minister Clement Attlee. On 21 July, Truman learned that the test of an atomic bomb on 16 July had not only been successful but that it was even more powerful than had been expected and that it would soon be ready for use. On 26 July, Truman and Attlee, with the concurrence of the absent Chiang Kai-Shek – but without that of Stalin, because the USSR had not yet entered the war against Japan – set forth their terms for the surrender of Japan in the awesome document known as the Potsdam Declaration.

Constitutional Reform as an Occupation Objective

The stated purpose of the Potsdam Declaration was to eliminate the authority and influence of the old order in Japan that had misled the Japanese people into a war of conquest, with a view to establishing a new order of peace, security, and justice. Accordingly, the declaration required the Japanese government to "remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people" and to establish "freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for fundamental human rights." The declaration also stated that after the objectives of the declaration had been accomplished "and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government," occupying forces of the Allies would be withdrawn.[4]

On 29 August 1945 the U.S. government announced the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," a document approved by the president and drafted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, an interdepartmental group engaged in planning postwar policies for occupied areas. That policy declared

> The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are
>
> (a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.
>
> (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government [which]
>
> should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.[5]

About the middle of January the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) came to Tokyo. The commission, which had been organized in October 1945 under the auspices of the U.S. State Department, consisted of representatives of ten of the eleven nations that had been at war with Japan; the USSR had declined to

[4] Proclamation by Heads of Governments, United States, United Kingdom, and China, Paragraphs (6), (10), and (12), PR 413.

[5] Part I (a) and (b), PR 423.

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join. The FEAC was about to become the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), which had been created by the Moscow Agreement of 27 December 1945 between the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, and was to have its headquarters in Washington. The FEC included the Soviet Union as well as the ten members of the FEAC and acted by majority vote with the U.S., the U.K., the USSR, and China having the power to veto any action. The Moscow Agreement provided that the FEC would formulate "policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished" and it was entrusted with power to review "any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions" within its jurisdiction.[6]

At a meeting in Tokyo on 30 January 1946 with the FEAC, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), stated that it was his hope that whatever might be done about constitutional reform in Japan should be done in such a way as to permit the Japanese to look upon the resulting document as a Japanese product. He felt that only in this way could the work be permanent. He stated that it was his belief and conviction that a constitution, no matter how good or well-written, forced upon the Japanese by bayonet, would last just as long as bayonets were present. He was certain that the moment force was withdrawn and the Japanese left to their own devices, they would get rid of that constitution.[7] Thus, it is clear that MacArthur believed that he should not direct the specific constitutional reforms to be made, but that they should be initiated by the Japanese.

Nevertheless, MacArthur put a high priority on the revision of the Meiji Constitution. Less than six weeks after the signing of the Instrument of Surrender aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri* in Tokyo harbor, he initiated the process of constitutional reform. On 5 October 1945, the day after the issuance by SCAP of a civil liberties directive to the Japanese government,[8] the cabinet under Prince Higashikuni as prime minister resigned. Immediately after Baron Kijūrō Shidehara succeeded him as prime minister, MacArthur emphasized that reformation of the constitution was an essential prerequisite to compliance with the Potsdam Declaration. According to Theodore McNelly, professor of political science at the University of Maryland, MacArthur had earlier suggested on 4 October 1945 to Prince Fumimarō Konoe of the Higashikuni cabinet that he undertake constitutional reform.[9] Commander Alfred R. Hussey of SCAP's staff puts the date even earlier, saying that in September Prince Higashikuni was informed that MacArthur regarded revision of the Meiji Constitution as a "matter of first importance."[10]

[6] Agreement of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, Part A, PR 321.

[7] Memorandum by the Secretary General of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (U. Alexis Johnson) dated 30 January 1946, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. VIII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1986), 123.

[8] SCAPIN 93, PR 463.

[9] McNelly, "Induced Revolution" in Ward and Sakamoto, eds., *Democratizing Japan*, 77.

[10] Hussey, "New Constitution," PR 91.

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Unaware of either the approach to Higashikuni or to Konoe, I was informed of MacArthur's discussion with Shidehara, which became public on 11 October 1945, when MacArthur dispatched a "Statement" to the Japanese government, the first paragraph of which said:

> In the achievement of the Potsdam Declaration, the traditional social order under which the Japanese people for centuries have been subjugated will be corrected. *This will unquestionably involve a liberalization of the Constitution.*

The statement then gave examples of what "liberalization" meant. After saying that the Japanese people must be freed from "all forms of control which seek to suppress freedom of thought, freedom of speech or freedom of religion," the statement called for the "emancipation of the women of Japan through their enfranchisement," the "encouragement of the unionization of labor," the "opening of the schools to more liberal education," the "abolition of systems which through secret inquisition and abuse have held the people in constant fear," the "democratization of Japanese economic institutions to the end that monopolistic industrial controls be revised through the development of methods which tend to insure a wide distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade," and the "full employment in useful work of everyone."[11]

Constitutional Reform as a Government Section Function

The Government Section had been established as a special staff section in General Headquarters (GHQ) on 2 October 1945. Among its functions were to advise the Supreme Comander concerning policies pertaining to the structure of government in Japan, to make recommendations for the demilitarization and decentralization of the government and its subordinate agencies, and to eliminate feudal and totalitarian practices and those relationships between government and business that tended to continue the Japanese war potential and to hamper the achievement of occupation objectives.[12] Those duties were assigned to the Public Administration Division of which I was then the chief.[13] Lieutenant Colonel Milo E. Rowell, the judicial affairs officer of the division, was designated to examine Japanese governmental practices and to follow developments in the constitutional reform area. In the course of carrying out his responsibilities, Rowell wrote a memorandum dated 11 January 1945 in which he commented favorably on a draft of a new constitution that had been delivered to the Government Section by a private group called the *Kempō Kenkyūkai* (Constitutional Research Group). Rowell attached to his memorandum a Report of Preliminary Studies and Recommendations, which he had made the previous December concerning the operations of the Japanese government under the Meiji Constitution. In his report Rowell had pointed out the lack of effective rights of individuals, the existence of powerful

[11] Statement to Japanese Government, PR 741. (Emphasis added.)
[12] General Orders No. 8, Paragraphs 1 and 3, PR 796.
[13] Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, Para. 2, PR 804.

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extra-constitutional bodies exercising important governmental functions, the executive's usurpation of legislative functions, the lack of an independent judiciary, and other major defects in the Meiji Constitution.[14]

During this period the Public Administration Division of the Government Section had many problems on its platter. It was concentrating on securing the governmental and administrative separation of Japan from areas such as Korea and Formosa and the Pacific islands over which it had formerly exercised jurisdiction; in ending the relationships between Japan and representatives of neutral nations in Japan; in defining "neutral nations," "enemy nations," and classifying nations whose status changed as a result of the war; in dissolving militaristic, ultranationalist, and secret patriotic societies; in preparing directives for the removal and exclusion from public office of exponents of militaristic nationalism and influential members of the secret societies; in devising procedures for the screening of all candidates for public office in the upcoming election of members of the House of Representatives that MacArthur authorized and that the Japanese had then scheduled for the end of March; in collaborating with the Home Ministry in drafting a revision of the election law for submission to the Diet that would apply to the campaigns of candidates for the House of Representatives and to the forthcoming election; in preparing studies of the organization of internal civil government at the national, prefectural, and local levels and of proposals for the reorganization of their interrelationships; in reviewing plans for the dissolution of massive private holding companies; in abolishing all military and certain civil ministries, such as the Ministry of Greater East Asia; and in general supervising the activities of Japanese national government agencies. Hence, since constitutional revision had been entrusted by MacArthur to the Japanese government, it was not considered a Government Section priority. Moreover, during this period, notwithstanding daily contact between the Japanese ministries and the Government Section, no proposal for amendment of the Meiji Constitution was ever submitted formally or informally to the Government Section by any Japanese governmental body, as distinguished from political parties and private academic groups.[15] The subject of what to do about the Meiji constitution was, however, assigned to a skeleton-staffed planning group of the Government Section headed by Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Hays, a Wyoming National Guard cavalry officer and a lawyer in civilian life. Shortly after Brigadier General Courtney Whitney assumed command of the Government Section in December 1945, he merged the planning group into the rest of the Public Administration Division of the section and this preliminary work ceased.

In response to a question asked by Tomas Confesor, the Phillipine representa-

[14] For Rowell's report and memorandum, see Kenzō Takayanagi, Ichirō Ōhtomo, and Hideo Tanaka, *The Making of the Constitution of Japan* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1972), Vol. I (Documents) at 2 and 26, respectively. (hereafter cited as TOT).

[15] For a rationale of the lack of consultation, see Tanaka Hideo, "The Conflict between Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution of Japan" in Ward and Sakamoto, eds., *Democratizing Japan*, 119 and note 48 at 130.

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tive on the FEAC at a meeting between FEAC representatives and a few Government Section officers in Tokyo on 17 January 1946, I stated that the Government Section considered constitutional amendments to be "a long range problem concerning fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure which is within the province of your Commission." Later in the meeting, Confesor said to me that he did not understand "why constitutional revision is not part of your work." The next day Whitney sent to MacArthur an excerpt of the FEAC meeting including Confesor's remarks.

Whitney's February 1 Memorandum on Constitutional Reform

Possibly because of the criticism of SCAP, which could be inferred from Confesor's questions and remarks, about a week after the FEAC meeting Whitney directed me to prepare a memorandum for Whitney's signature on the extent of MacArthur's power as supreme commander to deal with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure. MacArthur himself expressed to the FEAC at a 30 January meeting with the members in Tokyo his own doubts concerning the scope of his power after the establishment of the FEC pursuant to the Moscow Agreement. Because of the myriad activities the Government Section was engaged in and the lack of any official Japanese approach to the staff on constitutional reform, the memorandum opinion on that subject was not completed until 30 January. By sheer coincidence, the same day MacArthur unbeknownst to me was meeting the FEAC. On that day at Whitney's direction the memorandum was shown separately to the three officers in the Government Section, other than Whitney and me, who had been lawyers in civilian life. Those officers—Hays of the Wyoming bar, Rowell of the California bar, and Hussey of the Massachusetts bar—spent that day and evening reviewing the memorandum and the underlying documents and on 31 January said they concurred in the opinion. The following morning Whitney had the memorandum retyped to insert a new last paragraph to state their concurrence and to date it 1 February 1946. Whitney then approved the memorandum and took it to MacArthur personally. The memorandum concluded with the opinion that at the time MacArthur had the

> unrestricted authority to take any action you deem proper in effecting changes in the Japanese constitutional structure—the only possible restriction being upon action taken by you toward removal of the Emperor, in which case you are required to consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, Whitney's memorandum also concluded that if the FEC should in the future issue a policy decision dealing with constitutional reform, MacArthur's decision would not then be "controlling" if a member of the Allied Council for Japan objected to his directive.[16] (The Allied Council for Japan, which sat in Tokyo, was an advisory group established by the Moscow Agreement which consisted of

[16] Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, PR 622.

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representatives of the United States, the British Commonwealth, the USSR, and China.)[17]

The opinion expressed in the memorandum was based on two separate sources of MacArthur's authority. One source was the Allied Powers—the United States, the U.K., the USSR, and China. The designation of MacArthur as supreme commander for the Allied Powers empowered him "to take such steps as you deem proper to effectuate the surrender terms." To comply with the Instrument of Surrender by the terms of which Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration[18] required fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure.[19] The other source was the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff under whose directive of 6 September 1945 MacArthur was to carry out his "mission" as he deemed "proper."[20] The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive of 3 November 1945 to SCAP also described his mission in terms of carrying out measures that implicitly, if not explicitly, contemplated revision of the Meiji Constitution.[21]

The Matsumoto Committee's Tentative Plan

The process of constitutional reform accelerated quickly that weekend. By another coincidence on the same day that Whitney submitted his 1 February memorandum to MacArthur, a Tokyo newspaper published what purported to be The Tentative Plan of the Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee. The Investigation Committee, usually referred to as the Matsumoto Committee after its chairman, State Minister Joji Matsumoto, had been created under the Cabinet by Prime Minister Shidehara in mid-October after MacArthur had told him that constitutional reform was necessary.

Saturday, 2 February, was a busy day. In the morning Whitney sent a translation of the so-called Tentative Plan to MacArthur with critical notes in the margin[22] and a brief memorandum stating in part:

> This draft is extremely conservative in character and leaves substantially unchanged the status of the Emperor with all rights of sovereignty vested in him. For this reason (along with others), the draft was poorly received by the press and the public.[23]

A storm of protest followed the publication of the Tentative Plan because of the superficial changes in the Meiji Constitution. A virtual flood of unfavorable editorials, letters to the editor, and press releases of opposition political parties engulfed the Cabinet, which finally issued an official denial that the purported amendments as published represented the final work of the Matsumoto Committee.

[17] Agreement of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, Part B, PR 442.
[18] Instrument of Surrender, sixth para., PR 419.
[19] Potsdam Declaration, para. (10) and (12).
[20] Cable from Joint Chiefs of Staff approved by the President, PR 427.
[21] JCS 1380/15, PR 428.
[22] Tentative plan with marginal notes, PR 611.
[23] Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, TOT 40.

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The chief secretary of the Cabinet, however, conceded at a press conference that the plan might be that of one of the members of the committee.

On that Saturday morning, the Foreign Office asked that a meeting with Whitney, which Foreign Minister Yoshida had scheduled for the following Tuesday, 5 February, to discuss the Matsumoto committee's proposal be postponed; Whitney agreed to postpone it until the following week. On Saturday afternoon, after reading the Tentative Plan and the marginal notes, MacArthur directed Whitney to have a memorandum prepared by the Government Section rejecting the published Tentative Plan and explaining in detail the reasons for the rejection. This should be handed to Yoshida and Matsumoto at the postponed meeting. Later, the Foreign Office delivered to GHQ a document entitled "Gist of the Revision of the Constitution" accompanied by a paper called "General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision Drafted by the Government."[24] The Gist and the General Explanation confirmed that the so-called Tentative Plan published in the newspaper on Friday was substantially accurate and that the proposed revision made only cosmetic changes in the Meiji Constitution. For example, the Gist provided in its first paragraph: "Article 3 which now reads: 'The Emperor is sacred and inviolable' shall be changed to 'the Emperor is supreme and inviolable.'"

The MacArthur/Whitney Notes

About noon on Sunday, 3 February, Whitney informed Hussey (chief of the Government Section's Governmental Powers Branch and the duty officer that day) that MacArthur had come to the conclusion that instead of delivering to the Japanese the memorandum rejecting the Matsumoto Committee's proposals, a more effective way to convey to the Japanese government the fundamental nature of the constitutional revision required by the Allied Powers would be to prepare a model for a constitution embodying basic principles acceptable to the Allied Powers. Therefore, MacArthur had directed Whitney to have the Government Section draft a model for a constitution to be handed to Yoshida and Matsumoto for their consideration at the meeting which the Japanese had postponed to the following week. Hussey immediately informed me, and I went with Hussey and Rowell to Whitney's office on Sunday afternoon. Whitney handed me a legal-size sheet of green-lined yellow paper on which were handwritten, in pencil, notes that Whitney said were to be used as the basis for the model for a constitution. The pencilled notes were then typewritten; a copy of the typewritten notes follows:

I

Emperor is at the head of the state.

His succession is dynastic.

His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsibe [sic; responsible? or responsive?] to the basic will of the people as provided therein.

[24] Gist, PR 617, and General Explanation, PR 619.

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II

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.

III

The feudal system of Japan will cease.

No rights of peerage except those of the Imperial family will extend beyond the lives of those now existent.

No patent of nobility will from this time forth embody within itself any National or Civic power of government.

Pattern budget after British system.

Although Whitney did not say so, I assumed that the notes had been written by MacArthur personally or dictated by MacArthur to Whitney. Their handwriting was very similar. But it is quite possible, as McNelly has pointed out, that the ideas had originated with Whitney, who wrote the notes and then obtained MacArthur's assent to them.[25]

Possibly the most frequently asked question concerning the Constitution is, who conceived the idea of Point II of the notes positing the renunciation of war and armament as part of the new constitution?

No one knows the answer. It could have been the emperor. In his Imperial Rescript of 1 January 1946 denying his divinity, the emperor proclaimed "we will construct a new Japan through thoroughly being pacific."[26] And in commenting on the Rescript, MacArthur said: "A sound idea cannot be stopped."[27]

It could have been Prime Minister Shidehara, who worked with the emperor in drafting the Imperial Rescript and later indicated it was his idea. MacArthur also testified and wrote that Shidehara suggested to him the inclusion of some such provision. It could have been MacArthur or Whitney, whoever was the author of the pencilled notes.

McNelly has explored the mystery in great depth and pointed out discrepancies in MacArthur's accounts.[28] I have nothing to add to McNelly's exploration except this anecdote. Near the end of the occupation a high-ranking Japanese official asked the same question concerning the source of the constitutional renunciation. A high-ranking American official replied, "*Before* the Korean War the author was *our* old man. *After* the Korean War the author was *your* old man." This may be as close to the truth as will ever be known. But what better way to assure that,

[25] McNelly, "Induced Revolution" in Ward and Sakamoto, eds., *Democratizing Japan*, 79.

[26] Rescript, PR 470.

[27] MacArthur's "Comment," PR 471.

[28] McNelly, "General Douglas MacArthur and the Constitutional Disarmament of Japan" in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Third Series (Tokyo, 1982), VII, 1.

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in the words of the U.S. Statement of Post-Surrender Policy, "Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world"?

The Drafters of the Model for a Constitution

On Sunday evening Hussey, Rowell, and I planned how to proceed the next day. It was decided that we three would be a Steering Committee and that the rest of the Government Section would be divided into seven committees—on the legislative; civil rights; the judiciary; the executive; local government; finance; and on the emperor, treaties, and miscellaneous affairs. Each committee would be charged with drafting the portion of the model constitution pertaining to the assigned subject. While drafting, each committee would have access to the Steering Committee to discuss problems that would undoubtedly arise. Upon completion of its draft each committee would submit it in the form of a report to the Steering Committee for review and integration into a single document.

Five of the sixteen officers on duty had been lawyers in civilian life, as mentioned above: Whitney, Hays, Hussey, Rowell, and me. Commander Guy J. Swope had been consecutively a congressman, governor of Puerto Rico, and director of the Interior Department's division of territories and insular possessions. Navy Lieutenant Osborne Hauge had been editor and publisher of a chain of weekly newspapers in North Dakota and public relations officer for the Norwegian embassy in Washington. Hays, Swope and Hauge served on the legislative committee.

Lieutenant Colonel Pieter Roest, who headed the civil rights committee, and Lieutenant Colonel Cecil Tilton, who headed the local government committee, were both university faculty members, the former a social sciences chairman and the latter in a graduate business school. Lieutenant Commander Roy L. Malcolm, a civilian intelligence specialist, assisted Tilton on the local government committee.

Major Frank Rizzo, later chief of the Government Section under General Matthew Ridgway, had been a partner in a Wall Street investment firm and National Securities Dealers Association executive regulating the over-the-counter stock market; he was the sole member of the finance committee.

Navy Lieutenant Richard Poole, a foreign service officer, headed the committee on the emperor, treaties, etc.; Lieutenant George Nelson, a recent college graduate, assisted him. First Lieutenant Milton J. Esman, a Princeton University Ph.D. and ex-staff member of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, and Dr. Cyrus Peake, a university professor who edited a scholarly journal on the Far East, constituted the committee on the executive; and First Lieutenants Joseph Gordon and I. Hershkowitz were interpreters.

Of the seven civilians in the Government Section besides Peake, Harry Emerson Wildes, who had been a literary editor of a metropolitan newspaper and an author, and Beate Sirota, who had been a resident of Japan since childhood and had served in the Office of War Information, were members with Roest of the civil rights committee. Of the remaining five civilians, who were government re-

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search analysts, Ruth Ellerman was designated to record the Steering Committee meetings and the other four were assigned to the various committees. Hussey volunteered to draft the preamble and worked with Rowell on the judiciary committee; and Point II of the Notes was reworked by me.

Drafting the Goverment Section's Model

On Monday morning, 4 February, Whitney approved the Steering Committee's plan and called a meeting of all personnel of the Government Section at which he informed them of MacArthur's decision. Having in mind his upcoming meeting with Yoshida and Matsumoto on Wednesday, 13 February, originally arranged to discuss the Matsumoto Committee's proposals, Whitney asked that a draft be completed by the end of the week.

The Steering Committee charged each committee with the responsibility of conforming its draft to the general principles set forth in a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's statement of policy entitled "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System" (SWNCC 228), a copy of which was available in the Government Section.

The typed copies of the notes that Whitney had given the Steering Committee were then distributed for the guidance of the committees, which were requested to follow the format of the Meiji Constitution as closely as would be consistent with the changes each committee would recommend.

During the week of drafting, many differences arose among members of the same committee and between committees when they submitted their respective reports and the Steering Committee, which redrafted many provisions and integrated all of them. The members of the Steering Committee also had differences of opinion on various subjects. With the help of Whitney, the differences were resolved.

Six days later, on Sunday, 10 February, a draft was submitted by Whitney to MacArthur. On Monday afternoon MacArthur, who with Whitney had previously reviewed each of the eleven chapters as they were completed, approved the document as a whole. MacArthur deleted a prohibition against any future amendment that would alter the chapter on the rights and duties of the people. MacArthur approved, however, an article (now Article 97) that Whitney had personally written, which provided:

> The fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age old struggle of man to be free; they . . . are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.

On Tuesday, 12 February, the Steering Committee made a few textual amendments to the draft MacArthur had approved; and later that day Whitney transmitted the revised draft, together with an explanatory summary, to MacArthur who that same night authorized submitting both to the Japanese government at the meeting the next day.

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Sources of the Model for a Constitution

It should be emphasized that the Government Section did not draft the model constitution in one week from scratch; by no means was the draft a Pantagruel emerging full grown from a Gargantuan Government Section. Quite the contrary: Japanese sources were most useful. Used to good advantage were outlines of draft constitutions that had been published by the Progressive, Liberal, and Socialist Parties; and other draft revisions which had been prepared by private groups and individuals—such as that of the Constitutional Research Group headed by Iwasaburo Takanō, Tsunego Baba, and Tatsuo Morito on which Rowell had written his 11 January memorandum and also the *Kempō Kondankai*, or Constitutional Discussion Group, headed by the venerable Yukio Ozaki, who had been elected to every House of Representatives from the first one convened in 1890. Although it has been said that the decision to introduce judicial review in the Constitution of 1946 "appears to be a fairly direct response to the pressures and counsel of the American military occupation officials,"[29] not only Ozaki's Constitutional Discussion Group but also the Progressive Party proposed a specific constitutional statement vesting in a court the power of judicial review. The Constitutional Research Group and various lawyers' groups, as well as the Liberal and Socialist Parties, all supported the principle of an independent judiciary.[30] In addition to the availability of various indigenous drafts, Lieutenant Esman and Beate Sirota separately collected from various libraries in Tokyo constitutions of about a dozen other countries.

Drawing on all these sources as well as their remembrance of state constitutions, the paradigm for a new constitution of Japan did not follow in the footsteps of the Founding Fathers of the U.S. Constitution. Rather it beat a new path in the direction of a Japanese constitutional structure consistent with Japanese liberal traditions, which had persisted throughout the more than six decades that followed the founding of the *Kaishinto* or Reform Party by Yukio Ozaki and his colleagues in 1881. Not only the Reform Party, but also the *Jiyuto* or Liberal Party founded in 1882, adhered to the principle that "all men ought to be equal in respect of their rights" and drew inspiration from the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.[31] It is sometimes forgotten that the Japanese, though homogeneous in their physical characteristics, have heterogeneous ideas; and it was the Japanese intellectual successors to their democratically inclined leaders of the nineteenth century who

[29] McWhinney, *Constitution-making*, 116.

[30] Daniel J. Danelski, "The Constitutional and Legislative Phases of the Creation of the Japanese Supreme Court" in Proceedings of Symposium, *The Occupation of Japan: Impact of Legal Reform* (Norfolk, Va.: The MacArthur Memorial, 1977), 27.

[31] See Karl Kiyoski Kawakami, *The Political Ideas of Modern Japan* (Iowa City, 1903); and Arthur Hyde Lay, *A Brief Sketch of the History of Political Parties in Japan* (Tokyo, 1902), both reprinted in *Japan Studies* (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1979), 116.

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contributed many of the concepts which under MacArthur's and Whitney's leadership became principles embodied in the new constitution. Not entirely a voluntary enactment, the Constitution of 1946 was a product of Potsdam, prodding by MacArthur and Whitney, and pressures emanating from forward-looking Japanese political leaders, the press, and academicians; neither potential force nor covert coercion brought about the metamorphosis of the Government Section's model into the current constitution. After the initial phase of the drafting process described above, the revised constitution became the creation of a joint enterprise of Japanese and Americans working together under the inauspicious circumstances of a foreign occupation to establish a political and social system which could be the prelude to a treaty of peace.

The Bilateral Making of the Japanese Constitution

On 13 February, Whitney, accompanied by the Steering Committee, met on the sun porch at the official residence of the foreign minister with Yoshida, Jiro Shirasu (Yoshida's personal assistant), Matsumoto, and Genkichi Hasegawa of the Foreign Ministry. Whitney began by saying, "The draft of constitutional revision, which you submitted to us the other day, is wholly unacceptable to the supreme commander as a document of freedom and democracy." He continued that the supreme commander had directed him to present a document that he had approved and that in the supreme commander's opinion embodied principles that the situation in Japan demanded. After handing copies of the document to the Japanese officials, the Americans went outside to the garden while the Japanese read the Government Section's model for a constitution. About an hour later they were asked to return to the sun porch.

American Version of Whitney's Remarks

Matsumoto stated that he had read and understood the draft, but that it was so vastly different from his commitee's draft that he could not comment on it before he consulted Prime Minister Shidehara. According to a memorandum written immediately after the meeting by Hussey and signed by all three members of the Steering Committee, Whitney then said:

> As you may or may not know, the supreme commander has been unyielding in his defense of your Emperor against increasing pressure from the outside to render him subject to war criminal investigation. He has thus defended the Emperor because he considered that that was the cause of right and justice, and will continue along that course to the extent of his ability. But, gentlemen, the Supreme Commander is not omnipotent. He feels, however, that acceptance of the provisions of this new Constitution would render the Emperor practically unassailable. He feels that it would bring much closer the day of your freedom from control by the Allied Powers, and that it would provide your people with the essential freedom which the Allied Powers demand in their behalf.

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General Whitney also emphasized that the supreme commander did not *require* the Japanese government to adopt the SCAP *draft* and present it to the people; but he did want the *principles* underlying the draft laid before the people and that, if the Japanese government did not do this, then MacArthur would. "The Supreme Commander is determined that this constitutional issue shall be brought before the people well in advance of the general election and that they shall have full opportunity freely to express their will on constitutional reform." Whitney and the Steering Committee left the meeting after reiterating that "the principles enunciated in this document provide a basis for free democratic government in Japan and for carrying out the terms of the Potsdam Declaration."[32]

It has been asserted that those who recorded Whitney's remarks "were ashamed of the methods employed" by Whitney, in particular, his "threats against the Emperor—against the man—not just the institution—which Hussey in 1958 still wanted Kades and Rowell to conceal from the Japanese Commission on the Constitution."[33] However, upon learning that Matsumoto had interpreted Whitney's words as a threat against the Emperor's person, Rowell did make the "Record of Events on 13 February 1946" available to Japan's Commission on the Constitution.[34]

After reviewing that memorandum and receiving statements from both Matsumoto and Whitney, the noted constitutional scholar, Kenzō Takayanagi, who was the chairman of the commission, concluded that "Whitney's real intention at that critical meeting was to refer plainly and objectively to the grim international situation."[35] Takayanagi's conclusion is supported by memoranda prepared contemporaneously by two other Japanese officials present at the meeting, neither of which makes any mention of any threat against the safety or the person of the emperor.

Two Japanese Versions of Whitney's Remarks

The memorandum by Jiro Shirasu, dated in the margin the same day as the meeting at which he was present, summarizes Whitney's words as follows:

a. The Japanese Government draft has been rejected as "totally unacceptable."

b. The SCAP draft is "acceptable" to all the Allied Nations and to SCAP.

c. *This draft is not being forced on Japan.*

d. The United States believes the Japanese people want this draft.

[32] "Record of Events on 13 February 1946," TOT 320.

[33] Meiron and Susan Harries, *Sheathing the Sword* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 93.

[34] Hideo Tanaka, *Introduction*, TOT xvii.

[35] Maki, trans. & ed., *Japan's Commission on the Constitution*, 76.

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e. *SCAP has supported the Emperor.* This draft supports the Emperor and is the only way for protecting the Emperor *system* from those opposing the Emperor.

f. It is better if the Japanese conservatives moved far to the left.[36]

The memorandum by Genkichi Hasegawa, who was also present, summarizes Whitney's words as follows:

> Whitney said the Japanese draft was totally unacceptable and submitted the SCAP draft. After reading the SCAP draft, Matsumoto said it was quite different from the Japanese draft and he could give no answer until after he had consulted the other Cabinet Members.
>
> *Whitney said neither the form nor contents were being forced on Japan*, but pointed out that General MacArthur had gone to a great deal of trouble *to protect the Emperor* in the face of strong opposition within the United States. He said he believed the SCAP draft met the wishes of the Japanese people.[37]

In 1956, Robert E. Ward appeared to accept Matsumoto's interpretation of Whitney's words,[38] but he had not seen either Shirasu's or Hasegawa's memoranda which were not released by the Japanese government until 1976. Nor were Whitney's letter or Takayanagi's conclusion then available to him as they were to Meiron and Susan Harries in 1987. It is utterly unbelievable that two Japanese officials, both fluent in English, would have failed to mention a threat against the person or safety of their emperor—"against the man"—if in fact it had been made. Their versions corroborate completely the American version of the 13 February meeting.

What Whitney knew then, and what presumably the Japanese did not know, was the fact that on 30 November 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed MacArthur in a classified cable that the emperor was not immune from indictment as a war criminal. They requested evidence in order that a decision could be reached whether the emperor should stand trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. What Whitney also knew, but presumably not the Japanese, was the fact that two weeks before the meeting, in a 25 January classified cable to the Joint Chiefs, MacArthur had taken a strong position against putting the emperor on trial. Whitney also knew, and perhaps the Japanese, that the very influential Senator Richard Russell of Georgia had introduced a Joint Resolution in the U.S. Senate declaring that "it is the policy of the United States that Emperor Hirohito of Japan be tried as a war criminal."[39] What Whitney did was encapsulate those facts for the information of the Japanese into a reference to the unremitting pressure from outside Japan to render the emperor subject to "war criminal investigation." In essence, Whitney was advising the Japanese as a lawyer would advise his client about a serious risk the client might be running if he rejected the advice.

[36] Japanese archival document reproduced in English in *Asahi Evening News*, (Tokyo), 31 May 1976. (Emphasis added.)

[37] Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

[38] Ward, "The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, *The American Political Science Review* 50 (December 1956): 980.

[39] U.S. Senate, Sen. Resol. 94, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 91 Cong. Rec. 8680 (1945).

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The Cabinet's Resistance to Revision

Two days after the 13 February meeting, Shirasu wrote Whitney that the American way to achieve an objective was too "straight and direct" for the Japanese, whose way must be "roundabout, twisted and narrow."[40] Whitney responded the following day:

> those who sponsor the principles as stated by the Supreme Commander in the referenced document do so with his firm support. . . . With that support they can be assured that the objectives can be reached promptly and directly and without either adverse effect upon the orderly processes of civil government nor dislocation in the lives of the people.[41]

Still undeterred, Matsumoto sent Whitney a letter dated 18 February enclosing a "Supplementary Explanation concerning the Constitutional Revision" which was brought that afternoon to Whitney by Shirasu.[42] The Supplementary Explanation reviewed the making of the Weimar Constitution after World War I and its "disastrous consequences"; the centuries-long development of the common law of England; the failure of presidential democracies in Latin America; the differences in the civil codes of France and Germany, notwithstanding that both were based on Roman law, and in their constitutions, notwithstanding that both were patterned on the English parliamentary system. Matsumoto declared that "the arbitrary transplantation of a constitutional system unadapted to the condition and circumstance of the nation concerned" was bound to fail, just as some "roses of the West, when cultivated in Japan, lose their fragrance totally." He protested that "the new constitution is a tablet sugar-coated for the benefit of the masses" and that the transfer of the sovereign powers of the emperor to the Diet was "'revolutionary' in a way." He expressed his fear that "the internal friction which may be brought on by an attempt at too sudden and too drastic a move . . . may beget reactionarism [sic] and in the end retard the smooth and wholesome progress of democracy."[43]

In response Whitney told Shirasu, after asking Shirasu to read Matsumoto's letter, that the Supplementary Explanation was a repetitious defense of Matsumoto's draft of constitutional changes. Unless the Cabinet accepted the principles of the draft constitution within forty-eight hours MacArthur would "take the constitution to the people directly and make it a live issue in the forthcoming [election] campaign in order that the people will have the opportunity to enact the constitution."[44]

The next day Shirasu called upon Whitney to say that the Cabinet requested a forty-eight hour extension, because a complete translation was not yet available to the Cabinet. Whitney granted this, even though he doubted Shirasu's statement

[40] PR 624.
[41] TOT 342.
[42] TOT 352.
[43] TOT 356–363.
[44] Memorandum for the Record, TOT 366 at 368.

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that this was the first time the 13 February model had been placed before the entire Cabinet.[45] On the afternoon of 21 February, the day before the extended time limit Whitney had given the Cabinet to decide whether it would sponsor the principles of the 13 February model, Shidehara called upon MacArthur. That evening Whitney recommended that MacArthur consider directing Shidehara to put the question to the emperor for his decision.[46] Whether MacArthur followed Whitney's advice is not known. But according to Wataru Narahashi, the chief secretary of the Cabinet, at a meeting with the emperor the next morning, 22 February, at which Shidehara, Yoshida, and Narahashi were present, the emperor gave his "unqualified approval" to the "democratic plan," as Narahashi called the model.[47] On that afternoon Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu came to Whitney's office and Whitney called in the Steering Committee for the ensuing discussion.

Matsumoto began by making another attempt to dispose of the 13 February draft by saying that, although there were "no objections to the basic principles" of the Government Section's draft, it would be preferable to use the existing constitution as the basis for revision. Whitney replied that the course had been considered but it had been decided that "the meaning can be better expressed if an entirely new Constitution is written." Whitney agreed to consider a bicameral Diet, instead of the unicameral assembly that the model constitution provided for and which, Whitney had told the Steering Committee, MacArthur favored. However, Whitney cautioned, both houses of the national legislature must then be elected by popular vote, though one house might be elected indirectly—such as by the prefectural assemblies, if those assemblies were elected directly by the people. Matsumoto objected to the final article of the model that the constitution "shall be established when ratified by the Diet by roll-call vote of two-thirds of the members present." Whitney agreed, "We will strike out our Article 92, if you like. Our only concern is getting this document before the people."

Whitney could not have made plainer to the Japanese present that the sole issue was whether the Cabinet or the supreme commander would put the principles before the people. The discussion covered other subjects, among which were the form of the preamble, whether the renunciation of war and arms should be included in it, the removal of the autonomy of the imperial household, and whether the enumeration of civil rights was necessary. At the end of the meeting, Yoshida requested that "perfect secrecy" be observed and Whitney acceded. Whitney then pressed Matsumoto for a Japanese version to be presented by the end of February.[48]

The Marathon Drafting Session

On 4 March, a draft in Japanese only was brought to the Government Section by State Minister Matsumoto and Tatsuo Sato, vice director of the Cabinet's Legis-

[45] Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, TOT 370.
[46] Memorandum for the Supreme Commander, TOT 376.
[47] Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, TOT 404.
[48] Minutes of Meeting of 22 February 1946, TOT 380.

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lation Bureau (who had helped draft the Matsumoto proposals), and four or five other Japanese.

Beginning between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning, the Steering Committee plus a few members of the Government Section who could read and speak Japanese met with Matsumoto, Sato, and the others. Discrepancies between the Japanese draft while it was being translated at the meeting and the model for a constitution, particularly in the provisions regarding the emperor, were called to Matsumoto's attention.[49] Perhaps in exasperation at the Americans' questioning of the use of Japanese words with nuances of subservience to the emperor, Matsumoto left the meeting rather precipitously early in the afternoon. When he did not return, the Japanese who remained were informed that no one else should leave until a mutually acceptable rough draft of a constitution in English and Japanese was completed. The session continued (with recesses of a few minutes each) throughout the night of 4 March and all the next day until about five o'clock in the evening of 5 March, when a seemingly satisfactory document in both languages was finished. As each of the eleven chapters had been completed, it had been sent simultaneously to Matsumoto and to MacArthur and Whitney who were standing by in MacArthur's office. MacArthur approved the document as a whole late the night of 5 March. The following afternoon the Japanese Cabinet published the Japanese text, which was described as an "Outline Draft of a Revised Constitution."[50] MacArthur announced the same evening that it had his "full approval."[51]

One reason for the urgency was that on 12 January MacArthur had authorized the Japanese to hold a general election for members of the House of Representatives. The Japanese had fixed the date of the election for the last week in March (later postponed to 10 April.) MacArthur hoped that a joint draft would be published as far as possible in advance of the election, so that the election would be in effect a plebiscite on a new constitution containing principles acceptable to MacArthur. Another reason may have been that once the FEC organized and became an operating body, the veto power vested in the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and China might be used by any one of those powers to frustrate the approval of any proposed constitution.

On 14 March the Cabinet announced that soon after the election a draft of a revised constitution would be submiited to a special session of the Diet. On 15 April 1946, five days after the election, the chief secretary of the Cabinet, Narahashi, brought to the Government Section such a draft in Japanese with a certified copy in English.[52] Two days later the Cabinet sent to the Privy Council a Bill for the Revision of the Constitution embodying that draft. An examination committee of the Council then began a series of eleven meetings, beginning on 22 April. On 8 June the Council at a plenary session attended by the emperor approved

[49] "First Government Draft of Constitution," PR 625. (English translation).
[50] "Second Government Draft of Constitution (Cabinet Draft)," PR 631. (English translation.)
[51] Announcement, PR 657.
[52] "Third Government Draft of Constitution," PR 637. (English translation.)

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for submission to the Diet the bill with several amendments.[53] Some of the amendments resulted from representations that had been made by the Government Section.

The Language Gulf

In reviewing the 17 April Privy Council Bill, the Government Section noticed that, though the English translation remained almost the same as the 6 March Cabinet Outline, in some instances different Japanese words had been substituted for those agreed upon at the all day/all night/all day session of 4–5 March. Rizzo, Gordon, and I met with Sato and a few assistants. We pointed out the discrepancies, which Sato attributed to using colloquial Japanese and discarding archaic words, the use of which the press had criticized. Although we too favored using colloquial Japanese, the colloquial ideographs had connotations inconsistent with the concepts accepted at the 4–5 March meeting. For example, to express the "advice and approval" required by Article 3 as a condition precedent for all "acts of the emperor in matters of state," it was manifest from the Japanese term that the Cabinet's function amounted to something less than an authorization for the emperor to act.

It was crucial that the emperor's role under the new constitution should be clear and unambiguous. Under the Meiji Constitution it had not been. Many Japanese constitutional lawyers, including Matsumoto and Sato, maintained that the emperor was powerless to act except by virtue of and pursuant to the advice of his ministers. Others maintained the emperor was an organ of government whose powers had been usurped by clan, oligarchic, and militaristic cliques. Apparently the Japanese government had not viewed him as an impotent figurehead. In its so-called qualified acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on 10 August, rejected by implication the next day by the Allied reply, the Japanese had stated their readiness to accept the declaration "upon the understanding that the said [Potsdam] declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."[54] Any notion that the emperor retained residual sovereign power to rule would have vitiated the underlying purpose of constitutional revision and returned the process to Matsumoto's original proposals in February.[55] Accordingly, it was agreed that the Privy Council would amend the Bill for Revision to use colloquial words not susceptible to equivocation. Nevertheless, new and other problems of language clarity arose during the debates in both the House of Representatives and the House of Peers. Those problems were resolved

[53] Minutes of the Privy Council, 8 June 1946, at 18 (typescript English translation supplied me as routine information, hereafter referred to as "English typescript").

[54] PR 414. For Allied reply, see PR 415.

[55] For a survey of the development of the imperial institution in Japan and the different views concerning its place in the political spectrum during successive periods of Japanese history, see McNelly, "The Role of Monarchy in the Political Modernization of Japan," *Comparative Politics* 1 (April 1969): 366; see also Alfred C. Oppler, Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, discussing powers of the emperor and the Diet with regards to constitutional amendments and national polity after acceptance of Potsdam Declaration, PR 662.

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in a friendly atmosphere, even though a military occupation is by its nature coercive. It cannot be gainsaid that the ultimate choice of words and phrases was left to the Japanese, who may have well believed that receptivity would accelerate their regaining the independence for which they had to wait six more years.

After the Privy Council acted, the emperor on 20 June sent it to the Diet in accordance with his exclusive power under Article LXXIII of the Meiji Constitution to initiate amendments.[56] Had it not been for Whitney's wide decision to omit from the "model" at Matsumoto's request at the 22 February meeting the article on ratification, legal continuity of the new with the old constitution might have otherwise been breached.

Deliberations in the Diet

As soon as the proposed new constitution was submitted to the Diet, MacArthur issued a statement declaring that it was imperative that the people of Japan, acting through their elected representatives, now determine the form and content of the fundamental charter of their existence "whether it be adopted, modified, or rejected" and that:

> In the course of legislative action upon this matter, it is incumbent upon the Diet that it assure to all members the free, fair and untrammelled right of discussion and debate, and that it give thoughtful consideration to every suggestion offered by its membership, regardless of strength or party affiliation.[57]

On 28 June the Speaker of the House of Representatives (where the Constitutional Revision Bill had been introduced on June 25) appointed a committee of seventy members, which in turn later organized a fourteen-member subcommittee. Almost all members of the full committee attended the twenty meetings it held between 28 June and 23 July. The same was true of the subcommittee, which met thirteen times from 23 July to 20 August. In addition, the House sat in ten plenary sessions to discuss the Revision Bill.

Amendments to the Model for a Constitution

Many amendments were proposed while the Revision Bill was being considered by both the subcommittee and the larger special committee; and after the bill was reported to the House some thirty-odd amendments were adopted. At least two

[56] Article LXXIII of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan provides: "When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.

"In the above case, neither House can open debate, unless not less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members present is obtained." PR 386 at 589.

[57] Statement, PR 660.

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of the amendments went against the personal predilections of MacArthur. Instead of abolishing peerage after the lifetimes of existing peers, as MacArthur (or Whitney) had suggested in the Notes, the House of Representatives abolished peers and peerage forthwith. Also, instead of a unicameral legislature, the Cabinet proposed and the Diet created an elective House of Councillors in addition to the House of Representatives.[58] Other amendments also contravened American inclinations, such as one omitting a provision that aliens are entitled to equal protection of the laws and another limiting to Japanese people only a provision that all natural persons are equal before the law.[59]

The Ashida Amendment to Article 9

Of all the amendments, none exceeded in importance the amendment advocated by Hitoshi Ashida, chairman of the House of Representatives special committee to which the Constitutional Revision Bill had been referred. Ashida's amendment consisted (apart from some minor refinements in style) of inserting two phrases, one preceding the first sentence of Article 9: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order. . . ." The other preceding the second sentence of that article read: "For the above purpose. . . ." The House of Peers later altered the second phrase to read: "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph" so that the first two sentences of Article 9 as finally adopted are:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.[60]

Before Ashida introduced his amendment, I advised him it was unobjectionable. When Ashida asked if it should have the approval of the supreme commander or at least that of the chief of the Government Section, he was informed that neither MacArthur's nor Whitney's approval was necessary because of an oral standing order not to object to any proposed amendment that did not violate a basic principle.

In recasting Point II of the MacArthur/Whitney Notes into a form suitable for inclusion in the model for a constitution, I had omitted the phrase "even for preserving its own security" from the sentence in which Japan renounced war. I believed it was unrealistic to ban a nation from exercising its inherent right of self-preservation. Having that in mind while reading Ashida's proposed amendment

[58] Constitution of Japan, Art 14, PR 671 at 672; and Arts, 42 and 43 at 673.

[59] "First Government Draft," Art. 14: "Aliens shall have equal rights to receive protection of law," PR 625 and "Second Government Draft," Art. 13: "All natural persons are equal under the law," PR 631 at 632.

[60] Constitution of Japan, Art. 9, PR 671.

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to Article 9, it seemed that the rather vague terms of his amendment would permit Japan to have forces, such as a home guard and a coast guard, sufficient to repel any invasion as well as to contribute an armed contingent to a United Nations international force. Leading Cabinet ministers, such as Shidehara, Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Tokujirō Kanamori (who was the state minister charged with answering interpellations and otherwise guiding through the Diet the Revision Bill) had expressed from time to time concern that Article 9 might prevent Japan from joining the United Nations without a reservation because of its constitutional prohibition against fulfilling the obligation of all UN members to make available to the Security Council, "on its call . . . armed forces . . . for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."[61] The Ashida amendment appeared intended to alleviate their concerns; and it certainly was not an objective of the Occupation to put any obstacle in the way of Japan becoming a full-fledged member of the United Nations after a future peace treaty. Today, however, many legal scholars in Japan are of the opinion that Article 9, even with the incorporation of the Ashida amendment, not only prohibits the maintenance of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, but also the use of any armed forces to aid in enforcing a UN Security Council decision, or even to participate in a UN peacekeeping force.[62]

To the question of why Japan did not expressly reserve the right of self-defense, Yoshida replied:

> Of late years most wars have been waged in the name of self-defense. This is the case of the Manchurian Incident, and so is the War of Greater East Asia. The suspicion concerning Japan today is that she is a warlike nation, and there is no knowing when she may rearm herself, wage a war of reprisal and threaten the peace of the world. . . . I think that the first thing we should do today is to set right this misunderstanding . . . it cannot be said there is no foundation for that suspicion.[63]

General Hideki Tōjō, both prime minister and army minister when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, maintained at his trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East that the Japanese invasions of Manchuria, China, and East Asia, and the bombings of Pearl Harbor and Manila were acts of liberation and defensive measures and in no sense acts of aggression. Given the then existing climate of opinion in the countries at war with Japan, Japanese statesmen were well aware that to exclude wars of self-defense and arms for such wars from the renunciation of war and armaments in Article 9 would hardly improve Japan's international image or hasten the departure of Allied occupation troops. Although the phraseology of the Ashida amendment was certainly obscure, it was perceived by FEC members, especially China, to be designed to authorize Japanese remilitar-

[61] Charter of the United Nations, Art. 43.

[62] Lawrence W. Beer, "Japan's Constitutional System and its Judicial Interpretation," *Law in Japan* (Seattle: The Japanese American Society for Legal Studies) 17 (1984): 7 at 12; McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," *Armed Forces & Society* 13 (Fall 1986): 81 at 83, 96–97.

[63] Minutes of the Proceedings in the House of Representatives, *The Official Gazette Extra*, No. 6 (27 June 1946), 4 (col. 1).

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ization. This perception motivated the issuance of two FEC directives insisting that Cabinet ministers must be civilians.[64]

The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security specifically provides that both countries' obligations under the treaty are subject to their constitutions. Consistent with this limitation, Article III of the treaty contemplates the development of a capacity "to resist armed attack"; Article V recognizes as a "common danger" an armed attack against either party "in the territories under the administration of Japan."[65] Those provisions would appear to validate the public (non-expert) consensus in both countries that Article 9, as amended, does not bar Japan from maintaining defensive forces and war potential indispensable to its existence as an independent nation, but not of a character that would threaten the security of its neighbors.

The Japan Socialist Party urged various amendments both at committee hearings and on the floor of the House of Representatives to fortify the economic rights of the people. One idealistic Socialist amendment, which was approved, added to Article 25 a provision that "All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living." Another rejected Socialist proposal resulted in an important modification. That proposal would have added a new Chapter 1 to precede the chapter concerning the emperor to stipulate that "The state powers originate from the people."[66]

The Socialists Sovereignty Proposal and the FEC's Directive

From the very first report to the Steering Committee of the Government Section's Committee on the Emperor and Miscellaneous Affairs, Article 1 had provided that the emperor derived his position "from the sovereign will of the people." The Steering Committee had thought that it was implicit in those words that sovereignty was vested in the people. However, the Japanese word used to modify "will" could also mean "supreme." (Though another Japanese word was less susceptible to the alternative meaning, the Japanese had hesitated to use it when such a suggestion was made.) Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent SCAP on 16 July a statement of policy adopted by the FEC setting forth principles to which any constitution adopted by the Japanese should conform. The first principle stated was that, "The Japanese Constitution should recognize that sovereign power resides in the people."[67]

[64] Osamu Nishi, *The Constitution and the National Defense Law System in Japan* (Tokyo: Seibundo Publishing Co., 1987), 110–118.

[65] U.S. Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961) vol. 11, 1632; United Nations, *United Nations Treaty Series* (New York: United Nations, 1963) vol. 373, 186, 59 Stat. 1051 (19 January 1960).

[66] Minutes of the proceedings in the House of Representatives, *The Official Gazette Extra*, No. 35 (26 August 1946), 13 (col. 1).

[67] JCS Directive Serial No. 54, 6 July 1946, PR 661.

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If the Socialist Party's proposal to make express what had been assumed to be implied from the words "sovereign will of the people" were rejected and nothing was altered, the legislative history of the constitution could be construed to reject that assumption. This, in turn, could have created an awkward problem for the FEC as well as for GHQ. Accordingly, at a 17 July meeting with State Minister Kanamori and Director Irie of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (later a justice of the Supreme Court), it was pointed out that there were still those among the Allied powers who called for the removal or abdication of the emperor. It would strengthen MacArthur's defense of the emperor if it could be made clear that the people could remove him or even abolish the throne whenever they wished. Thus, if Article 1 could be amended to provide that the emperor derives his position not only from the will of the people but to provide *in haec verba* that sovereign power resides in the people, such a statement, when combined with the plenary power to amend the constitution vested in the Diet and the people, would protect the emperor by emphasizing his new exclusively ceremonial status as a "symbol of the State" (Const. Art. 1) who lacked any and all "powers related to government" (Const. Art. 4).[68]

On 2 August the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Revision Bill decided to add at the end of Article 1 of Chapter I after the word "people" the phrase "with whom resides sovereign power."[69] On 21 August the full committee approved the amendment[70] so that Article 1 would read (as it does now):

> The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.

Even though the full committee also decided to substitute an unambiguous Japanese word for sovereign in the Preamble, as well as in Article I, the Socialists renewed their original proposal. It was rejected at a plenary session of the House of Representatives.[71]

The FEC's Directives on Cabinet Eligibility

The FEC statement of "Basic Principles for a New Japanese Constitution" also required that, unless a system of government was adopted whereby the chief executive was elected to that office by the people, the prime minister and a majority

[68] Memorandum by Kato (Political Dept., Central Liaison Office) *Asahi Evening News*, (Tokyo) 31 May 1976.

[69] Minutes of the Subcommittee on the Bill for the Revision of the Imperial Constitution, No. 8, (English typescript), 2–3.

[70] Minutes of the Proceedings of the Committee on the Bill for the Revision of the Constitution, No. 21, 5 ff, 69 (English typescript).

[71] Minutes of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives, *The Official Gazette Extra*, No. 35 (26 August 1946), 6 (col. 1) and 18 (col. 1).

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of the Cabinet should be selected from the Diet, and that the prime minister and all other members of the Cabinet must be "civilians."[72]

Although one might question whether these two policies were really basic to the establishment of a democratic government, MacArthur advised the prime minister to submit proposed amendments to the Diet embodying the FEC's principles. On 20 August the House of Representatives subcommittee deleted the clause necessitating approval by the Diet of the appointment of state ministers (which would have seemed an adequate provision to protect representative democracy) and provided in lieu thereof that the prime minister and a majority of the Cabinet must be chosen from the Diet. No action was taken to require cabinet members to be civilians, since the word "civilian" is ambiguous even in English. There then existed no Japanese word into which it could be translated. It might disqualify for Cabinet office even those who had once served in the armed forces but were not career personnel or had not served on active military duty for many years.[73]

After the House of Representatives in plenary session on 26 August approved the Revision Bill by a vote of 421 to 8 (five of the dissenters were members of the Communist Party), it was sent to the House of Peers.[74] There a Special Committee of the Bill for the Revision of the Constitution was appointed consisting of forty-four members, who included many of the foremost constitutional scholars in Japan. The Committee held twenty-five meetings between 31 August and 2 October. A Small Committee consisting of eleven members met four days between 28 September and 2 October. At a meeting on 2 October they agreed on several proposed amendments.

The Special Committee recommended approval of the amendment requiring Cabinet members to be civilians, which had failed in the House of Representatives.[75] Prince Tokungawa, the president of the House of Peers, in summarizing the proceedings of the Special Committee, adverted to the necessity to invent a new Japanese word to express the English concept of "civilian" correctly in Japanese. He pointed out that, since the Japanese word "*bushin*" [sic] was translated into English as "military person," an antonym was needed. After discarding other possibilities, the word *bunmin* was fabricated by a group of scholars in the House of Peers and inserted in the Revision Bill.[76] Even after the House of Peers adopted the provision, but before the Privy Council had acted, the FEC had reaffirmed in a directive to MacArthur on 10 October its policy that "all cabinet ministers

[72] PR 661, Para. 3 (b).

[73] Minutes of the Subcommittee on the Bill for Revision of the Imperial Constitution, No. 13, (English typescript), 1-15.

[74] Minutes of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives, *The Official Gazette Extra*, No. 35 (26 August 1946), 31 (col. 2).

[75] Minutes of the Proceedings of the Special Committee on Revision of the Imperial Constitution, No. 24. (English typescript 2, 34-36.)

[76] Minutes of the Proceedings of the House of Peers, *The Official Gazette Extra*, No. 39, (6 October 1946), 8 (col. 3), 9 (col. 1), and 28 (cols. 1-2).

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should be civilians."[77] On 6 October, at a plenary session of the House of Peers, the Revision Bill with this and two other amendments was passed on a rising but unrecorded vote by more than two-thirds of the members present, as required by Article LXXIII of the Meiji Constitution.[78] Of the two amendments one was technical and of Japanese origin, and the other complied with an FEC principle requiring that universal adult suffrage be guaranteed; the latter seemed redundant in view of the provision in the first sentence of Article 15 that "The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them." The Peers added the FEC sentence to Article 15, providing that "Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials."

Passage of the Revision Bill

On 7 October, with 347 members present, all but five in the House of Representatives agreed with the amendments adopted by the House of Peers.[79] After lengthy meetings on 19 and 21 October of the Examination Committee of the Privy Council, with the prime minister, State Minister Kanamori, other leading members of the Cabinet and its staff, as well as members of the imperial household present, the Privy Council, with the emperor also present, unanimously approved the Bill for the Revision of the Imperial Constitution.[80] Finally, on 3 November the emperor promulgated by imperial rescript the revised constitution as an amendment to the Constitution of the Empire of Japan.[81]

Thus, exactly nine months to the Sunday that MacArthur had conceived the idea of writing a model for a constitution, Japan gave birth to a new constitution embodying basic principles that Matsumoto had considered "revolutionary." Much more time would be required, however, before it could be known whether the "roses of the West" when cultivated in Japan would put down deep roots. Or as Matsumoto had predicted to Whitney, would they wither and lose their fragrance totally?

In the Wake of the Passage of the Constitution

Once the basic principles of the model constitution were accepted by the Cabinet, MacArthur's policy in furthering constitutional revision could be accurately described as that of monitoring the Japanese enactment process to the degree necessary to assure that the American objective of fundamental constitutional reform was not subverted by intransigent imperialist zealots.

[77] JCS Directive Serial No. 60, PR 667.

[78] Minutes of the Proceedings of the House of Peers, *The Official Gazette Extra*, No. 40, (7 October 1946), 23 (col. 2).

[79] Minutes of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives, *The Official Gazette Extra*, No. 54,1

[80] Notes of Privy Council Conference (29 October 1945) 9. (English typescript).

[81] Rescript, PR 670.

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As Tetsu Katayama, later to be prime minister, told a plenary session of the House of Representatives on 26 August, the reason why the Socialist Party, whose votes in the House of Representatives were indispensable to the adoption of the Constitution, endorsed the new constitution is because "sovereign power is in the hands of the people." It was also because of Article 9 renouncing war and arms which, Katayama continued, "has by no means been given or dictated from outside but is an expression of a strong current of thought which has been running in the hearts of the Japanese people."[82]

More to the point perhaps is the testimony of Tatsuo Sato, who was present from the beginning to the end of the joint drafting and deliberative process. He wrote in his memoirs:

> They [GHQ staff] were very strict about the Preface [sic] and the chapter on the Emperor. They would make no concessions. Only a few minor wording changes were allowed. But they granted a great many of our points and objections about other parts of the draft . . . unlike their attitude at the stage when we were preparing the government draft [based upon the GHQ draft] the GHQ applied hardly any direct pressure on the Diet's deliberations on the constitution. Indeed they seemed to have great respect for the Diet as the supreme representative of the people. With the revisions as well they needed SCAP's approval, but 80 or 90 percent of our changes were allowed to stand.[83]

Even with respect to the preamble, mentioned by Sato as if it were untouchable, amendments were made in the House of Representatives. Preambles proposed in the House of Peers by Kenzō Takayanagi and Eiichi Makino would have been acceptable, but were never referred to the Government Section.[84] It is worthy of note that each of those preambles began, as does the enacted preamble with the words, "We, the Japanese people. . . . "

The House of Peers did actually make a significant alteration in the thrust of the preamble. Apparently not satisfied that the Ashida amendment to Article 9 codified the constitutional right of self-preservation, the peers tried to clarify any ambiguity in the text of Article 9 by inserting in the preamble to demonstrate their intention the clause: "and we have determined to preserve our security and existence."

Reluctance of the Diet to Review the Constitution

In the interim between the promulgation of the constitution and its effective date, MacArthur wrote the prime minister that "between the first and second years of its effectivity, it [the Constitution] should again be subject to their [the Japanese

[82] Minutes of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives, *The Official Gazette Extra*, No. 35 (26 August 1946), 26 (col. 2).

[83] As translated and quoted by Tanaka, "The Conflict between Two Legal Traditions" in Ward and Sakamoto, eds., *Democratizing Japan*, 124.

[84] Minutes of Proceedings of the Special Committee of the House of Peers, No. 24, (English typescript.) Appendices.

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people's] formal review and that of the Japanese Diet" because "the Allied Powers feel that there should be no future doubt that the constitution expresses both the free and considered will of the Japanese people."[85] When neither the Cabinet nor the Diet moved towad a review of the constitution, the Government Section called MacArthur's letter to the attention of Yoshio Suzuki, attorney general in the Katayama and Ashida Cabinets. Suzuki passed on the suggestion for such a study to the Speakers of the House of Representatives and of the House of Councillors. The matter was dropped when Shigeru Yoshida became prime minister after the election in January 1949, and was not revived until the Commission on the Constitution was created in June 1956 by a Diet statute. Marlene Mayo of the University of Maryland has attributed "the Constitution's continuing popularity and staying power" to three reasons: "First, it owes much to lessons learned during Japan's prior experience, both good and bad, under the Meiji Constitution of 1889. . . . Second, the present document benefited from the support of the Showa Emperor who in effect legitimated the process of revision. . . ." Third, and crucial to "the success of the document was a massive campaign of political education and popularization" undertaken by the American occupation authorities and Japanese leaders.[86]

In his penetrating introduction to *Japan's Commission on the Constitution: The Final Report*, John M. Maki of the University of Massachusetts concluded that the Commission on the Constitution (according to Maki, after 131 plenary sessions, 325 committee and subcommittee sessions, 56 public hearings at which over 418 expert witnesses testified and 487 representatives of the public appeared, over a period of seven years) had created a new and special framework within which revision would have to be carried out and that the components of that framework preclude revision. Those components, which Maki describes with deep discernment, are: *first*, the commission unanimously affirmed the three basic principles of the Constitution:—popular sovereignty, pacifism, and the guarantee of fundamental human rights; *second*, no single potentially crippling defect in the Constitution has surfaced; *third*, the constitution is functioning effectively in practice as a fundamental law for Japanese society based on general principles of democracy; *fourth*, no matter what the outcome on the question of revision, one inevitable result would be a deep scarring of the body politic; and *fifth*, no revision, whether on a large scale or small scale, would be quick or easy.[87]

There may be other reasons for the constitution's stability. The first is that the constitution accurately caught the spirit and aspirations of the Japanese people. The people were heartsick and weary with war; they were resentful of military adventures abroad and police repression and thought control at home; they longed for peace and liberty and governmental recognition of the sanctity of life and the

[85] Letter dated 3 January 1947, PR 681.

[86] Marlene Mayo, "Popularizing Japan's Post War Constitution," *Japan Society Newsletter* 35 (October 1987): 2; See Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution*, chap. 7.

[87] Maki, "Introduction," 3, 10–11.

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dignity of the individual. The constitution struck a responsive chord and answered those yearnings with its renunciation of war, with its declaration of both political and economic rights of both men and women (as well as boys and girls[88]), with its establishment of an independent judiciary to safeguard those rights, and with its proclamation that the people are sovereign. Although the people continued to respect the emperor, their respect ceased to be rigid subservience to a sacred sovereign.

The second is that the constitution contained provisions aimed at the liberation not only of individuals but also of congeries of individuals, such as women, labor unions, local governmental entities with their limited home rule powers, the academic community, the press and other information media, and the previously underprivileged. Because any movement to amend the constitution in any one respect risks opening the door to amendments in other respects, a consensus seems to have developed among all groups that this overall risk outweighs any specific advantage from any particular amendment.

The third is that without any formal constitutional amendment there has been a "gap between the constitutional law-in-books and the constitutional law-in-action."[89] The constitution enjoins equality of treatment for "All of the people" in Article 14 and for both of "the sexes" in Article 24. Although after over forty years the gap may have narrowed (but has by no means closed) with respect to the inequality of women with men, unequal treatment of others by both men and women continues in Japan. Lawrence W. Beer of Lafayette College has pointed out the discrimination with respect to various classes, including (among others):

> the *dowa* or *burakumin* . . . ethnic Japanese descended from traditional outcasts . . . ethnic Koreans in Japan as a result of Japan's prewar possession of the Korean peninsula . . . Chinese . . . Okinawans . . . who returned to citizenship with the 1972 reversion of the United States to Japan; a small proto-caucasian group, the Ainu of Hokkaido . . . .[90]

Another such gap relates to the electoral system. Disparities in population of election districts in Japan debase the weight of electors' votes in such a way that a representative from one district often represents several times as many voters as a representative from another district. The Supreme Court of Japan recognizes that the election law contravenes constitutional provisions that provide for equality under the law (Article 14), guarantee universal adult suffrage (Article 15), and prohibit discrimination against membership in the Diet and their electors (Article 44).[91] Although the Diet has taken some remedial action, its reluctance to enact

[88] Art. 26 and Art. 27.

[89] McWhinney, *Constitution-making*, 9.

[90] Beer, "Japan's Constitutional System," *Law in Japan*, 17 at 15; See also Lawrence Repeta, "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Human Rights Law in Japan," *Law in Japan* 20 (1987): 1; and accompanying Japan Civil Liberties Union, "Citizens Human Rights Reports," Nos. 1–5, ibid., 30; and Kenneth M. Holland, "We, The Japanese People. . . ." *Constitution* 1 (Spring 1989): 41, 46.

[91] Beer, "Japan's Constitutional System," 36.

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more drastic electoral reform, which would equalize the weight of all votes, calls to mind how long it has taken the United States to rid itself of the "rotten apportionment" statutes of some state legislatures (reminiscent of the "rotten boroughs" of England) which contract the value of some votes and expand that of others.[92]

The constitution's form of parliamentary government has also been modified without a formal amendment to conform to parliamentary practice in western democracies, such as England and France. When Prime Minister Yoshida in 1952 secured from the emperor a rescript to dissolve the House of Representatives without the passage of a non-confidence resolution or the rejection of a confidence resolution—as Article 69 provides—he established a precedent effectively expanding the power of the Cabinet vis-à-vis the Diet. Yoshida's action would have been applauded by Milton J. Esman of Cornell University, a lieutenant on the Committee on the Executive who wrote a memorandum dissenting from his Committee's Report on 8 February 1946, because its draft denied the prime minister authority to dissolve the Diet on the ground that the "omission gravely compromises the workability of a cabinet system."[93]

In a suit challenging Yoshida's action, Supreme Court Justice Tsuyoshi Mano took the position that since the Cabinet in the exercise of its executive power is responsible to the Diet, "it stands to reason that the cabinet cannot dissolve the House of Representatives."[94] But the suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Finally, revision is discouraged by the extraordinary majority required for the adoption of an amendment. Although the the Meiji Constitution requirement that a quorum of two-thirds of the entire membership of each house be present before a proposed amendment was eligible for debate was dropped, Article 96 of the 1946 Constitution requires "a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House" before the amendment can be submitted to the people for ratification by a simple majority of the votes cast. No proposal to modify Article 96 was suggested during the drafting or the deliberation process, but in 1964, when the Commission on the Constitution made its final report, a majority of the commissioners regarded the requirements of a two-thirds vote in both Houses and ratification in a national referendum as too strict, making amendment "either extremely difficult or next to impossible."[95] Some commissioners took the position that since the requirements for Diet passage were so high, all amendments should not necessarily be required to be submitted to the people; others said that if amendments are to be ratified by the people, the size of the majority required for Diet passage should be lowered somewhat. Only a minority of those favoring revision thought,

[92] *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); *Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris*, 57 US Law Week, 4357 (1989).

[93] Memorandum for the Constitution Steering Committee, TOT 182.

[94] John M. Maki, *Court and Constitution in Japan, Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1948–60* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 366, (Supplementary Opinion at 368).

[95] Maki, *Japan's Commission on the Constitution*, 350; see Robert E. Ward, "The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects for Constitutional Change in Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 24 (May 1965): 401.

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however, that if a referendum of the people were retained as a prerequisite, only a simple majority in each House should be sufficient for submitting an amendment to the people. The majority thought this would result in too frequent Diet initiatives for amendments, because no greater number would be necessary than that needed to pass any statute. Apparently stability of government was of paramount importance for those favoring modification of Article 96 as well as for those opposing any change.[96] In opposing any alteration of Article 96, Takayanagi said, "differences in the ease difficulty of amendment do not necessarily coincide with differences in the stability and flexibility of constitutions."[97]

As Article 98 annulled the Meiji Constitution by providing that the Showa Constitution "shall be the supreme law of the nation," so the people of Japan have delegated by Article 96 the sovereignty that Article 1 vested in their national community to a majority consisting of two-thirds of their elected representatives in each House of the Diet plus one more than half of the citizens voting on any amendment. In essence, the community has entrusted the power to veto any proposal to alter their supreme law to a triumvirate consisting of one-third plus one of their representatives in either House and half of the voting citizenry, each of which may exercise the veto alone.

With the power to amend committed to the custody of the electors and the elected, it is safe to predict that no amendment will accomplish a second restoration of the emperor similar to the restoration of 1868, which the ultranationalist editor, Ichirō Tokutomi, called "Centripetal Mikadoism." Nor will any amendment rein vent the myth that "the Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine, and sacred" in whom "all the different legislative as well as executive powers are united," a sovereign who "is the fountain of justice," his judicial authority being "nothing more than a manifestation of the sovereign power."[98]

Perhaps it was premature for Sir George Sansom, the noted English scholar on Japan, to refer in retirement to the revised constitution as "idiotic."[99] Certainly it was premature a century ago for Chief Justice Cooley of Michigan to praise the Meiji constitution as effusively as Sansom decried the Showa constitution. Cooley declared that as a "guaranty of individual liberty *Magna Charta* [sic] itself was not so full and particular"[100] as the 1889 constitution. He then went on to quote John Milton's words lauding the freedoms granted in the Puritan proposal in 1649 for a written English constitution, the aborted "Agreement of the People of England"; "peace hath her victories no less renownd than warr" but he omitted

[96] Maki, *Japan's Commission*, 348.

[97] Ibid, 349.

[98] Hirobumi Ito, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan*, Myōji Itō, trans. (Tokyo: *Igirisu Horitsu Gakko*, English Law College, Govermment Printing Office, 1889), v, 6–7, 99–101.

[99] Roger Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 68.

[100] Address by the Honorable Thomas M. Cooley, *The Constitution of the Empire of Japan with Speeches Addressed to Students of Political Science in the John Hopkins University*, Baltimore, 17 April, 1889, 27.

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Milton's prefatory exhortation "yet much remaines to conquer still" as well as the warning that followed: "new foes aries."[101]

Perhaps it is not premature in 1989 to use Cooley's words of 1889 to describe the 1946 constitution. Certainly it would be imprudent to omit Milton's caveat:

> yet much remaines
> To conquer still; peace hath her victories
> No less renownd then warr, new foes aries
> Threatning to bind our soules with secular chaines;
> Help us to save free Conscience from the paw.

[101] "To the Lord General Cromwell May 1652" in H.C. Beeching, ed., *The Poetical Works of John Milton* (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1925), 88. (Spelling as in original.)

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The Government's Role In Building the Women's Movement

GEORGIA DUERST-LAHTI

Many aspects of the women's movement's resurgence have been ably considered. These include its political history,[1] social forces that gave rise to the movement,[2] and insights of key women involved in advancing women's status.[3] Other works comprehensively recount issues involved in the movement,[4] or cover the development of particular governmental policies.[5] However, one aspect remains largely unexplored: the role played by federal and state governmental bodies as organizational entities in helping to build the current women's movement.[6] Gov-

[1] Judith Hole and Ellen Levine, *Rebirth Of Feminism* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Jo Freeman, *The Politics of Women's Liberation* (New York: David McKay Co, 1976); Sara Evans, *Personal Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), among others.

[2] Ethel Klein, *Gender Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); and Evans, *Personal Politics*.

[3] Irene Tinker, *Women In Washington: Advocates For Public Policy* (London: Sage, 1983); Betty Friedan, *"It Changed My Life": Writings on the Women's Movement* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985); Judith Paterson, *Be Somebody: A Biography of Marguerite Rawalt* (Austin, Tex.: Eakin Press, 1986).

[4] Barbara Deckard, *The Women's Movement: Political, Socioeconomic, and Psychological Issues* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

[5] Cynthia E. Harrison, "A 'New Frontier' for Women: The Public Policy of the Kennedy Administration," *The Journal of American History* 67 (December 1980); and Patricia G. Zelman, *Women, Work, and National Policy: The Kennedy-Johnson Years* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1982). Also see Harrison, *On Account of Sex: The Politics of Women's Issues, 1945–1968* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

[6] Some work touches this area. For example, see Debra W. Stewart, *The Women's Movement in Community Politics in the United States: The Role of Local Commissions on the Status of Women* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980) and "Institutionalizing of Female Participation at the Local Level,"

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ernmental bodies have the capacity to assist interests generally, and in this case women's interests specifically, in ways governmental outsiders found difficult, if not impossible.

This article attempts to demonstrate that governmental entities concerned with women were critical to national mobilization – an aspect essential to any political movement in the United States – in ways which have not been recognized. Informed by interest-group and bureaucratic politics in a federal system, the analysis is based upon the observation that governmental bodies have at their disposal especially significant resources: access to and knowledge of governmental data collection and information, public funding, full-time expert personnel, established relationships with political decision makers, and perhaps most critically, their "legitimate" nature. They also operate through the existing federal organizational structure of federal regions and state governments. The analysis traces from 1963 to 1969 how government officials consciously and actively used public resources to establish a legitimate agenda for action and then mobilized nationwide support by creating a communication infrastructure to disseminate that agenda – most importantly through State Commissions on the Status of Women. To a lesser degree, it demonstrates collaborative efforts with women's organizations outside government.

The governmental bodies considered at the federal level are the U.S. Department of Labor Women's Bureau (established in 1920), the President's Commission on the Status of Women (PCSW-1962), Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CAC-1963), the Interdepartmental Committee on the Status of Women (IC-1963), and the Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities (TFWRR-1969). At the state level, the State Commissions on the Status of Women (established from 1962–1967) are considered. Governmental documents, reports, and brochures comprise the major data of this analysis. These data are buttressed with supporting evidence from archival holdings and interviews with key individuals.[7]

Background

The government's involvement in the resurgence of the women's movement may have been overlooked or underestimated for several reasons. First, the social-movement approach employed in earlier studies led scholars to focus on extragovernmental aspects. Second, many major contributions have come from

Women and Politics 1 (Spring 1980): 37–64; Rina Rosenberg, "Representing Women at the State and Local Levels: Commission on the Status of Women" in Ellen Boneparth, ed., *Women, Power and Policy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982); Leila S. Rupp and Verta Taylor, *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women's Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 166–174; and Harrison, *On Account*, 159–165.

[7] All interviews were conducted by the author in 1985 and were tape recorded. Those with Kathryn Clarenbach on 21 May and 25 June, and with Esther Peterson on 29 June were in person. Those with Catherine East on 11 June and 16 July, Mary Hilton on 16 July, and Virginia Allan on 1 August were by telephone. Citations below will refer only to the names of the respondents.

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historians who tend to avoid social theory in treatments of subjects. Finally, the orientations of feminist scholars come into play. The suffrage coalition disintegrated into two camps with differing orientations—one militant and radical feminist centered around Alice Paul and the National Women's Party, the other liberal and reformist comprising the Women's Bureau coalition.[8] The former maintained a feminist label, while the latter was generally seen as antifeminist. In the 1960s these camps were labeled "women's liberation" and "women's rights" respectively.[9] Contemporary feminist scholars have tended to identify with and see the women's liberation branch as the movement's heart and vanguard. Hence, they were likely to dismiss or underestimate "conservative" efforts of governmental bodies largely concerned with women's rights. Most attention paid to the latter branch tended to concentrate on important contributions of women working in government and not on the role played by government per se.

Yet, the Women's Bureau, along with the several federal advisory bodies and the State Commissions on the Status of Women that joined it in the 1960s, were integrally involved with the reformist branch of the resurgence. The Women's Bureau nurtured a coalition of groups concerned with the plight of working women and favoring protectionist legislation, and in the process it kept a spark of activism alive.[10] According to activists Virginia Allan and Kathryn Clarenbach in interviews, Women's Bureau reports kept a flame burning in "traditional" women's organizations like the Young Women's Christian Association, the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs (BPW), and the American Association of University Women during the decades between suffrage and the resurgence. Early in the resurgence, the federal government, through bodies concerned with women, was the only game in town that marshalled and directed its resources towards the broad based concerns of women.[11] But the involvement of the governmental bodies has been interpreted differently.

[8] See Harrison, "A 'New Frontier'"; and Judith Sealander, *As Minority Becomes Majority* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), esp. 28–36, for an elaboration of the Women's Bureau coalition. Labels attached to the various branches by scholars are many and relationships are complex. Generally speaking, the former branch, "radical individualism" feminism, promoted the Equal Rights Amendment through militant action. The other, "familial" or "relational" activism (which became feminism) was based upon social reform working through the political system and defended protectionist labor legislation. The former recognized sex differences but saw them as irrelevant for women's civil and political rights. The latter sought to preserve sex differences. See Joan Hoff-Wilson, ed, *Rights of Passage: The Past and Future of the ERA* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 4–5, based upon work done by Karen Offen. See also Kathryn Kish Sklar, "Why Were Most Politically Active Women Opposed to the ERA in the 1920s," in Hoff-Wilson, *Rights of Passage*, 25–38.

[9] Hole and Levine, *Rebirth of Feminism*, divide orientations into "women's rights" and "women's liberation" branches of the movement. Freeman employs an "older and younger" conceptual framework and emphasizes the complementary nature of two branches.

[10] BPW was unique among members of the Women's Bureau coalition in endorsing the ERA in 1937. See Sealander, *As Minority Becomes Majority*, 76, on the BPW.

[11] Interview with Kathryn F. Clarenbach, who headed the Wisconsin State Commission on the Status of Women, served as president of the Interstate Association On the Status of Women in 1970 to 1972,

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Jo Freeman can be credited with the best overall account of the politics behind the formation of the current women's movement.[12] Perhaps because she stresses developments at the end rather than the beginning of the time period investigated, she overlooks or downplays the critical role played by governmental bodies in creating the initial infrastructure that sustained the larger movement. While she mentions government entities, her analysis neglects to detail the critical nature of their contributions. For example, Freeman credits the activity of federal and state bodies with laying the groundwork for the future movement by bringing the right women together, unearthing evidence of unequal status, and creating a climate of expectation for action. She also recognizes that because the involved women corresponded and met annually at federally-sponsored conferences for state commissions, they were in a position to share and reinforce their growing awareness of women's concerns. They also "created an embryonic communications network among people with similar concerns."[13]

Unfortunately, Freeman does not carry the line of reasoning further, even though she deems a preexisting, cooptable communications network or infrastructure essential to the origins of a movement.[14] Clues to this apparent oversight are found in her view of the Women's Bureau as a "*latent* resource for the spread of feminism, once groups developed that could make use of its material"[15] and in her conclusion that "a *symbiotic* relationship [exists] between feminists within our governmental institutions [and] feminists operating in the private sphere. . . ."[16] In the former case Freeman casts the Women's Bureau in the role of a passive actor and ignores other governmental bodies concerned with women. In the latter, symbiosis is predicated upon a social movement of feminists that is already present. Like other scholars, she does not adequately consider the resources used to sustain the movement initially and contribute to the rise of feminists in nongovernmental arenas.

Prior research on the origins of the current women's movement has also largely ignored the legitimizing function governmental bodies played with the issues of concern to feminists for the nonfeminist majority—in other words, the mobilization potential. First, numerous political sociology studies point to high levels of

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and was a founder of the NOW, among other involvements. The breadth of the constituency and number of concerns remain key to this claim. Clarenbach was definitely part of the Women's Bureau coalition so, like other "reformist" women, she saw it as essential. However, the National Women's Party's (NWP) strategy of moving for equal rights on national and international fronts arguably incorporated more women's concerns through fewer fronts.

[12] Freeman, *Politics of Women's Liberation*.

[13] Ibid., 52-53.

[14] Ibid., 48.

[15] Ibid., 52, n.23. (Emphasis added.)

[16] Ibid., 230. (Emphasis in original.)

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citizen trust in government during the time period being considered.[17] By extension, if citizens generally trusted government, they were likely to trust information generated by it. Second, the government is often the only source with the capacity to gather data on the entire gamut of national concerns. This has implications for the context into which a particular concern is placed. For example, the Soviet lead in the space race stimulated the publication of *Womanpower* (1957), which bemoaned the underutilization of women's abilities in the context of national security.[18] Finally, information or recommendations generated by private groups with vested interests are more suspect than those produced by government. Government, constrained by a need to balance concerns of competing interests, is generally perceived by citizens as more likely to present reliable information. While the degree to which these explanations operate may vary, citizens who accept government's legitimacy are also likely to accept the authoritativeness of its reports. Government outsiders have no such an advantage.

Of course the actions of individual women and traditional organizations already studied by others were indeed vital. Nevertheless at least two facets of governmental entities require attention for a complete understanding of the movement's resurgence: the availability and active use of public resources to build a communication infrastructure, which hastened the development of the movement; and the ability to establish a legitimate public agenda for action on women's concerns. While the role of the government in the movement should not be inflated, it should be recognized for its unique and essential contributions.

Government As Stimulus for Interest Organization

Women's interests are far from alone in using governmental resources to create outside organized efforts. Within the agricultural arena, the largest and most important association had a

> close relation to government from its beginnings . . . in the form of Federal funds and encouragement for the formation of farm bureaus. . . . With the aid of officials of the United States Department of Agriculture, the American Farm Bureau was launched in 1919–20.[19]

This type of relationship between government and interests has accelerated in the past two decades with the explosion of interest-group activity and the development of issue networks. One of the most notable consequences of the growth of issue networks—bureau and agency administrators, members of Congress and their

[17] For example, see Paul R. Abramson, *Political Attitudes In America* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1983), esp. 230.

[18] National Manpower Council, *Womanpower: A Statement by the National Manpower Council with Chapters by the Council Staff* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). Clarenbach in interview states that *Womanpower* served as an important precursor for the PCSW.

[19] See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971/1951), esp. 87–93.

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staffs, and affected interest groups—has been the rise of "second generation interest groups."[20]

The birth and maturation of most new groups depend upon prior governmental policies or programs that bureaucrats are charged to carry out. Then, within an already established broad policy area, bureaucrats become advocates for additional activities. Examples of these dynamics include welfare and environmental interest areas, among others.[21] It is within this context that members of governmental bodies concerned with women applied governmental resources to create the infrastructure upon which the women's movement grew.

Governmental bodies then find it in their interest to engineer, if possible, or at least encourage the development of a strong outside constituency. From 1963 to 1969, governmental bodies concerned with women did just that as officials proactively applied resources to establish women's concerns on the public agenda and to foster and control a mobilized outside constituency.

Establishing a Legitimate Women's Agenda

While governmental bodies are by definition authoritative, activities deemed appropriate or legitimate for each vary according to each body's stated purpose. Therefore, in order to understand the ways in which governmental involvement contributed to perceptions of a legitimate women's agenda, one must also understand the importance of the structures and processes of the governmental organizations concerned with women.

Although the Women's Bureau had been generating authoritative reports for over forty years by 1961, no movement had developed. Certainly, a society increasingly aware of "a general sense of disenchantment with the idyllic image of female fulfillment in domestic life" was a necessary ingredient.[22] Lacking this, the government was unlikely to act. Even so, its bureaucratic structure constrained Women's Bureau activity.[23] The critical difference within governmental structures can be traced to the development of advisory bodies.[24] Once these were added to the for-

[20] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The Federal Role In the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth*, Report A-86 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1981), 16.

[21] Ibid., 11-19.

[22] Gayle Graham Yates, *What Women Want: The Ideas of the Movement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 3, cites the 1959 publication of Eleanor Flexner's history of American feminism, *Century of Struggle* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959); Mable Newcomer, *Century of Higher Education for Women* (New York: Harper, 1959) documents the decline of women's involvement in academic life; and Robert W. Smuts, *Women and Work in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) shows little change for women working outside the home as examples of this growing awareness.

[23] See Sealander, *As Minority Becomes Majority*, 8, for a cogent discussion of this problem from 1920 to 1963.

[24] Sealander, *As Minority Becomes Majority*, 5, notes examples of previous advisory bodies but underestimates the ability of the Women's Bureau to engineer outcomes due to its control of resources.

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mula in a time of growing social consciousness, governmental dynamics concerning women took on an entirely different cast.

Synergy: The Best-of-Both-Structures

Different types of organizational structures are endowed with different kinds of resources. For that reason, creating advisory bodies able to complement the capacity of the Women's Bureau proved an essential ingredient for establishing and disseminating a legitimate women's agenda. Women activists in the federal government had created a situation in which beneficial resources inherent in each structure could be used.

Statutory bodies, such as the Women's Bureau, have many structural advantages. Bodies created by legislatures are likely to continue once established in the bureaucracy; they usually have sufficient budgets to undertake larger and longer term projects; and they have offices that afford resources such as staff expertise, clerical support, telephone, and copying. Of greater importance in establishing a nationwide communication network, the Women's Bureau was stably located and easily found over an extended period of time. However, a bureau is "neutral," at least technically, and constrained to advocacy within its legal mandate. Recommendations for action beyond its mandate are not legitimate.

Alternatively, appointive structures are usually advisory bodies; the President's Commission On the Status of Women, the Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women, the Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities, and State Commissions are examples. Their purpose differs from the neutral bureaucratic unit. They are generally short-lived and mandated to investigate a specific area in order to make recommendations. This mandate enables considerable freedom both in defining their own objectives or agendas and in critically evaluating public policy. Most important, appointed advisory bodies control the legitimate agenda, a fundamental power in the policy process. However, these bodies usually lack fiscal resources, technical expertise, and long-term connections.

While the strength of one structure is the weakness of the other, by working together synergy can result. Synergistic dynamics from combining the expertise, stability, and budget of statutory bodies with the agenda control and policy-generating capacity of appointed advisory bodies are evident on many fronts among the federal entities concerned with women.

The Initial Agenda and a Climate for Action

Esther Peterson, director of the Women's Bureau, was cognizant of the bureau's limits. She persuaded President John F. Kennedy to appoint individuals to the PCSW from the "power structure."[25] By breaking the tradition of partisan ap-

[25] Information in this paragraph is from the interview with Esther Peterson. The impetus for creating the PCSW has been placed squarely with Peterson, who was then the director of the Women's Bureau. See Zelman, *Women, Work, and National Policy*, esp. chap. 2.

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pointments, both believed a program of action with the potential to achieve results would develop. With the prominence of persons on the PCSW whose careers were not primarily identified with working women's concerns, "[t]here is no question that the members . . . , as a group, were able to tap resources and gain attention more easily than the Women's Bureau."[26] Peterson also secured sufficient funding for the PCSW to publish and distribute 200,000 copies of its report, *American Women*, and assured continued attention to the PCSW agenda through the immediate creation of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Status of Women and the CAC, which were also linked to the Women's Bureau.

The governmental capacity to produce and widely distribute well-researched reports with recommendations was an important contribution in two ways: it established an agenda carrying expectations for public action and raised feminist consciousness among professionally employed women holding positions within "the establishment."[27] These women were able to muster their personal and positional resources to foster mainstream acceptance of the women's movement and to cajole other women into pushing for governmental activity. While Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* was critical in raising consciousness among women, including those in traditional roles, it did not provide an organized agenda for action.[28]

According to Mary Hilton, deputy director of the Women's Bureau from 1964 to 1981, *American Women* set the agenda for both women activists inside and outside government.

> [It] wasn't any great original thought on the part of the Commission. These certainly were issues that were in the air and that other women's organizations had been working on. What the Commission did, and it was an invaluable service, was to codify those issues and clarify them. My own view is that the Women's Bureau and then the PCSW powered the women's movement.[29]

Though not original in issues addressed, no other single work on women contained the breadth of isssue, clarity of statement, or was so widely distributed at that time.

Although the PCSW's recommendations were intentionally presented in a very acceptable (if not conservative) manner, as advisory bodies the PCSW (and the CAC and TFWRR, which followed) had the latitude to bring new and controversial subjects into the realm of public discourse.

> One of the least measurable and most far-reaching results of the Roosevelt (Kennedy's) Commission was to make discussion of women's "role" and "status" respectable. Almost

[26] Sealander, *As Minority Becomes Majority*, 144.

[27] See, for example, Catherine East's conversion to a pro-ERA position during PCSW meeting discussions, in Paterson, *Be Somebody*, 136.

[28] Clarenbach, Peterson, East, and Hilton all refer to Friedan's contribution to the movement in their interviews.

[29] Interview with author.

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83,000 copies of the report, *American Women*, were distributed in the first year and its recommendations were quoted and summarized in women's organizations' publications.[30]

A broad range of women's issues entered the realm of legitimate public debate for the first time since suffrage.

Furthermore, the government's ability to attract and pay women of stature like Dr. Mary I. Bunting, president of Radcliffe College, and Mary R. Callahan, member of the executive board of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, to participate in making recommendations was a critical factor in mobilizing mainstream support by giving the reports credence with potential feminists. In Allan's view, because of the regard for individuals on the commissions by members of outside organizations, "Women who belonged to organizations paid attention. We tried to help to implement those recommendations [because] . . . they listened to the so-called constituency."[31]

The CAC was especially granted latitude to expand the agenda because its inside counterpart, the Interdepartmental Committee on the Status of Women, lacked authority to control its recommendations. The CAC was also mandated to serve as a liaison with private organizations. Both provisions were unusual for citizen advisory bodies and both enabled it to expand the agenda and constituency for women's concerns through annual and in-depth subcommittee reports. Along with the changed social climate, these provisions help explain the mobilization that followed from these advisory bodies, and not from the earlier bodies that Judith Sealander discusses.[32]

Critical to successful action, government funds were used to disseminate these informative reports to interested parties such as professional women, establishment women's organization leaders, state legislators, and libraries. Between 1964 and 1969, the CAC maintained a mailing list of about 10,000 who received all reports. In total, about 20,000 of each CAC report were distributed nationally at no charge, with many copies disseminated at traditional women's groups' meetings throughout the country.[33]

The 1969 report of the TFWRR, *A Matter of Simple Justice*, also made far-reaching recommendations. In it, a governmental body recommended passage of the Equal Rights Amendment and reaffirmed prior CAC positions on no-fault divorce, relaxed abortion laws, and others. Because of these controversial recommendations, the director of the Women's Bureau, Elizabeth Koontz, needed to

[30] Catherine East, *American Woman: 1963, 1983, 2003* (Washington, D.C.: National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc., 1983), 10.

[31] Interview with author.

[32] Sealander, *As Minority Becomes Majority.*

[33] East's interview for mailing list information. Allan mentions distributing 300 copies of *American Women* at a conference in Michigan in 1963. At a 1969 Leadership Conference in Wisconsin, the Women's Bureau supplied 100 copies each of fifteen different women's publications. Clarenbach papers, Wisconsin Memorial Library Archives, Madison, Box 6, File 2.

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convince the White House to release the report publicly.[34] While the National Organization For Women (NOW) and other outside groups had by then taken such stands, with this report the government provided legitimacy.

This best-of-both-structures arrangement enabled a synergistic approach to women's issues at the federal level. Advisory bodies could broaden the agenda and spark debate on policy-related matters. Simultaneously, the Women's Bureau applied data collection resources and longstanding expertise for background information, thereby making the reports unquestionably legitimate. Ironically, the perception that the Women's Bureau was antifeminist under Peterson and Mary Keyserling probably contributed to the legitimacy in a time when mere discussion of the status of women was controversial. The efforts of the PCSW and later advisory bodies broke public sod that lay fallow for decades, addressing some issues that had never been tilled by a governmental agency. By doing so, the government set the broad public agenda of women's concerns for several years.[35]

But accommodating structures and a legitimate agenda were only the beginning. Individuals within the federal bodies concerned with women also made conscious efforts to establish the necessary infrastructure for a larger women's movement by mobilizing a constituency around the agenda they helped develop.

Activism: Determined Use of Governmental Resources

In an era of issue networks, second-generation interest groups constitute an essential ingredient if government officials are to be successful advocates for additional activity. First, civil servants in the network are expected to remain neutral and are therefore limited in their ability to lobby for a cause. Second, various interests compete for the attention of elected officials and for public funds. If the Women's Bureau and the advisory bodies were to obtain funding for increased levels of activity, a mobilized constituency was needed to lobby Congress and the White House. For these reasons, feminists within the government would quite rationally and consciously attempt to transform themselves into a movement. They needed a mobilized constituency throughout the country to be successful. The development of State Commissions on the Status of Women became critical in creating the mobilized constituency, which in turn became a nationwide infrastructure for the women's movement.

The availability of simple but essential office resources was indispensible in the creation and maintenance of the fledgling communication network. Federal bodies facilitated an interstate communication network by using WATS line telephone privileges, maintaining and dispersing mailing lists, copying pertinent materials,

[34] Both East and Allan cite the efforts of Koontz as critical for the report's release. It was widely disseminated at the conference for the fiftieth anniversary of the Women's Bureau.

[35] Peterson, East, Hilton, Allan and Clarenbach all agreed emphatically on this point. While they all were insiders and can be expected to hold this view, East and Clarenbach played critical roles in outsiders efforts also.

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and providing postage for meeting notices. Many of these resources were applied on an informal basis and Catherine East—through her centralized position as executive secretary for the CAC—was at the hub of the newly emerging network from 1964 onward. Kathryn Clarenbach recounts the utility of East's "midnight phone calls" for keeping abreast of activities at the federal level and in other states.[36] Virginia Allan describes the value of East's work more poignantly: "Catherine East was the Thomas Paine of the women's movement. She used her xerox machine like he used his printing press."[37] Using such organizational resources, the small staff of the CAC gathered information from across the states and distributed both federal and state advances in thinking throughout the country.

The national government's regional organization structure also proved useful in establishing the movement's infrastructure.[38] While regions differed in activities and effectiveness, regional Women's Bureau offices were directed to serve as hubs by utilizing their administrative resources. Marguerite Gilmore from the Chicago office was especially active. She went so far as to design a number of pamphlets to aid State Commissions.[39]

The role of the Women's Bureau in establishing the infrastructure was formal as well. In 1965 the Women's Bureau's stated functions and services were to "provide informed, active leadership; serve as a clearinghouse for the exchange of ideas and information by sharing its data and findings on a wide scale; and serve as a reference resource which includes giving assistance to State Commissions as they organize."[40] These stated purposes belie Freeman's view that the Women's Bureau served as a "latent resource" that waited for groups to develop.

Neither the Women's Bureau nor the CAC appeared to behave as passive helpmates waiting to provide latent assistance to developing groups. While the Women's Bureau did not support feminism per se prior to 1969, its technical and advisory assistance to state and local level activities (as well as outside constituencies) fostered the development of women's rights groups and the larger movement mainly by working through state governments. Furthermore, the pattern of involvement suggests members of governmental entities were quite deliberate in their attempts to create (and in some cases, control) the development of State Commissions.

Deliberately Creating A Network: Proactivity

To ascertain if individuals in the federal bodies consciously intended to create a national commmunication network or infrastructure necessary to sustain a movement, in interviews I posed related questions to Esther Peterson, director of the

[36] Interview with author.

[37] Interview with author.

[38] According to Hilton, Peterson charged the regional offices of the Women's Bureau with the task of helping to establish State Commissions in 1963 and that mandate continued under Keyserling.

[39] East, Hilton, and Clarenbach all state this in interviews.

[40] U.S. Department of Labor, *Women's Bureau*, Brochure.

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Women's Bureau from 1960 to 1964; Mary Hilton, deputy director of the Women's Bureau from 1964–1981; Catherine East, executive secretary for the CAC from 1963 to 1975; and Virginia Allan, program chair (1962) and president of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs (BPW) in 1963, member of the CAC from 1968 to 1971 and chair of the TFWRR in 1969–1970. Their responses are revealing.

Peterson reports that she was not particularly conscious of creating an ongoing network. For her, the move to establish State Commissions was a practice in "the art of the possible," a pragmatic strategy to take the action program of the PCSW report to the source of the difficulty—state laws. "Quite naturally we moved to the states. . . . I think unconsciously we thought that the whole women's movement would come out of this. But we really had to go after those [state] laws. . . . We had to be practical."[41] Although this practical strategy was consistent with the anti-ERA approach, the move to the states involved the BPW, one of the few traditional women's organizations to support ERA.[42] This perhaps indicates that Peterson was indeed more concerned with action than with blocking ERA. Allan was critical as they "moved to the states" and recounts her intention at the time.

> I was appointed to the Governor's Commission in the state of Michigan [in 1962, the first in the nation]. What we were doing in Michigan impressed me greatly. At the same time, I was the first vice-president in charge of programs for the national BPW. It occurred to me that it would be wonderful if we had State Commissions across the country. . . . I got an appointment with Peterson and she thought it was a great idea. . . . We [BPW] said we were willing to push the idea. She said that was great but she wanted all possible organizations to get involved. That's what BPW did. We gave the major push but encouraged other organizations to go along with them.[43]

Allan describes an attempt to involve a wide range of organizations. In other words, Allan sought to create State Commissions across the country and consciously used the existing national structure of the BPW to do so.[44]

East's comments reveal that she was quite aware of the role she played as information conduit mentioned by Clarenbach and Allan above. Furthermore, when asked to characterize the relationship between the Women's Bureau and outside women's organizations, she responded:

> I think it was proactive. The regional directors of the Women's Bureau . . . were very active in getting the State Commissions set up. They worked closely with the BPW . . .

[41] The Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, *Milestones: The Women's Bureau Celebrates 65 Years of Women's Labor History* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985). Quote from author's interview with Peterson.

[42] Jo Freeman reminds me, in personal correspondence.

[43] Interview with author.

[44] One cannot overstate the importance of BPW for establishing State Commissions in all the states. Paterson argues, "Without Rawalt and a few others (like Allan) there would have been no bridge between suffrage and the women's movement of the 1960s," *Be Somebody*, xviii. Jo Freeman, in personal correspondence, argues that "there would not have been state commissions without BPW."

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> in getting staff services. . . . They were very supportive . . . and it became even more so when Libby Koontz became director of the Women's Bureau. It was always a very open and active support.[45]

In a caveat East adds that one reason Women's Bureau directors prior to Koontz provided support was to control the direction of the emerging movement.

Mary Hilton reports overt intentions on the part of the Women's Bureau to foster a nationwide communication network.

> That was always one of our ambitions. But the Bureau had a very small staff. . . . Although we tried informally, I don't think we were ever able to establish any formal communication between the State Commissions. But lots happened informally. . . . People knew each other from the conferences and the conferences were really important for developing the network.[46]

The conferences were carefully orchestrated to serve as a vehicle for reproducing the federal approach and agenda within the states and to put women together in such a way that a network was likely to emerge.

These key women report at least some awareness that a national network would follow from efforts by federal bodies to establish State Commissions. Most state those intentions explicitly. Furthermore, all saw the federal bodies consciously playing an active role in laying the foundation for what eventually became the women's movement. While all agreed that governmental efforts alone would have been insufficient, governmental services remained critical in creating and sustaining the embryonic infrastructure.

Federal Action, State Reaction

Most accounts of State Commissions credit them with little short-term success in implementing recommendations for action on the women's agenda. As Freeman indicates, however, they were useful for raising consciousness and bringing women across the country together to discuss specific issues—those raised in *American Women*.[47] By examining the rise and fall of State Commissions, one can detail their catalyst function for the nascent women's movement.

The extent of federal influence on the direction taken by State Commissions is evident on a number of counts. Federal advisory bodies recommended that states form commissions and then served as models to states. Women's Bureau representatives used the prestige of their federal affiliation to aid state women in obtaining gubernatorial action and then applied federal resources to maintain State Commissions initially. Perhaps most important, dynamics surrounding a series of federally sponsored conferences for the states illustrate the overall pattern of federal action and state reaction from 1963 to 1969. The pattern demonstrates strong fed-

[45] Interview with author.
[46] Interview with author.
[47] Freeman, *Politics of Women's Liberation*, esp. 52–53.

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eral influence on the internal structure and perceived purposes of state commissions—a course of action that helped launch the mainstream women's movement.

Creating State-level Interest and Structures

Before the PCSW had filed its report on 11 October 1963, President Kennedy urged a nationwide effort to create a Commission on the Status of Women in every state. The BPW, under the leadership of Virginia Allen, spearheaded the effort, with the support and direction of the Women's Bureau under Esther Peterson.[48]

The Women's Bureau plied its resources in a number of ways. As early as February 1963, Peterson raised the question of establishing a State Commission patterned after the PCSW in Wisconsin before a group of fifty statewide women leaders.[49] She took every opportunity to travel to states and plant the seed across the country. In 1964 the Women's Bureau sponsored a series of regional meetings to disseminate ideas and stimulate discussion.[50] Regional Women's Bureau staff worked closely with state women to establish State Commissions, even accompanying them to meetings with governors to broach the subject. Upon request, representatives from the Women's Bureau met with newly-formed commissions to advise on organizational procedures, help plan and participate in programs, supply background information and special studies, advise on the formulation of proposed legislation, and assist with conferences and other commission meetings.[51] Inasmuch as forming a governmental advisory body was novel to most of these women, let alone formulating legislation, the advice of the Women's Bureau was indispensible. Other than the National Woman's Party (NWP), no outside mainstream feminist groups were as yet in existence.[52]

On a more concrete level, most states were reticent to fund their commissions, which proved to be a particular problem. For example, in 1965 one governor responded to a commission member's concern over the lack of a budget that it "shouldn't be any particular problem to finance the activities through one of the companies with whom some of the gals are associated."[53] So the Women's Bureau

[48] East, *American Woman*, 10, as well as Allen and Peterson interviews; and Zelman, *Women, Work*.

[49] "On Wisconsin Women: Chronology of Recent Highlights of Wisconsin's Women's Movement (1962–77)," prepared for Wisconsin International Women's Year Meeting, 3–5 June 1977, Madison. From Kathryn Clarenbach's personal papers. Next sentence from her interview.

[50] Zelman, *Women, Work*, 74. Three of the four regional meetings she cites occurred within the Chicago region.

[51] U.S. Department of Labor, *Women's Bureau*, brochure, 1965.

[52] However, the NWP focused mainly on efforts to pass the ERA and was not successful in renewing its membership. Hole and Levine, *Rebirth of Feminism*, 78–79. It also maintained an elite posture, generally lacking concern for issues affecting working-class or poor women in contrast to the Women's Bureau coalition. Leila J. Rupp, "The Women's Community in the National Woman's Party, 1945–1960s," *Signs* 10 (Summer 1985): 715–739, esp. 719.

[53] Letter to Nancy K. Knaak from Governor Warren P. Knowles, 29 October 1965. Clarenbach papers, Box 6, File 8.

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assistance with mailings and conference materials made simple operation in pursuit of State Commission mandates possible.

Lack of interest on the part of the governors led them to establish commissions to appease a handful of interested women. Mostly, according to Clarenbach, governors "couldn't have cared less what they did or didn't do."[54] Few state officials apparently saw harm in letting female activists meet under state auspices. But because state officials were generally indifferent to the efforts of state women and provided little support, the role of the Women's Bureau took on additional meaning.

Undoubtedly some states would have formed a commission without federal support. Michigan, for example, established its commission in August 1962. However, many probably would not have come into existence without the considerable federal urging and support.[55] Even with it, one state formed its commission as late as 1967. One can also predict that the State Commissions would have been slow to develop sophistication without assistance from federal women's entities. Nevertheless, governmental bodies dealing with the status of women were established across the country and women's concerns achieved a measure of legitimacy at the state level.

Solidifying the Infrastructure: National Conferences

As part of their mandate, the IC and CAC were to assist State Commissions by sponsoring (with Women's Bureau technical and other support) national conferences for State Commissions. They did so with national conferences held in Washington D.C. in 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1968, and regional conferences in 1967. Prior to 1968 the conferences were planned and fully orchestrated by key individuals from the federal entities.[56] Implications for the nationwide feminist infrastructure are found in the conferences' agendas and through the expansion of types of women attending.[57]

The 1964 First National Conference of Governors' Commissions on the Status of Women program was devoted entirely to organizing State Commissions based upon the federal model. While states were under no obligation to mimic the federal approach, the conference's message encouraged it. Twenty-four State Commissions represented by seventy-three delegates and eight states considering estab-

[54] Interview with author.

[55] *Progress Report on the Status of Women: October 11, 1963 through October 10, 1964*, First Annual Report of the Interdepartmental Committee and Citizens' Advisory Council On the Status of Women (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 20.

[56] Indicated in the conferences' Programs and confirmed in interviews.

[57] Paterson, *Be Somebody*, 152, quotes a letter about the 1964 conference from Rawalt to Alice McRae in which she notes the importance of these conferences for the revival of feminism. "Out of favor since suffrage, the word 'feminist' was slipping back into the language. In speaking of the new state commissions Virginia Allan, then national president of BPW, used the word favorably and in its broadest meaning."

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lishing commissions participated. The conference program lists fifty-four observers from twenty states, a large contingent from Washington, D.C., and representatives from Puerto Rico and Canada.[58]

The 1965 conference evidenced the increasing stature of State Commissions and an ability of the federal-level entities to command more attention. Of the forty-four State Commissions in existence at the time, forty-three sent representatives, as did the remaining six states that as yet had no State Commissions. President Lyndon B. Johnson headed the day-long parade of Washington dignitaries who addressed the 446 people in attendance—a marked change in both the list of speakers and the number of state women present. Symbolically, this suggests increased prestige for State Commissions. Pragmatically, it implies that women as a constituency were beginning to be recognized—especially mainstream women, perhaps bolstered in order to counter the growing number of those making more radical demands.

The Information Exchange program was designed by planners to give their preferred substance and form to the burgeoning communications network. Eleven morning workshops presented information from *American Women* (plus Title VII) that delegates "needed to know." By default and concern, these were topics for State Commissions to consider. The six afternoon sessions covered the nuts and bolts of a successful State Commission.[59]

By 1966 the idea of governmental commissions on the status of women had a toehold across all levels of government. Conference planners had dropped the "Governors'" from the title in order to include city and territorial representatives. The meeting also attracted a large contingent of observers. For the first time, the conference did not concentrate on organizing state commissions. Instead it focused on a greatly expanded issue agenda covered in twenty-eight panel discussions. The agenda was becoming more sophisticated as women's consciousness inside and outside government increased. While many State Commissions faced expiring mandates, the conference presented the message that even more issues than before required attention. Of greater importance to the larger women's movement, for the last time governmental-sponsored activity served as the only game in town. The National Organization for Women was born at this conference.

Pressed by expiring State Commissions mandates, a conference format that prohibited participants from passing resolutions, and understanding of the need for an outside constituency, Catherine East and the "Washington underground" decided an autonomous group was needed.[60] East had been encouraging women with national organizational experience such as Marguerite Rawalt, former president of BPW, to start an action-oriented women's organization.[61] Eventually, East and

[58] Conference data from Hole and Levine, *Rebirth of Feminism*, 402; "Program of the 1964 Conference," Clarenbach papers, Box 6, File 5.

[59] *Report of the Second National Conference of Governors' Commission on the Status of Women* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1965), 43–61.

[60] See Friedan, *"It Changed My Life,"* 76–83.

[61] See Paterson, *Be Somebody*, 157–168 for Rawalt's perspective.

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others cajoled a reluctant Betty Friedan into working on the idea, secured her conference invitation, and provided her with the names of key women from state commissions, including Kathryn Clarenbach. Friedan then invited a carefully selected group of women attending the conference to a meeting in her hotel room. East also attended. After Clarenbach learned Keyserling, the director of the Women's Bureau, would not allow the conference to take action and pass a resolution, Clarenbach changed her position and supported the formation of NOW, much to the dismay of Keyserling.[62] In an ironic turn of events, a conference called by federal entities for state representatives served as the vehicle to end governmental dominance of the infant women's movement—an end largely precipitated by women long active in government.

The year of 1967 was a tenuous time for State Commissions. A majority of states did not provide travelling or general operating expenses.[63] In addition, some of the most active people's efforts were drained off into NOW. Recognizing these limitations, the federal governmental bodies sponsored and supported conferences within each of the federal regional divisions and the Women's Bureau regional offices easily served as a resource.

The regional conferences served several purposes. First, the cost of attending decreased so that greater numbers of women came to participate and the base of the audience with a raised consciousness expanded.[64] Second, conferences fostered regional communication networks, because like-minded women in the same proximity—many of whom could not attend national conferences—got to know one another. Third, because the agenda of these conferences dealt with national not regional concerns, a crossfertilization of ideas and identification of tactics appropriate for a geographical area occurred.[65] This arguably increased the saliency of agenda items for participants and the effectiveness of their efforts. In effect, regional conferences expanded the mobilized constituency for the Women's Bureau, CAC, State Commissions, and the newly emerging women's issues organizations outside of government.

A transition period began in 1968. Commissions were disintegrating as state officials withdrew authorization and support and federal efforts proved inadequate to maintain their needs.[66] State governments could no longer be indifferent to a few harmless female activists. Women were establishing autonomous pressure groups and mobilized, mainstream women were no longer dependent solely on governmental direction. Conditions had changed and roles began to shift. A power transfer was underway.

[62] According to East's interviews. Clarenbach's interviews support this version of her actions and Keyserling's reaction.

[63] *Third Annual Report of the IC and CAC,* 80.

[64] Clarenbach in interviews states that the expanded number of women with a raised consciousness was a critical outcome of the regional conferences.

[65] Hilton interview.

[66] Clarenbach papers, Box 6, File 5; letter from Clarenbach to members of 1968 planning committee discusses this disintegration.

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The skill and mobilization levels of State Commission members had increased, and momentum swung away from Washington. Seven State Commission members participated in conference planning thereby ending the federal monopoly over the program. However, the federal government, still superior in issue development and resources, continued to fund the conference, including provision of expenses for the state representatives to participate in a planning meeting.[67]

Nonetheless, the product of those resources began to change in a reflection of the growing sophistication of women inside and outside of government. With the goal "that the exchange of ideas this conference made possible will serve as a spur to action throughout the country,"[68] the conference program included how-to's of implementation and leadership. Further, the program encouraged state women to support CAC recommendations drawn mainly from several task forces commissioned to develop indepth reports. Included in the program were action-oriented sessions on equal employment opportunities, childcare services, and women in leadership. Recommendations of the CAC included legal abortion, repeal of a number of protective labor laws, and maternity benefits. But while the issue agenda was still introduced to state representatives by spokespersons on the federal advisory bodies, many of key advisory body members also belonged to NOW. As a result, "[d]espite the difference in tone . . . their [the CAC Task Force reports] women's agenda mirrored NOW's Bill of Rights and the aims of the moderate women's movement in general."[69] In short, governmental bodies no longer fully controlled the agenda.

The 1968 conference also encouraged further development of an infrastructure in two ways. First, an afternoon session devoted to "outlining an Action Program for Day Care" was organized according to geographic regions. Consistent with their charge, Women's Bureau staff members served as recorders for each regional session. This arrangement fostered relationships much as the regional conferences had. Second, one session was devoted to strategies for involving all types of groups in commission structures and activities. It was a short course on mobilizing a women's constituency.

By June 1968 the pattern of federal action and state reaction was no longer clear. Federal efforts had succeeded in establishing the foundation of a nationwide infrastructure for a women's movement, even if that was not the original intent and if some individuals feared the loss of control. All fifty states claimed some form of State Commission providing at least a symbol of a legitimate public forum for debate about women's concerns. And through individual state commission members, who constituted walking coalitions with overlapping membership in

[67] Ibid., copy of "Travelers authorization" for the planning meeting paid out of the Woman's Bureau account.

[68] *1968: Time for Action*, highlights of the Fourth National Conference of Commissions on the Status of Women, Washington D.C., 20–22 June 1968, iii.

[69] Paterson, *Be Somebody*, 189.

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public and private women's organizations, the public debate began to take on a decidedly different, more feminist tone.

With the 1969 appointment of Elizabeth Koontz as director of the Women's Bureau, feminists gained an ally inside the most stable governmental unit devoted to women's concerns. Among other changes, the bureau reversed its longstanding opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Koontz actively used the director's status and cordial relations with key congresswomen like Martha Griffiths to promote its passage in Congress. The rise of women's issues organizations outside of government and the increasing sophistication of issues tackled by State Commissions blurred the direction in which agenda issues flowed, even though the federal entities maintained the upper hand in structural resources. The Women's Bureau and CAC now served more as a supporter of state and outside efforts than as the sole agenda setter and facilitator of the network's development.

Probably the best example of changes underway was the shift in the federal relationship with the State Commissions. In lieu of the regular national conference for commissions, Koontz proposed a meeting of governor-appointed state representatives to discuss the possibility of the State Commissions forming their own private organization. This federal proposal was accepted, and throughout 1969 the Women's Bureau paid costs for the organizing committee of the newly forming Interstate Association of Commissions on the Status of Women (IACSW).

The IACSW held its first annual meeting in conjunction with the Women's Bureau's fiftieth anniversary celebration. While no direct, on-going federal funding ever existed for the IACSW, the Women's Bureau contributed money by acting as a sponsor for their annual meetings, providing materials, and serving in advisory and technical roles for conferences and individual State Commissions. The Bureau also continued to act as the communications hub by maintaining up-to-date mailing lists and generally keeping track of developments in State Commissions.[70] They continued this last function through the Reagan administration.

Conclusion

To project how the movement might have proceeded without these mundane but essential organizational services can be no more than speculation. With the changed social context, women were likely to have mobilized anyway. However, without the active application of governmental resources to the needs of the movement's infrastructure, the movement's resources, pattern of national mobilization, and issue construction undoubtedly would have been quite different. Much like the radical wing of the movement, the organizational structure probably would have remained localized for a longer time; and gaining legitimacy for women's concerns would quite probably have proved much more difficult. In short, govern-

[70] Interview with Hannah Rosenthal, executive director of Wisconsin Women's Council, 20 May 1985.

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mental activity promoted nationalization of the women's movement – the root of any movement – and hastened its development.

One must remember the timing of the governmental activity. In the early 1960s, by and large a women's agenda and feminist consciousness existed only among women long active in government. The federal government, through the Women's Bureau and commissions/councils, initiated action as advocates for women. During the critical early stages of the women's movement, governmental entities provided a base in government for policy change, access for a sympathetic hearing, and insiders to influence decision makers. By working with and through state governments and outside organizations, these activists used governmental resources to initiate a nationwide constituency knowledgeable in legitimate facts of women's status in America. And they created mobilized second-generation interest groups required by modern bureaucratic politics. In the process, they created a foundation upon which the women's movement could build; they also helped make concerns about women's status legitimate for mainstream America.*

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Reassessing the Soviet Crisis: Big Problems, Muddling Through, Business as Usual

ALEXANDER J. MOTYL

Sovietologists commonly perceive the Soviet Union as being in the throes of what they like to call a "crisis." Some go so far as to suggest that the USSR is on the verge of collapse. Many expect the Soviet Union to be transformed into a second-class power. All agree with Mikhail Gorbachev that a radical restructuring is imperative.

The perception of crisis is only half of the picture, however. The other half is captured by the phrase "dilemma of reform."[1] According to conventional wisdom, radical reform may be impossible insofar as the Soviet system appears to be singularly incapable of transforming itself in the thoroughgoing manner that scholars recommend.[2] As a result, because the crisis is unlikely to be resolved, the downward slide will continue inexorably, with nasty consequences at best and catastrophic ones at worst.

[1] The phrase comes from Timothy J. Colton's excellent *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986).

[2] "Radical reform" is a term that is almost as abused as "crisis." For the sake of convenience, my use of the term reflects Colton's: "Reshaping the system in its totality, radical reform would be distinguished from the less sweeping varieties of reform by its concentration on the fundamentals of institutions and ideology." Ibid., 119.

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This analysis is faulty for a number of reasons. It suffers from the conceptual confusion surrounding the word "crisis," and it is based on four methodological errors—circularity of reasoning, substitution of projection for prediction, ahistoricity, and lack of comparative perspective. By distorting concepts, by assuming what they intend to prove, by projecting current trends into the future, by ignoring long-term developments, and by overlooking the international context, scholars inevitably skew their understanding of contemporary developments in the Soviet Union.

I

The word "crisis" enjoys great favor among Sovietologists.[3] Although it accurately connotes the urgency we rightfully seek to ascribe to the USSR's present condition, "crisis" is not a synonym for what most Sovietologists really have in mind—quite simply, a big problem or a set of big problems. To be sure, big problems are serious, but they should not be termed crises: semantic utility and etymological origins militate against such a facile definition. Crisis has far too many important connotations to be reduced to mere big problems. Such redundancy impoverishes our language and deprives it of an especially useful concept whose etymology suggests how it should be properly understood. Originally, crisis was a medical term that referred to life-or-death moments in a patient's condition: the patient's survival was literally on the line.[4] Crises, unlike problems, are conditions, which is why we speak of critical conditions; and they refer to particular kinds of modes of being—those that verge on non-being. In other words, the only kinds of crises worthy of the name are crises of survival. Some combination of big problems may be a logical precondition of crisis, but the problems as such can never be equivalent to crises.

Determining what crises are with respect to relatively abstract or complex units of analysis is no easy task. Cabinet crises do not strike us as problematic, because we can easily imagine a cabinet's dissolving. So, too, governmental crises can be grasped without too much difficulty, because governments such as those in Italy visibly rise and fall. Crises of economy, society, or culture are far fuzzier notions. All three rarely, if ever, just cease to be; Lebanon is surely testimony to that. Consequently, if we wish to retain the concept's heuristic value and not restrict it to extremely rare events, it makes sense to apply "crisis" not just to physical survival, but to maintenance of conceptual *type*. That is, survival should be interpreted more loosely, to refer to both existence and, as it were, essence.

The point will be clearer and more relevant for present purposes if we consider

[3] For a typical example, see Marshall I. Goldman, *USSR in Crisis. The Failure of an Economic System* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983).

[4] See Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions* (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1983), 188–191. For a discussion of Marxist interpretations of crisis, see James O'Connor, *The Meaning of Crisis* (Oxford, Eng.: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

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how states, or for that matter political systems, face non-survival. Naturally, that can mean destruction, as actually happened in some countries during World War II. Conceptually less restrictive and theoretically more rewarding is to view non-survival as the transformation of certain kinds of states into other types—say, from totalitarian to authoritarian, from socialist to fascist, from democratic to authoritarian, and so on. Any number of conceptually legitimate systemic typologies can, of course, be developed; what is important for our purposes is not the typology, but the movement by a state within some typology.

An important defining characteristic of critical conditions is that they be immediately threatening to survival. (Loosening the requirement to "more or less immediately threatening" does not change my point.) Thus, systemic contradictions, logical fallacies, and irrationalities may at some time in the near to distant future lay the foundations for a crisis, but on their own they never are crises. There may, for instance, be an irreconcilable difference between capital and labor, tyranny and efficiency, or liberty and equality, but neither of these contradictions should be considered a crisis or—what is completely illogical—a "permanent crisis."[5] Seen in this light, Karl W. Deutsch's characterization of crisis as "an existing state of affairs [that] has become untenable, or is rapidly becoming so," although commonsensical, fails to distinguish with sufficient rigor between the immediacy that crisis connotes and the openendedness that untenability suggests.[6]

What, then, are crises? As immediately life-threatening conditions, they are the product of the interaction between, to draw on the medical analogy, a system (or state) and destructive agents (or state adversaries). The relationship between the two, if sufficiently tilted in the latter's favor, may create a crisis by bringing the state to the verge of non-existence. The image of a tug-of-war aptly conveys this notion; crises are not the contest itself, but the condition that characterizes the losing contender, who, perched at the line, is straining not to be pulled over it.[7] Big problems can explain why a contender is weak in the first place, but big problems cannot be crises.

Specifying a critical condition in concrete terms appears to be a daunting task

[5] Seweryn Bialer's notion of "crisis of effectiveness" really refers to just such a contradiction—between political and economic centralization and economic efficiency and growth. See *The Soviet Paradox* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 75. Relatedly, scholars who speak of permanent crises really seem to mean that some systems, like sickly patients, are especially prone to critical conditions.

[6] Karl W. Deutsch, "The Crisis of the State" in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., *Comparative Politics. Notes and Readings* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986), 44–45. Deutsch's entire definition reads as follows: "Crisis we may call a situation with three characteristics: an existing state of affairs has become untenable, or is rapidly becoming so; a new more stable and tenable pattern or arrangement is not known or does not appear to be practicable, due to ignorance, lack of means, lack of consensus or the pressure of countervailing interests; and the search for such a viable and practicable pattern, its establishment in practice and the decisions relating to this task all must be carried out under great pressure of time."

[7] I develop the tug-of-war image with respect to stability and instability in *Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 6.

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until we consider what the logical consequence of unresolved crises must be. The physical annihilation of states or the rapid transformation of conceptual types is tantamount to total defeat in war or revolution. Consequently, as that which conceptually precedes revolution or defeat, crises must be either revolutionary situations or defensive wars.[8] Both modes of being are characterized by multiple sovereignty: they are conditions whose immediate resolution will determine whether or not a state survives as the state it is. Revolutionary situations can, of course, emerge as a result of challenges from below by revolutionary forces within society, from outside by foreign revolutionaries, or from above by revolutionary forces within the state. No less than the first two, revolutions from above are preceded by conditions of multiple sovereignty, when radical and anti-radical forces within the state are engaged in a struggle for the upper hand. Revolutions from above may be said to have occurred when the radicals have won.

Significantly, my definition of crisis as a condition of multiple sovereignty accords with most scholarly use of the term and, no less important, it appeals to common sense. Thus, we routinely call 1917 a year of crisis for the Kerensky government, the Russian Civil War a crisis for the Bolsheviks, and 1980–1981 a crisis for the Polish United Workers Party. The period from Hitler's attack on the USSR on 22 June 1941 to the conclusion of the battle of Stalingrad in early 1943 was clearly a crisis for the USSR, as was for Poland the Red Army's drive to the Vistula in mid-1920. So, too, Iraq's attack on Iran in 1980 brought about a crisis for the latter, although the subsequent Iranian counterattack and stalemate were a crisis for neither side. Finally, we say that Weimar was in crisis in 1933, especially during Hitler's policy of revolutionary *Gleichschaltung*, or coordination, as was the Soviet party-state in 1937–1938 during Stalin's purges.[9]

Given such a definition, it becomes immediately evident that the contemporary Soviet system is nowhere near a critical condition. Agriculture and industry may be woefully inefficient and wasteful, the bureaucracy may be strangling society, youth may be disillusioned, and the ideology may have lost its appeal. In a word, the USSR's big problems may be—and obviously are—enormous and quite

[8] On multiple sovereignty as the defining characteristic of revolutionary situations, see Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1978), 191.

[9] Scott C. Flanagan's is a somewhat looser definition of crisis—one that I would be inclined to attribute to instability. But it, too, goes in the same conceptual direction, thus confirming my point that significant challenges to sovereignty are at the core of the concept: "Systemic crisis is a challenge to the authority of the constituted decision-makers expressed through extralegal means of protest on a scale sufficient to threaten the incumbents' ability to maintain order and continued occupancy of authority roles. In other words, a crisis becomes visible when non-compliance or the imminent expectation of non-compliance to the authorized rules and procedures for processing demands and effecting change threatens the incumbents' constitution. Thus non-compliance is manifested in nonsanctioned forms of protest and resistance—civil disobedience, strikes, assassinations, sabotage, rioting, etc. According to this definition, a crisis is resolved when the threat of systemic attack has been removed and compliance has once again been ensured." Scott C. Flanagan, "Models and Methods of Analysis" in Gabriel A. Almond et al., eds., *Crisis, Choice, and Change. Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 48.

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numerous. But as all scholars realize, there is no way to characterize the USSR's current condition as one of multiple sovereignty or anything even remotely approximating it: quite simply, genuine contenders are absent.[10] The Baltic popular fronts, like the Armenian and Georgian movements, do not qualify, because by their very nature as the regionally-focused nationalisms of peripherally located small nations, they represent limited and, therefore, fully containable "small problems." To be sure, the USSR's big problems, if unchecked, *could* result in the country's secular decline, decay, or degeneration; indeed, they could generate country-wide anti-state forces and provide them with the resources and constituencies they need to mount serious challenges to the authorities. But note that such a conclusion flatly contradicts the scenario connoted by the concept of crisis. After all, decay is a long-term, evolutionary process quite unlike the sudden collapse or transformation heralded by crisis terminology. Moreover, measuring decay or predicting with any degree of accuracy its future course is well-nigh impossible.

Although Sovietologists instinctively understand that the USSR was not on the verge of non-being after almost two decades of Leonid Brezhnev's rule, we persist in using a word that connotes just such a meaning. The effects of what Giovanni Sartori calls "concept stretching" are debilitating, because so cavalier an attitude toward analysis permits scholars to win easy debating points without pondering the analytical consequences of their carelessness.[11] Since concepts, theories, and hypotheses are inextricably related, "crisis" leads scholars to overstate the urgency of the USSR's big problems and misinterpret Mikhail Gorbachev's.[12] In turn, recognizing that the Soviet Union's collapse or transformation into something else will not happen overnight leads to several important conclusions.

First, however severe its problems, the USSR is sure to remain a formidable world actor for a long time. After all, the vast majority of states, even those that manage to address and resolve their problems with some degree of temporary success, are never exempt from having to face substantial, perhaps even unsolvable, difficulties. Times of trouble are exceptional only in that they are especially troubling. Modern states with inflated ambitions of managing all aspects of social, political, and economic life in the realms under their jurisdiction have set themselves a humanly impossible task. As a result, systemic dysfunctions—unemployment, inflation, citizen dissatisfaction, crime, poverty, racial conflict, strikes, and demonstrations—are the order of the day. Indeed, big problems are endemic to modern states, which respond mostly by tinkering with one problem, throwing money at another, ignoring a third, resolving a fourth. And, for better or for worse, they do get by.

[10] To his credit, Gorbachev appears to appreciate this point. Unfortunately, the term he prefers, "pre-crisis," is about as specific as "pre-death."

[11] Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review* 64 (December 1970): 1033–1053.

[12] On the structure of theories, see Stephen Gaukroger, *Explanatory Structures* (Hassocks, Eng.: The Harvester Press, 1978); Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

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If radical reform is the exception, not the rule, for all states, then the stability of states is not directly dependent on such reforms.[13] That is, radical reform may be a sufficient condition of stability under most circumstances, but a necessary one under very few. Indeed, the historical experience of states shows that they can flourish for many decades without radical reform. The USSR's predecessor, imperial Russia, is a case in point. As radical as they were, Peter the Great's reforms were insufficient to prevent Russia's subsequent internal decay. Nonetheless, Russia not only survived for close to two hundred years after Peter's death, but also expanded into Eastern Europe, the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Siberia, and Central Asia—hardly a poor record for a declining state in need of radical reform. Moreover, it is not at all self-evident that the empire's days were numbered in 1914, had not World War I intervened and shaken the tsarist state at its very foundations.

Second, since decline is a long-term process, reform need not be immediate or immediately successful in order ultimately to succeed in reviving the system. History tells us that most states at most times do not embark on major, radical, and long-lasting reforms willingly. States, to put it somewhat baldly, are not in the business of transforming themselves. If and when big problems occur, the impulse for reform may, but need not, arise. Radical change, be it consciously chosen by governing elites or externally imposed by foreign states or revolutionary forces, is not an everyday occurrence. For the most part, states simply lumber along; they muddle through from problem to problem, from mess to mess. The business of states is business as usual. And surprisingly or not, they do manage to survive, even with relatively low levels of policy effectiveness and decidedly low levels of policy innovation.

Naturally, governments come and go with predetermined regularity, as in countries with established constitutional procedures, or with unpredictable regularity, as in countries without such procedures. Leaders also come and go, popular expectations rise and fall, conflict heats up or cools down, domestic and foreign problems rear their heads, but states as states remain for the most part unaffected. Their bureaucratic structure, their relationship to economy and society, their overall political predilections, their general commitment to what they already are generally remain unchanged. Business as usual is the norm for all states, and all states have a remarkable capacity to muddle through as the states they are.

There are exceptions to this generalization. Wars have a way of undermining states and providing the impulse for radical change.[14] Major economic and social catastrophes often serve the same kind of catalytic function. In some cases a drawn-out process of incremental change may finally result—under circumstances that few social scientists would dare claim to have understood—in the cup's running

[13] For a discussion of stability, see Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel?*, 1-19.

[14] For discussions of the war-revolution connection, see Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Charles Tilly, "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation" in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Modern Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 601-638.

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over. None of these countercases, and there are many, changes the fact that lack of radical reform is typical for most systems and that most systems can manage to survive at some level of effectiveness even under such supposedly dire circumstances for remarkably long periods of time. In sum, planned radical change, like systemic crisis and conscious choice, is rare. Things are no different in the Soviet Union, and that means that it may have much more time to change than we are willing to grant.

II

It is ironic to note how similar American analyses of the USSR are to left-wing analyses of the United States. Even the terminology is virtually identical: radicals speak of the crisis of the capitalist state, while Americans speak of the crisis of the Soviet state.[15] The parallel between left-wing critiques of American capitalism and mainstream critiques of Soviet communism is instructive, because it shows us the degree to which conclusions are implied in the kinds of questions that are asked and the kinds of evidence that is collected. Left-wing critics know that capitalism is doomed. American scholars know that the USSR is a thoroughly unviable system. If Gorbachev's utterances support this view, all the better; if Brezhnev's do not, dismiss them as typically Soviet propaganda. Given these premises, it is no wonder that both sides reach similar conclusions vis-à-vis the systems they study: all current problems are unresolvable, while all resolved problems are only temporary quick fixes bound to break down.

In essence, the two sides argue that both capitalist and socialist systems are continually confronted with a dilemma of reform. Reform is necessary, but for some reason impossible; hence the dilemma, and hence the inevitable breakdown. The problem with industrial democracies is that they are wedded to capitalism in general and to repressive class structures in particular. Autonomous or not, capitalist states are in the last analysis captives of the ruling class and, try as they might, cannot overcome the imperatives of bourgeois class rule. The bourgeoisie is doomed, and all attempts of the capitalist state to perpetuate its rule, even under the guise of welfare state policies that seem to undermine ruling class interests, result only in growing contradictions, sharpened class consciousness, and heightened class struggle. What is the solution to the capitalist dilemma of reform? It is socialism, which alone can overcome the inherent contradictions of these systems.

American analysts tend to view the USSR in similar terms. For them, the problem with the socialist system is that it is wedded to centralized economic planning in general and the Communist Party in particular. Socialism is in the last analysis economically irrational and inefficient, while the Party has long outlived whatever usefulness it may have had in constructing Soviet society. The result is economic stagnation, technological backwardness, political repression, and ideological suffo-

[15] An example is James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

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cation. Once again, the implicit and often explicit solution to these profound contradictions is economic decentralization and political democracy, preferably a turn to a free market and perhaps even a whiff of capitalism.

There are elements of truth in both perspectives. The cyclical nature of capitalist development, as manifested in recurrent recessions and depressions, the attendant inflation, unemployment, class conflict, and racial antagonisms are not figments of left-wing imagination. They have plagued and in all likelihood will continue to plague the United States and other advanced industrial democracies for a long time to come. Naturally, the radical left is not alone in pointing to these problems. A variety of middle-of-the-road scholars share its conviction that, unless reforms are adopted soon, the United States may be headed for disaster.[16] They point to the country's inability to compete on the world market in general and with Japan in particular, the alarming growth of the national debt, the inadequacy of the infrastructure, the possibility of deindustrialization and the division of the population into high-tech employees and fast-food workers, the continued existence of poverty and racism, growing illiteracy, the narcissism of American youth, the demoralization of the working class, the shrinkage of the middle class, and the decline of the trade union movement.

No serious analyst of the American political scene would deny that these are real problems. Yet very few analysts assume that the United States is congenitally incapable of reforming itself or of confronting and solving these problems, if not immediately, then certainly in the not too distant future. Very few analysts and probably no policy makers would ever go so far as to suggest that all these factors point to inevitable doom. It is assumed that the United States has historically manifested so large a degree of vitality and flexibility that there is in the last analysis no cause for alarm. Americans will rally together, their leaders will implement intelligent policies, and things will improve. Even the 19 October 1987 stock market meltdown—as cataclysmic an event as any in a capitalist economy—has generally not been interpreted as the beginning of the end of the world.

Intellectual honesty demands of scholars that we apply similar standards to the Soviet case. Naturally we should not underestimate the severity of their problems, but we should avoid the pitfalls of circularity and not smuggle our conclusions into our premises. After all, if we know and believe that communism simply cannot work—while the American way of life naturally can and does—it is no surprise that we reach the conclusion that it does not work.

Quite possibly the USSR *is* unviable. It would be absurd to reject this possibility a priori. If so, however, we need to specify exactly how unviability manifests itself and demonstrate why our conclusions regarding the Soviet Union cannot be extended to other political systems in general and the American in particular. Systems may decay or degenerate on their own, but the criteria we choose for determining the propinquity or likelihood of such eventualities must be capable of being applied comparatively to a variety of systems. If our critieria are specific only to

[16] For example, see Lester C. Thurow, "A Useful Mirror," *The Atlantic*, February 1983.

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some system, there is simply no way of answering the accusation that we are merely describing, and not really explaining, a system's woes.

III

Sovietologists are especially prone to overstate the USSR's unviability and incapacity to change, because we judge its recent performance out of historical context and then project that performance into the future—an error akin to the Marxist propensity to ignore the cyclical nature of capitalist development and focus only on recessions. The history of this century shows that capitalist states have a flexibility and vitality that early Marxists completely overlooked. Their policy choices are not limitless, but neither are they as narrow as the left-wing critique implies. States are not machines that are preprogrammed in a certain direction and, therefore, have to be "smashed"; they can adapt, they can innovate, they can even act against their purported interests.

Just as radical critiques of capitalism tend to be simplistic, so, too, do western critiques of communism. Communist states, like their capitalist counterparts, are also capable of change; Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and China are testimony to that. Indeed, the Soviet Union has probably undergone more change in the last seventy years than any country in the developed world. Stalin's "revolution from above" radically altered the face of Soviet society; and, what is more, it effectively resolved the "crises" of industry and agriculture that arose in the mid- to late-1920s. Nikita Khrushchev's partial dismantling of the totalitarian Stalinist state was also a major feat of social engineering. To be sure, the late Brezhnev years were a period of stagnation, but only after bold measures were taken in the 1960s to reverse Khrushchev's hare-brained schemes. Now, as before, there are powerful forces in the Party, government, and economic bureaucracy opposed to change of any kind. Yet, if history is any guide to the future, the atrophy of Brezhnev's rule will probably be overcome. Gorbachev may eventually fall flat on his face, but his debut does suggest that the continuation of Brezhnevite policies need not be historically inevitable.

In any case, whether Brezhnev's legacy is typical or anomalous, it would be a grievous methodological error to project it into the future. Present trends need not be future trends; projections are not predictions. One of the reasons for Sovietologists' initial underestimation of Gorbachev and their continued surprise at his policy initiatives is that a decade of stagnation under Brezhnev had persuaded them that Soviet leaders were incapable of vision, initiative, and boldness. The USSR's least dynamic features were then reified, made into the system's defining characteristics, and declared impervious to change. Now, it may turn out that the USSR really cannot change—not because of Brezhnev's extended rule, but because of forces, trends, and developments that are currently acquiring momentum and which will come into their own in the next decade or two.

The methodological point is that with every change instituted by Gorbachev, and they promise to be many, the less valid it becomes to apply yesterday's analysis of Brezhnevism to today's Soviet system. As what Ernst Nagel calls the "initial

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conditions" (those empirical conditions that must be met for a certain interpretation to hold) of a theory change, so, too, our analytical categories and theoretical frameworks have to change.[17] Just as it was incorrect to ascribe to Brezhnev's USSR all the characteristics of Stalinism, so, too, it is counterproductive to think of the post-Brezhnev era in exclusively Brezhnevite terms. (This is not to say, of course, that Stalinism, Khrushchevism, and Brezhnevism may not all be variants of some conceptual type—say, totalitarianism or authoritarianism.) The challenge before scholars is to keep their fingers on the pulse of change in the USSR and adjust their theories accordingly. The alternative is to engage in what the Soviets call "mistaking wishes for reality" and to experience rude shocks as our explanations consistently fail to account for the possibility of major deviations from our expectations.

No less fallacious than projecting Soviet decay into the foreseeable future is to do the same for American growth. It is all too easy to fall into the trap of making the worst assumptions for one's adversary and the best ones for oneself, of projecting his negative trends and one's positive ones, of ignoring the historical context. After all, the prospects for continued American ascendancy in an increasingly multipolar world may not be too sanguine. America's ability to set the world's political agenda and propose appropriate courses of action has declined markedly since the Vietnam war; its ability to project and utilize military power has also visibly diminished; its ability to compete economically needs no comment. Indeed, if this country were to experience a severe recession—hardly an outlandish scenario—its relative standing vis-à-vis the Soviets would decline, thus giving the USSR extra breathing space for its own reforms and perhaps even stabilizing the current correlation of forces.

The possibility of American decline may necessitate a rethinking of the scholarly approach to the Soviet-American relationship. As Paul Kennedy suggests, the end of the twentieth century, like the middle, may be a time of declining empires—not the British and French this time, but the Soviet and American.[18] Naturally, nuclear weapons add a special twist to the prospect of Soviet and American decline. Nonetheless, they do not alter the fact that the world may be a very different place in the twenty-first century on both sides of the Atlantic. The implications of such a transformation are surely profound, not only for the United States and the Soviet Union, but especially for their allies and, of course, all the world.

IV

If crises are best defined as immediately life-threatening conditions upon whose successful resolution systemic survival depends, then it clearly, though paradoxi-

[17] Ernst Nagel, *The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), 31.

[18] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1988); see also Richard J. Krickus, *The Superpowers in Crisis: Implications of Domestic Discord* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987).

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cally, follows that radical reform is not the logical response to crisis. Beating back one's adversary—as in a revolutionary situation or defensive war—and reestablishing sovereignty is the only rational immediate course of action. Quite logically, therefore, General Wojciech Jaruzelski responded to Solidarity's life-threatening challenge in 1981 with coercion, not reform; in 1989 his response to the Party's problem of dealing with a recalcitrant civil society was to reform Poland's political system. Radical reform is, then, not what leaders choose to do in response to systemic crises. Rather, it seems far more plausible to suggest that leaders pursue radical reform either to defuse big problems and thus forestall the possibility of systemic crises,[19] or to resolve their own leadership crises. In the first case, reform is systemically necessary, but its success need not be immediate. In the second instance, reform is incidental to systemic health, but its success must be rapid.

The distinctive character of Gorbachev's reform measures is that they appear to be prompted by both leadership crisis and big problems. They are testimony, perhaps, to the remarkably consistent manner in which succession struggles and reform initiatives are intertwined in the USSR. For Gorbachev, immediate, radical, and successful reform is imperative, first and foremost for reasons of personal political survival—a point brought home forcefully by his unending attempts to blunt the criticism of left-wing populists such as Boris Yeltsin and right-wing reformers such as Yegor Ligachev. If the crisis is Gorbachev's, and not the system's, then the general secretary's alarmist language, his remarkably critical analysis of Soviet society, especially at the 19th Party Conference in 1988, and his growing stridency must be reassessed.[20] Not an unfolding master plan of action against systemic crisis, they may be Gorbachev's response to the obstacles to his consolidating power, building authority, and instituting reform. Like all good politicians, he may be escalating the rhetoric as part of a strategy to overcome opposition to his program for addressing the country's big problems and establishing control.

These reflections suggest a number of interesting and testable hypotheses. Other things—such as big problems—being equal, leaders should be most inclined to reform a system if its malfunctioning appears to threaten their elite status or when their survival as an elite actually is at stake. Given the nature of the vote-getting process, we expect democratic politicians to be most prone to tinker on a day-to-day basis, and authoritarian and totalitarian ones to be least inclined to do so. When leadership crises occur, however, when challenges to their authority are so great that their status appears to be in question, then we expect a relatively equal degree of commitment to far-reaching reform among all types of leaders. *Ceteris paribus*, therefore, communist reforms should come in spurts, as indeed they do. Democratic reforms should be more or less ongoing processes whose intensity increases if and when leadership crises occur. This reasoning suggests why democra-

[19] This, precisely, is Colton's point with regard to Gorbachev. See Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform*, 61–67.

[20] *Kommunist* 3 (February 1987): 5–47.

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cies may in fact be more durable systems in the long run.[21] Whereas both democratic and communist systems can and do change, the communist tendency to wait until a "pre-crisis" condition emerges can but negatively affect systemic effectiveness, societal attitudes toward the elite, and the ease with which reform can be implemented. Ironically, the lesson posed by systemic "crisis" for Gorbachev and his comrades is not so much that radical restructuring is necessary, but that ongoing reform might make it unnecessary.

[21] On the durability of different types of political systems, see Ted Robert Gurr, "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971," *American Political Science Review* 68 (December 1974): 1482–1504.

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Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas

DEBORAH A. STONE

There is an old saw in political science that difficult conditions become problems only when people come to see them as amenable to human action. Until then, difficulties remain embedded in the realm of nature, accident, and fate—a realm where there is no choice about what happens to us. The conversion of difficulties into problems is said to be the *sine qua non* of political rebellion, legal disputes, interest-group mobilization, and of moving policy problems onto the public agenda.[1]

This article is about how situations come to be seen as caused by human actions and amenable to human intervention. Despite the acknowledged importance of this phenomenon as a precursor to political participation and to agenda setting, there is little systematic inquiry about it in the political science literature. For the most part, the question is dealt with under the rubric of agenda setting, even though the transformation of difficulties into problems takes place in something of a black box prior to agenda formation. Three strands of thinking in the agenda literature contribute indirectly to an understanding of this topic. One strand focuses on the identity and characteristics of political actors—leaders, interest groups, professionals, breaucrats. It looks at the actors' attitudes, resources, and opportunities

[1] On litigation, see William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and Austin Sarat, "The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming," *Law and Society Review* 15 (1980–81): 631–654; on interest groups, the locus classicus is David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); on agenda formation, see John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 115–121.

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to account for the appearance of policy problems and their particular formulations at any given time.[2] A second strand focuses on the nature of the difficulties or harms themselves – for example, whether they are serious or mild, new or recurring, short-term or long-term, health effects or economic effects.[3] Finally, a third strand focuses on the deliberate use of language and of symbols in particular as a way of getting an issue onto the public agenda or, alternatively, keeping it off.[4]

While each of these approaches gives us some insight into the processes of problem definition and agenda setting, they miss what I think is the core substance of the transformation of difficulties into political problems: causal ideas. Problem definition is a process of image making, where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility. Conditions, difficulties, or issues thus do not have inherent properties that make them more or less likely to be seen as problems or to be expanded. Rather, political actors *deliberately portray* them in ways calculated to gain support for their side. And political actors, in turn, do not simply accept causal models that are given from science or popular culture or any other source. They compose stories that describe harms and difficulties, attribute them to actions of other individuals or organizations, and thereby claim the right to invoke government power to stop the harm. Government action might include prohibition of an activity, regulation, taxation, economic redistribution, criminal sanctions, education campaigns, direct compensation of victims (through social insurance or special funds), and mandated compensation of victims (through litigation).

In thinking about how causal argument works in politics, I have borrowed from all three strands of the agenda-setting literature. I take a social constructionist view of policy problems. That is to say, I believe our understanding of real situations is always mediated by ideas; those ideas in turn are created, changed, and fought over in politics. I will show how political actors use narrative story lines and symbolic devices to manipulate so-called issue characteristics, all the while making it seem as though they are simply describing facts.[5] I have created a typology of causal stories, and I hope to demonstrate with a variety of examples that there is in fact a systematic process with fairly clear rules of the game by which political actors struggle to control interpretations and images of difficulties.

[2] I see this approach as the main thrust of Kingdon's *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, ibid., though he certainly incorporates the second and third approaches mentioned below.

[3] This strand is best exemplified by Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), chaps. 6 and 7. Cobb and Elder also pay attention to the nature of the participants and to symbolic language (see esp. chaps. 8 and 9), but I think their distinctive contribution is the argument that certain characteristics of a difficult situation determine whether it is likely to expand.

[4] The work of Murray Edelman dominates this tradition. See his *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964); *Politics as Symbolic Action* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971); and *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

[5] The best analysis I know of using this perspective is Joseph Gusfield, *The Culture of Public Problems* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

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Causal stories have both an empirical and a moral dimension. On the empirical level, they purport to demonstrate the mechanism by which one set of people brings about harms to another set. On the normative level, they blame one set of people for causing the suffering of others. On both levels, causal stories move situations intellectually from the realm of fate to the realm of human agency. This intellectual step is the key trigger for moving a condition onto what Roger Cobb and Charles Elder call the "systemic agenda," the set of issues up for general discussion in a polity.[6] The great books that launched public issues, such as Ralph Nader's *Unsafe At Any Speed*, all performed this intellectual transformation, as I will show later. But the competition to control causal stories does not stop once an issue reaches either the systemic or the formal agenda. Causal stories continue to be important in the formulation and selection of alternative policy responses, because they locate the burdens of reform very differently.

In politics, causal theories are neither right nor wrong, nor are they mutually exclusive. They are ideas about causation, and policy politics involves strategically portraying issues so that they fit one causal idea or another. The different sides in an issue act as if they are trying to find the "true" cause, but they are always struggling to influence which idea is selected to guide policy. Political conflicts over causal stories are, therefore, more than empirical claims about sequences of events. They are fights about the possibility of control and the assignment of responsibility.

A Typology of Causal Stories

We have two primary frameworks for interpreting the world—the natural and the social. In the natural world, we understand occurrences to be "undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided, 'purely physical'."[7] There may be natural determinants—the clash of a cold front and a warm front causes a storm. But there is no willful intention behind the occurrences, at least not without invoking a purposeful God. The natural world is the realm of fate and accident, and we believe we have an adequate understanding of causation when we can describe the sequence of events by which one thing leads to another. In the social world, we understand events to be the result of *will*, usually human but perhaps animal. The social world is the realm of control and intent. We usually think we have an adequate understanding of causation when we can identify the purposes or motives of a person or group and link those purposes to their actions. Because we understand causation in the social sphere as related to purpose, we believe that influence works. Coaxing, flattering, bribing, and threatening make sense as efforts to change the course of events; and it is possible to conceive of preventing things from happening in the first place. In the natural world, influence has no place. We laugh

[6] Cobb and Elder, *Participation*, 14.

[7] Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 22.

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at those who would bring rain with their dances or sweet talk their computer into compliance. In the natural world the best we can do is to mitigate effects.

In everyday discourse, as Erving Goffman points out, we use the term "causality" to refer to both "the blind effect of nature and intended effect of man, the first seen as an infinitely extended chain of caused and causing effects and the second something that somehow begins with a mental decision."[8] Yet in politics, the distinction between actions that have purpose, will, or motivation and those that do not is crucial. So, too, is the distinction between effects that are intended and those that are not, since we know all too well that our purposeful actions may have unintended consequences.

These two distinctions—between action and consequences and between purpose and lack of purpose—can be used to create a framework for describing the causal stories used in politics. (See Table 1.) Each box contains a different kind of story about causality. The four types are rough categories with fuzzy boundaries, not clear dichotomies. The table is meant to serve as a map to show how political actors push an issue from one territory to another.

The most important feature of the table is that there are two relatively strong, pure positions—accident and intent—and two relatively weak, mixed positions—mechanical and inadvertent cause. In the struggle over problem definition, the sides will seek to stake out the strong positions but will often move into one of the weaker positions as a next-best option.

In the upper right box are accidental causes. These include natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, droughts, and hurricanes. Here we might also put machines run amok—the car that careens out of control or the CAT scanner that crushes its captive patient. These phenomena are devoid of purpose, either in their actions or consequences. In fact, one cannot properly speak of actions here, but only of occurrences. This is the realm of accident and fate.

Since our cultural understanding of accidents defines them as events beyond human control, causal politics is centrally concerned with moving interpretations of a situation from the realm of accident to one of the three realms of control. This is not to say that government action is limited to the realm of human control; we often call upon government to mitigate the effects of natural disasters, for example, by providing famine relief or aid for flood and storm victims. Yet even for natural disasters, where there is probably the strongest cultural agreement that they are indeed accidents, there is sometimes a political struggle over even that consensus as victims call for government aid. For example, government-subsidized flood insurance has been opposed because it artificially lowers the true cost of residing or doing business in a flood plain; it thus gives people an incentive to do something that an informed rational calculus would prevent. Government, too, is often called upon to prevent accidents; but almost always the debate then turns on whether and how human action contributes to accident or exacerbates its effects.[9]

[8] Ibid., 23.

[9] See, for example, Anders Wijkman and Lloyd Timerlake, *Natural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts*

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TABLE 1

Types of Causal Theories

Actions	Consequences: Intended	Consequences: Unintended
Unguided	**MECHANICAL CAUSE** intervening agent machines trained animals brainwashed people	**ACCIDENTAL CAUSE** nature weather earthquakes machines that run amok
Purposeful	**INTENTIONAL CAUSE** assault oppression conspiracies that work programs that work	**INADVERTENT CAUSE** intervening conditions unforeseen side effects neglect carelessness omission

In the lower left box are intentional causes, where an action was willfully taken by human beings in order to bring about the consequences that actually happened. When the consequences are perceived as good, this is the domain we know as rational action, apotheosized by the professional schools of public policy. When the consequences are perceived as bad, we have stories of oppressors and victims. In this box also belong conspiracy stories; here the argument is that problems are the result of deliberate but concealed human action. For example, the Johns Manville company knew about the dangers of asbestos exposure but concealed them from its employees.

In the lower right box are inadvertent causes, or the unintended consequences of willed human action. (Actions often have good side effects, but I will ignore these, since we are talking about problems here.) One type of story in this box is the tale of harmful side effects of well-intentioned policy. Here, the consequences are predictable but still unforeseen. Lester Thurow tells such a story about infla-

of Man? (Washington, D.C.: International Institute for Environment and Development, 1984), arguing that the event, if not the consequences, in most floods, droughts, famines, etc. can be prevented or mitigated by human action.

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tion during the Nixon era. Richard Nixon imposed wage and price controls to stem inflation, but didn't realize that in the context of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, the controls would only create even bigger price increases when they were lifted. Economic theory would predict exactly these results.[10]

Stories of inadvertent cause are common in social policy; problems such as poverty, malnutrition, and disease are "caused" when people do not understand the harmful consequences of their willful actions. The poor do not realize how important it is to get education or save money; the elderly do not understand how important it is to eat a balanced diet even if they are not hungry; the sick do not understand that overeating leads to diabetes and heart disease. Inadvertence here is ignorance; the consequences are predictable by experts but unappreciated by those taking the actions. These stories are soft (liberal) versions of blaming the victim: if the person with the problem only changed his or her behavior, the problem would not exist. The conservative version of blaming the victim is intentional causation: the victim actually chooses to have the problem. Thus, as President Ronald Reagan said about the homeless, there are those who sleep on grates by choice.[11]

Another type of inadvertence is carelessness or recklessness. Problems in occupational safety and health are often explained in this rubric, although carelessness is alternately attributed to labor or management. In management's version, workers understand the dangers of machines or chemicals; but they decline to use protective gear and safety devices because their tasks are easier, more comfortable, or faster without the precautions. In labor's version, management understands the hazards; but it does not monitor equipment conscientiously or provide safety gear, hoping it can keep productivity up without any undue mishaps. And in a more radical labor version, management knowingly stints on safety in the interests of profits, a conscious trade-off that pushes the problem into the sphere of intent.

In the upper left box are mechanical causes. It contains things that have no will of their own but are designed, programmed, or trained by humans to produce certain consequences. The idea of mechanical cause is that the effects of actions are intended, but the actions are guided only indirectly; someone's will is carried out through other people or through machines. There is an intervening agent. The notion of planned obsolescence is such a causal story: manufacturers design light bulbs, appliances, and tools to wear out so that consumers will have to buy new ones. The story asserts that a problem once thought to be unintended machine failure (accident) is really a case of intended machine failure (mechanism). In this category might also fit situations – common in tort law – where one person frightens another; the frightened person acts reflexively, almost mechanically, in a way that creates a harm. For example, a person frightened by one danger dashes into an oncoming car or drives his own car into someone else's.

[10] Lester Thurow, *Dangerous Currents*, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 54–56.

[11] Reagan speech, 31 January 1984, cited in Herbert Block, *Through the Looking Glass* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), 123.

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In mechanical cause, the exact nature of human guidance or control is at issue. Often a fight about the cause of a problem is a debate about whether certain people are acting out of their own will or carrying out the will of others. To return to the example of malnutrition, one liberal causal story rests on unintended consequences of purposeful action: malnourished people do not know how to eat a proper diet or, alternatively, unwittingly sacrifice good nutrition in trying to stretch their meager resources. A conservative story rests on intended consequences of purposeful action: malnourished people knowingly choose to spend their food money on beer and junk food. And a radical causal story rests on indirect control: food processors and advertisers, in their quest for profits, manipulate people into eating junk food and unbalanced diets.

If the nature of human control over other humans is problematic, so is human control over machines. Debates about nuclear power, chemical plants, airplane accidents, and toxic chemical spills usually center on this issue. After a chemical leak at the Union Carbide plant in Institute, West Virginia in 1985, company officials blamed a computer for their delay in notifying local authorities. The computer had erroneously predicted that the aldicarb oxime gas cloud would not leave the plant site. Officials told a story of accidental breakdown. Then the president of the company that had made the computer safety system said the computer had never been programmed to detect aldicarb oxime. "The computer worked exactly the way it was supposed to," he affirmed, changing the story to pure mechanism. He revealed that his company could have provided a more expensive safety system that would have detected the leak, predicted the flow of the cloud, and automatically notified local authorities; but Union Carbide had ordered only the "basic model."[12]

By the end of the week, the Union Carbide story had grown hopelessly complex. The injuries from the leak could be traced to a tank that wasn't designed to hold aldicarb oxime, faulty meters on another tank, defective safety valves, weak gaskets, pipes too small for the job, mistaken transmission of steam to the tank, failure of control room operators to notice pressure and temperature gauges, failure of the computer to detect the spreading gas cloud, failure of executives to purchase a program that could detect the chemical, and failure of government to regulate the chemical industry.[13]

The Union Carbide "accident" suggests a type of causal story far more complex than can be contained in the table. The ideas of accidental, mechanical, intentional, and inadvertent cause all conjure up images of a single actor, a single action, and a direct result. This underlying image remains even when the ideas are

[12] David Sanger, "Carbide Computer Could Not Track Gas That Escaped," *New York Times*, 14 August 1985.

[13] See, in addition to Sanger article, ibid., Stuart Diamond, "Carbide Blames A Faulty Design for Toxic Leak," *New York Times*, 13 August 1985; Stuart Diamond, "Chemical Pipe Size Called Key Safety Factor" *New York Times*, 14 August 1985; and Robert E. Taylor, "Carbide Tank Wasn't Designed to Hold Chemicals That Leaked," *Wall Street Journal*, 16 August 1985.

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applied to corporations, agencies, and large groups—or to sequences of identifiable actions and results. Many policy problems—the toxic hazard problem notable among them—require a more complex model of cause to offer any satisfying explanation. There is a wide variety of such models, but let me paint three broad types.

One might be called "complex systems."[14] It holds that the social systems necessary to solve modern problems are inherently complex. Today's technological systems, such as chemical production, involve parts that serve multiple functions, juxtaposition of different environments (high and low temperatures), complicated feedback loops, and interactions between different parts of a system. In such complex interactive systems, it is impossible to anticipate all possible events and effects; so failure or accident is inevitable. Failures also involve so many components and people that it is impossible to attribute blame in any fashion consistent with our cultural norm that responsibility presupposes control.

A second type of complex cause might be called "institutional." It envisions a social problem as caused by a web of large, long-standing organizations with ingrained patterns of behavior. The problem of cost overruns and "gold-plating" in weapons acquisition—symbolized by $630 toilet seats—has been explained in these terms. The armed services operate with a basic drive to have the edge in operational performance over the other side. They believe that it pays to develop the best quality weapons during peacetime, because Congress will certainly authorize high quantity production during wars. The different service branches gain by colluding for overall increases in the defense budget rather than competing with each other for a fixed pie. The services also gain by colluding with industry contractors to push programs through Congress on the basis of low initial cost estimates and by coming back later for increases once costs have been sunk. As one analyst says, "the causes of gold plating in its broadest sense are rooted in the institutional interests and professional outlooks of the military."[15]

A third type of complex cause might be called "historical" or "structural." Quite similar to institutional explanations, this model holds that social patterns tend to reproduce themselves. People with power and resources to stop a problem (for example, mining accidents) benefit from the social organization that keeps them in power and maintain it through control over selection of elites and socialization of both elites and non-elites. People who are victimized by a problem do not seek political change because they do not see the problem as changeable, do not believe they could bring about change, and need the material resources for survival provided by the status quo. Causal explanations of poverty that blame economic inequality or capitalism would be examples of such a structural explanation.[16]

[14] For an excellent statement and exploration of this theory, see Charles Perrow, *Normal Accidents* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[15] Robert J. Art, "Restructuring the Military-Industrial Complex: Arms Control in Institutional Perspective," *Public Policy* 22 (Fall 1974): 423–459.

[16] A well thought-out example of this type of argument is Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers's explanation of how capitalist democracy reproduces itself, in their *On Democracy* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1983), chap. 3. On historicist causal theories, see also Arthur Stinchcomb, *Constructing Social Theories* (New York: Harcourt Brace, and World, 1968), 101–130.

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Images of complex cause are in some sense analogous to accidental or natural cause. They postulate a kind of innocence, in that no identifiable actor can exert control over the whole system or web of interactions. Without overarching control, there can be no purpose and no responsibility. Complex causal explanations are not very useful in politics, precisely because they do not offer a single locus of control, a plausible candidate to take responsibility for a problem, or a point of leverage to fix a problem. Hence, one of the biggest tensions beween political science and real-world politics. The former tends to see complex causes of social problems, while the latter searches for immediate and simple causes.

Strategies of Causal Argument

There are many strategies for pushing responsibility onto someone else. For the side that believes it is the victim of harm, the strongest claim it can make is to accuse someone else of intentionally causing the problem. Short of being able to make that claim stick, the victim group will allege either mechanical causation or inadvertent causation. Mechanical causation is a somewhat stronger claim, because it implies intended consequences, even if only through indirect guidance such as management instructions to floor supervisors or explicit decisions to design a safety system for some contingencies but not others.

Books and studies that catalyze public issues have a common structure to their argument. They claim that a condition formerly interpreted as accident is actually the result of human will, either indirectly (mechanical or inadvertent cause) or directly (intentional cause); or they show that a condition formerly interpreted as indirectly caused is actually pure intent. Crystal Eastman's *Work Accidents and the Law*, usually deemed the trigger event for Workmen's Compensation, showed that workplace injuries were not primarily caused by worker carelessness (inadvertence) but by employer refusal to provide safe machines and working conditions (intent). Eastman's framing of the problem is illustrative of the political logic in all these arguments:

> If adequate investigation reveals that most work-accidents happen because workmen are fools, like Frank Koroshic, who reached into danger in spite of every precaution taken to protect him, then there is no warrant for direct interference by society in the hope of preventing them. If on the other hand, investigation reveals that a considerable proportion of accidents are due to insufficient concern for the safety of workmen on the part of their employers, . . . then social interference in some form is justified.[17]

Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* argued that the deterioration of animal and plant life was not a natural phenomenon (accident) but the result of human pollution (inadvertence).[18] Ralph Nader's *Unsafe at any Speed* claimed that automobile crashes were not primarily due to unpredictable mechanical failures (accidents) or even to reckless drivers (inadvertence), but to car manufacturers' decisions to

[17] Crystal Eastman, *Work Accidents and the Law* (New York: Russell Sage, 1910), 5.
[18] Rachael Carson, *The Silent Spring* (New York: Fawcett, 1978).

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stint on safety in design (intention).[19] Jonathan Schell's book on nuclear holocaust, *The Fate of the Earth*, is a twist on this genre of policy writing, because it has to begin by imagining, predicting, estimating, and portraying consequences of an event that has not yet occurred. Having done that, Schell argues that this new "knowledge" moves our actions into the sphere of intent, and we can no longer regard the effects of nuclear holocaust as accident.[20]

A common strategy in causal politics is to argue that the effects of an action were secretly the intended purpose of the actor. If people sleep on grates or work in dangerous jobs, they must have chosen to do so because they get more satisfaction out of those activities than anything else (to pick a conservative version of the argument). Or (to pick a liberal version), since the deficit incurred by the Reagan administration has united liberals and conservatives around reduced government spending, Reagan must have run up the deficit deliberately in order to force Democratic support for his program of government retrenchment.[21]

To assume that the effects of an action are its purposes is to commit the teleological fallacy. Purpose must always be demonstrated with evidence of the actor's wishes or motives, apart from the effects of his actions. Still, teleological reasoning is a good political ploy, because the person who turns out to have willed harm while concealing his malevolent intent is a doubly despicable character; the symbolism of the disguised malefactor is a potent rallying cry.

The concept of risk has become a key strategic weapon for pushing a problem out of the realm of accident into the realm of purpose. Risk serves this function in two ways. First, when the harms at issue are medical, as in food and drug regulation, occupational safety, consumer product safety, environmental pollution, or nuclear power, the probabilistic association of harmful outcomes with human actions is widely accepted as a demonstration of a cause-and-effect relationship.[22] If the harms associated with an action or policy are predictable, then business and regulatory decisions to pursue a course of action in the face of that knowledge appear or can be made to appear as a calculated risk. Similarly, business and regulatory decisions justified by risk/benefit analysis can be portrayed as the intentional causation of harms in the pursuit of benefits to oneself.[23]

Increasingly, courts are willing to hold companies liable for calculated risks. The Ford Pinto automobile case is especially notable because the court construed

[19] Ralph Nader, *Unsafe at Any Speed* (New York: Bantam Books, 1973).

[20] Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Avon Books, 1982).

[21] Daniel Moynihan, letter to the editor, *Wall Street Journal*, 15 August 1985.

[22] On the predominance of the probabilistic interpretation of causation in twentieth-century scientific culture, see Jacob Brownowski, *The Common Sense of Science* (London: William Heinemann, 1951). On the increasing acceptance of statistical and epidemiological evidence in American courts, see Richard E. Hoffman, "The Use of Epidemiological Data in the Courts," *American Journal of Epidemiology* 120 (1982): 190–202; and Berk Black and David Lilienfeld, "Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation," *Fordham Law Review* 52 (1984): 732–785.

[23] See Richard Bogen, "Quantitative Risk-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Decision-Making," *Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law* 8 (1983): 120–143.

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Ford's business decision to trade off safety for cost as "conscious disregard of the *probability* that [its] conduct will result in injury to others," and, therefore, as "malicious intent."[24] Calculated risk is also the crux of the plaintiffs' argument in the asbestos and Agent Orange litigation. In short, predictable stochastic outcomes have been transformed by reformers into conscious intent. The idea of calculated risk is a way of pushing a problem from inadvertence to intent.

A second way that risk serves to push harms into the realm of purpose is in the area of civil rights. Statistical evidence is now the primary tool to prove discrimination in employment, jury selection, schools, voting districts, housing, and other government service programs.[25] Until the 1970s the only way minorities could win discrimination suits was to show evidence of intent to discriminate on the part of an employer, a prosecutor, a school superintendent, and so forth. In cases where a policy or rule did not explicitly mention race or gender as a criterion, this requirement usually meant adducing evidence of a person's motives and intentions (evil-motive analysis), showing that a seemingly neutral rule was really a pretext for discrimination or showing that a rule was administered in an obviously discriminatory fashion.

In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time allowed statistical evidence of a rule's "disproportionate impact" on a minority group to stand as proof of discrimination without a showing of purpose.[26] Since then, plaintiffs can sometimes succeed in discrimination suits if they can show that the result of a selection process (for jobs, juries, school assignment, public housing) could not have occurred by chance. If the risk of not being selected is higher for a minority group than for another group or higher than it would be with random selection from a pool of both groups, then a court may find discrimination, assuming some other tests are also met.[27]

The significance of this change in legal doctrine is that it broadens the concept of discrimination to encompass systematic effects without a direct link to human intent and motivation. Civil rights advocates have long argued that contemporary economic and occupational differences between blacks and whites or women and men, though not attributable to contemporary bias or intended discrimination,

[24] *Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.*, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), citing language from *Dawes v. Superior Court*, 111 Cal. App. 3d. 82 (1980). (Emphasis added.)

[25] Caroline Peters Egli, "Judicial Refinement of Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases," *Connecticut Law Review* 13 (1981): 515–548; and Julia Lamber, Barbara Reskin, and Terry Dworkin, "The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology," *Hastings Law Journal* 34 (January 1983): 553–598.

[26] *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Duke Power Company required either a high school diploma or a minimum score on an intelligence test as a condition for internal transfer. The Court found that neither requirement was related to ability to learn or perform jobs. Far fewer blacks than whites (proportionately) could satisfy either of these requirements, and so blacks fared poorly in job advancement.

[27] An employer can maintain a rule that has a discriminatory impact if he can show that its criteria are job-related or necessary for the business. Even after Griggs, statistical arguments do not always win the day, but it is fair to say that they are increasingly victorious in discrimination cases.

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are attributable to differences created by past intentionally discriminatory treatment. In effect, they have successfully pushed the problem of institutional discrimination from the realm of accident to the realm of inadvertence. The acceptance of statistical evidence by courts as proof of discrimination converts discriminary impact into the moral and political equivalent of calculated risk.

As one side in a political battle seeks to push a problem into the realm of human purpose, the other side seeks to push it away from intent toward the realm of nature or to show that the problem was intentionally caused by someone else. The side accused of causing the problem is best off if it can show the problem was accidentally caused. Hence, after the leak at its West Virginia plant, Union Carbide began with a story about failed safety valves and a malfunctioning computer. Second best is to show that the problem was caused by someone else. This strategy is only second best, because anyone else accused of causing the problem will fight back and resist the interpretation, whereas the accidental causal story does not generate a live opponent.

The weakest defense is to show inadvertence, especially of the unforeseen consequences variety. Carelessness and neglect do not look very good, but they are probably better defenses than planned or designed failures. For example, Union Carbide chose to program its computer to detect only ten of the hundreds of chemicals it produces and had purchased programs for only three of the ten at the time of the leak. Aldicarb oxime wasn't even on the list of ten. In the aftermath, management talked of faulty pipes and valves but not of its decision not to purchase a warning system for the chemical that leaked.

The struggle between interpretations of accidental cause and controllable cause frequently takes the form of a debate about heredity versus environment. This debate has long been prominent with respect to intelligence and its supposed correlates of academic, economic, and political success.[28] More recently, the propensity to commit crime has also been debated in this framework.[29] Accepting heredity as a determinant of a social problem usually means adopting a policy of laissez faire, while finding environmental determinants, such as education or income, means investment of social resources to equalize the benefits or burdens of a problem.

Complex cause is sometimes used as a strategy to avoid blame and the burdens of reform. When a company comes under fire and appears to be losing in the struggle to prove itself innocent—Manville and asbestos litigation, for example—it may argue that the problem is really due to a complex structural cause and can only be "solved" by larger institutions. By insisting that the federal government deal with compensating asbestos victims, Manville attempted to spread out the costs onto society at large. The widespread adoption of Workers' Compensation in the early twentieth century can be seen as a successful move by employers, who

[28] See Stephen J. Gould, *Mismeasure of Man* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

[29] See James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrenstein, *Crime and Human Nature* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

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were increasingly losing liability suits, to define the problem of industrial accidents as the "natural" result of modern technology and to socialize the costs through insurance.[30]

The Limits of Causal Argument

Causal stories need to be fought for, defended, and sustained. There is always someone to tell a competing story, and getting a causal story believed is not an easy task. American automobile and steel producers, for example, blame their declining market share on unfair Japanese competition. They try to sustain their claims by lobbying Congress for import tariffs and domestic content legislation, petitioning the International Trade Commission for restrictions on Japanese imports, and advertising about their market difficulties. Meanwhile, others (including the Japanese) are trying to define the problem as caused by failure of steel companies to innovate; failure of car manufacturers to offer small, fuel-efficient cars; overly generous union contracts; and poor management. Auto and steel producers, for all their apparent political strength, have not succeeded in making their story stick, however. In a recent poll, 53 percent of American respondents thought the United States makes Japan a scapegoat for its trade problems, and only 30 percent thought Japan engaged in unfair trading practice.[31]

Most citizens have and can articulate explanations of national problems such as poverty, unemployment, or terrorism. But recent research suggests that causal beliefs are quite sensitive to the way television news coverage portrays problems. For example, when people watch news stories about poverty that show a homeless family, they are much more likely to think of individual explanations of poverty, such as lack of motivation or lack of skills. When they see news stories that portray a high rate of unemployment or reductions in federal social spending, they are more apt to give societal or governmental explanations of poverty.[32]

If problem definition is a great tug of war between political actors asserting competing causal theories, one wants to know what makes one side stronger than another. What accounts for the success of some causal assertions but not others? What are the political conditions that make one causal theory seem to resonate more than others?

Many of the constraints that have been identified for agenda setting hold for causal argument in problem definition as well.[33] Assertions of a causal theory are

[30] Lawrence Friedman and Jack Ladinsky, "Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents," *Columbia Law Review* 67 (1967): 50–82; and James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal and the Liberal State: 1900–1918* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), chap. 2.

[31] Susan Chira, "Poll Blames U.S. on Japan Trade," *New York Times*, 13 August 1985.

[32] Shanto Iyengar, "Television News and Citizens' Explanations of National Affairs," *American Political Science Review* 81 (September 1987): 815–831.

[33] See Kingdon, *Agendas*, 138–46; and Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, "Communications and Public Policy" in Dan Nimmo and Keith Sanders, eds., *Handbook of Political Communications* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981).

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more likely to be successful—that is, become the dominant belief and guiding assumption for policy makers—if the proponents have visibility, access to media, and prominent positions; if the theory accords with widespread and deeply held cultural values; if it somehow captures or responds to a "national mood;"[34] and if its implicit prescription entails no radical redistribution of power or wealth. One major causal story—that the capitalist economic and political system is the cause of innumerable social ills—is consistently shut out.[35]

The political success of causal theories is also constrained by two powerful social institutions for determining cause and legitimating claims about harms: law and science. Law is a whole branch of government devoted to hearing claims, examining evidence, pronouncing verdicts, and enforcing them. Science is an intellectual enterprise with its own vast social and economic organization devoted to determining cause-and-effect relationships. And if law carries greater formal authority by virtue of its status as part of government, science commands enormous cultural authority as the arbiter of empirical questions. Not all battles over causal stories will be resolved in the court of law or science, but most significant ones will find their way into one or both of these forums.

Tort law (sometimes called accident or personal injury law) is the branch of law concerned with injurious behavior that is not regulated via criminal law or formal contracts. It has to do with the informal standard of care for one another that a community expects of its members. Since there is no formal set of rules, only case-by-case decision making, tort law is fuzzy and constantly evolving. Tort law arbitrates issues of causation, because it is concerned with deciding what harmful consequences of people's actions the people should be expected to control. It therefore defines the political boundaries between the realm of fate (what harmful effects are considered natural or plain bad luck) and the realm of human control (what harmful effects will trigger the attribution of responsibility).

The tort suit is a primary vehicle in the United States for asserting a causal theory about harm and demanding a remedy. It has been used for all manner of harms—dangerous consumer products, drug side effects, radiation exposure, incompetent professional services, occupational hazards, and emotional distress. Discrimination and affirmative action suits under constitutional and statutory laws are another legal vehicle for asserting and defining socially-caused harms. Large class action suits make the law a forum for group warfare, not merely individual disputes. The Agent Orange cases, for example, in addition to being individual claims, are an organized protest by Vietnam veterans against their treatment during and after the war.[36]

All of this is to say that the rules of the game in law are crucial determinants of the political success of causal theories, even theories with the stamp of approval

[34] Kingdon, *Agendas*, 153–57.

[35] For both the story and an analysis of the reasons why it is shut out, see Cohen and Rogers, *On Democracy*.

[36] See Peter Schuck, *Agent Orange on Trial* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).

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of science. Although epidemiological studies had shown a link between asbestos and cancer by the late 1940s, it was not until 1973 that the courts first allowed a verdict against an asbestos manufacturer. The scientific evidence for the cigarette-cancer link is even stronger, and yet it was first in 1988 that a cigarette manufacturer was held liable for smokers' lung cancer.[37]

Science serves as an arbiter of causal theories for an even broader array of issues than law. Proponents of causal theories—whether about disease or poverty, crime or inflation, car accidents or homelessness—appeal to scientific studies and the canons of scientific inquiry in their quest for political support. Often academics and scientists are the chief proponents of a theory. But to say the enterprise of science exercises some kind of constraint on the successful assertion of causal theories is not to say that its judgments are any more consistent, any less confusing, and any less political than those of law. We can only say that having some science on your side may help; it will not guarantee that a causal theory will become the guiding assumption of public policy.

An extended analysis of the role of law and science in problem definition is beyond the scope of this article. Here I only want to make the point that a theory of how problems come to be defined in politics must include a more extended analysis of how these two social institutions support and constrain causal argument.

The Political Functions of Causal Theories

Causal theories, if they are successful, do more than convincingly demonstrate the possibility of human control over bad conditions. First, they can either challenge or protect an existing social order. Second, by identifying causal agents, they can assign responsibility to particular political actors so that someone will have to stop an activity, do it differently, compensate its victims, or possibly face punishment. Third, they can legitimate and empower particular actors as "fixers" of the problem. And fourth, they can create new political alliances among people who are shown to stand in the same victim relationship to the causal agent.

Bringing a condition under human control often poses a challenge to old hierarchies of wealth, privilege, or status. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, many poor rural whites in the South were afflicted with a chronic sickness later discovered to be caused by the hookworm parasite. People with the disease were listless and eventually became slow-witted. Popular belief held that the condition reflected the laziness and lax moral character of the victims. When Charles Stiles demonstrated in 1902 that hookworm was the cause and that the disease could easily be cured with a cheap medicine, he was widely ridiculed in the press for claiming to have discovered the "germ of laziness." The discovery was resisted because it meant that southern elites had to stop blaming "poor white trash" for their laziness and stupidity and stop congratulating themselves for their superior

[37] *Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.*, 683 F. Supp. 1487 (DNS 1988).

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ability to work hard and think fast—a supposed superiority that served to justify political hierarchy.[38]

The abortion issue is a more recent example of political resistance to the extension of human control into an area formerly deemed natural. Much of the rhetoric against abortion is couched in terms of "interference with nature" and the "sanctity of life." Religious beliefs aside, the control over childbearing made possible by abortion threatens the social order in which a woman's status and social protection is determined by her role in the family, at the same time as it enables a social order in which her status is determined by her role in the workforce. And in fact, women who actively oppose permissive abortion policies tend to be those who do not work and whose social identity is tied to motherhood, while those who actively support abortion tend to be career women whose identity depends on work outside the home.[39]

Causal theories are also used as an instrument of social control to maintain existing patterns of dominance. For example, the theory that poor, pregnant women "cause" premature and unhealthy babies through their dietary deficiencies justifies official monitoring of their shopping and dietary habits as a condition of social aid. The theory of maternal deprivation (that children whose mothers work suffer developmental deficits and delays) arose just as middle-class women entered the workforce in large numbers. The maternal deprivation theory, consciously or unconsciously, served as a brake on disintegration of the standard middle-class pattern in which the man is breadwinner and the woman is childbearer. Struggles over causal definitions of problems, then, can be seen as contests over basic structures of social organization.[40]

Any bad situation offers multiple candidates for the role of "cause." In the old nursery rhyme, the fall of a kingdom can be traced back through a lost battle, a fallen soldier, an injured horse, a loose horseshoe all the way to a missing nail and a careless blacksmith. In the real world, problems rarely come with such neat lineage, but, like the leak at Union Carbide, always are replete with possible causes.

In the world of policy there is always choice about which causal factors in the lineage to address, and different choices locate the responsibility and burden of reform differently. In the issue of deaths and injuries resulting from drunk driving, both our laws and cultural beliefs place responsibility with the drunk driver. There are certainly alternative ways of viewing the problem: we could blame vehicle design (for materials and structure more likely to injure or kill in a crash); highway design (for curves likely to cause accidents); lack of fast ambulance service or nearby hospitals; lax enforcement of drunk driving penalties by police; or even availability

[38] Deborah A. Stone, *The Disabled State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), 93–94. The history of medicine is full of stories of resistance to discoveries that would make disease controllable. See, for example, Charles Rosenberg, *The Cholera Years* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[39] Kristin Luker, *The Politics of Motherhood* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[40] I borrow these illustrations from Mary Douglas, *Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences* (New York: Russell Sage, 1985), 53–60.

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of alcoholic beverages.[41] Grassroots organizations of victims (such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving) have successfully moved the issue beyond moral exhortation by looking for targets of responsibility other than the driver. They have sued the people who served drinks to the driver—restaurants, taverns, private hosts, and even governments; pressured legislatures to pass laws making hosts and servers liable for damages caused by drunk drivers; and lobbied to ban "happy hours" in bars.[42]

Even when there is a strong statistical and logical link between a substance and a problem—such as between alcohol and car accidents, handguns and homicides, tobacco and cancer deaths, or cocaine and overdose deaths—there is still a range of places to locate control and impose sanctions. Each of these problems has a virtually identical chain of causation: substance-user-seller-manufacturer-raw materials supplier. In the case of alcohol, we have traditionally seen drinkers as the cause and limited sanctions to them, though sellers have more recently been made to bear the costs. In lung cancer deaths, we have blamed the smoker primarily; but to the extent people have sought to place the blame elsewhere, they have gone after cigaratte manufacturers, not sellers or tobacco growers. With handgun homicides, we have limited blame to the users of guns rather than imposing sanctions on either the sellers or manufacturers. And with cocaine, we cast the widest net with attacks against users, sellers, (importers, street peddlers, pharmacies, physicians), and growers. Finding the true or ultimate cause of harms in these policy areas is not what is at issue. Rather, the fight is about locating moral responsibility and real economic costs on a chain of possible causes. The location is dictated more by the political strength of different groups (tobacco growers, the gun lobby) than by any statistical proof or causal logic.

Just as different causal stories place the burden of reform on some people rather than others, they also empower people who have the tools or skills or resources to solve the problem in the particular causal framework. People choose causal stories not only to shift the blame but to enable themselves to appear to be able to remedy the problem.

Lloyd Ethridge tells a wonderful story about the problem of unreturned cafeteria trays when he was president of his high school student council. The student council, not wanting to get involved in policing other students but still needing to oblige the principal's request for help, chose to adopt the theory that offending students were ignorant of the consequences of their actions (inadvertent cause). That way the student council could offer to run an awareness campaign without accepting any form of coercion. The principal, believing in the school as a training ground for life and having at his disposal a host of teacher-employees and disciplinary powers, adopted instead an intentional cause theory. He asserted that students left trays on tables because "it wasn't worth it" to them to walk the trays

[41] The drunk driving issue is the topic of Gusfield's *The Culture of Public Problems.*

[42] Jilian Mincer, "Victims of Drunken Driving Press Suits on Drivers' Hosts," *New York Times,* 9 August 1985.

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back to the kitchen. Not surprisingly, he instituted a system of teacher monitors, moralistic lectures, and "the familiar repertoire of high school discipline."[43]

Like the famous six characters in search of an author, people with pet solutions often march around looking for problems that need their solutions. Causal stories then become mechanisms for linking a desired program to a problem that happens to be high on the policy agenda. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) were sold as reforms to increase health care for the poor during the liberal 1960s on the theory that limited access of poor people to health care was caused by the inefficient solo-practice system of delivery. The same advocates of HMOs then pushed them to the Nixon administration as answers to the cost-containment problem on the theory that high health care costs were caused by fee-for-service payment.[44] Urban mass transit was billed as the answer to traffic congestion during the urban-growth-conscious 1950s and early 1960s; to pollution during the environmental-conscious late 1960s and early 1970s; and to conservation during the energy-conscious late 1970s.[45] Causal theories serve as devices for building alliances between groups who have problems and groups who have solutions.

Shifting the location of responsibility on a causal chain can restructure alliances. Under the old view of drunk driving, where the driver bore sole responsibility for accidents, the drunk driver was pitted against everybody else. In the new view the driver becomes a victim (of the server's negligence) along with the people he injured, and the server is cast outside this alliance. The relationship between taverns and their customers is altered, because all customers—indeed especially the best customers—are now a potential liability. Tavern owners may seek new alliances with other anti-regulation groups. One can also imagine alcoholic beverage manufacturers facing a difficult political choice whether to ally themselves with the taverns (their most important customers) or with the injured victim and the driver (in the hopes that victims won't go after manufacturers next).

Causal theories predicated on statistical association can create alliances by mobilizing people who share a risk factor but otherwise have no natural communication or association. In the DES cases, organizations of mothers and their daughters exposed to DES some twenty or more years ago sprang up out of nowhere as soon as the initial publicity about the DES-cancer link occurred. The trigger for Vietnam veterans' mobilization around the Agent Orange issue was a benefits counselor in the Chicago Veterans Administration (VA) office who thought she saw a pattern of illnesses and exposure to Agent Orange. She collected her own statistics, publicized them on television in 1978, and soon Agent Orange-based

[43] Lloyd S. Etheredge, *The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays* (Washington, D.C. : American Political Science Association, 1976).

[44] Paul Starr "The Undelivered Health System," *The Public Interest* 42 (Winter 1976): 66–85.

[45] This example comes from Kingdon, *Agendas*, 181. Kingdon calls the phenomenon of hooking problems to causes "coupling." It has also been called "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice" by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen in *Administration Science Quarterly* 17 (March 1972): 1–25.

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disability claims began rolling in to the VA.[46] Irving Selikoff's early studies of cancer in asbestos workers stimulated unions to sponsor more studies, organize their members for research and litigation, and ally with other unions on issues of occupational safety.[47] Causal theories, thus, can be both a stimulus to political organization and a resource for political leaders seeking to create alliances.

Conclusion

It is only recently that political scientists have produced a literature on the question of how problems move onto policy agendas. The question of how difficult conditions become defined as problems in the first place has received very little attention in the public policy literature. In this article I have tried to develop a theory of problem definition, starting from the conventional social science wisdom that a bad condition does not become a problem until people see it as amenable to human control.

First, causal argument is at the heart of political problem definition. Problem definition is centrally concerned with attributing bad conditions to human behavior instead of to accident, fate, or nature.

Second, the process of problem definition cannot be explained by looking solely at political actors, the nature of bad conditions, or the characteristics of issues. Problem definition is the active manipulation of *images* of conditions by competing political actors. Conditions come to be defined as problems through the strategic portrayal of causal stories.

Third, these portrayals can be categorized as four causal theories: intent (direct control); mechanistic cause (indirect control exercised through an intervening agent); inadvertent cause (control mediated by intervening conditions); and accident (total absence of human control).

Fourth, actors seeking to define a problem attempt to push the interpretation of a bad condition out of the realm of accident and into the realm of human control. The three causal stories of human control all assign responsibility for the condition to someone else and so create a burden of reform. People blamed for a problem and saddled with the burden of reform will resist the new causal theory (assuming they benefit from the status quo) by portraying the condition as accidental, as caused by someone else, or as one of the indirect forms of causation.

Fifth, political actors have increasingly used probabilistic notions of causation in addition to mechanistic concepts, and arguments based on probabilistic cause are increasingly successful. (The world of policy seems to parallel the world of science with about a fifty year lag.)

Sixth, the competition over causal theories in problem definition is bounded not only by the usual political conditions that constrain agenda setting, but also

[46] Schuck, *Agent Orange on Trial*, 23.

[47] Paul Brodeur, *Expendable Americans* (New York: Viking, 1974).

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by law and science, two social institutions that are each in their own fashion charged with arbitrating disputes about causal theories.

Finally, causal theories have important consequences for politics beyond the mere demonstration of human control. They have a strong normative component that links suffering with an identifiable agent, and so they can be critical of existing social conditions and relationships. They implicitly call for a redistribution of power by demanding that causal agents cease producing harm and by suggesting the types of people who should be entrusted with reform. And they can restructure political alliances by creating common categories of victims.*

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Strategic Thought in America, 1952–1966

MARC TRACHTENBERG

In the 1950s, strategy emerged in the United States as a new field with a distinct intellectual personality. A small group of men—Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter, and a handful of others—working mainly at the RAND Corporation, had moved into an intellectually barren "no-man's land" traditionally neglected by both military officers and students of international politics.[1] The body of thought they created was very different from anything that had come before. Their ideas would prove to be enormously influential, and their style of analysis in large measure became the sophisticated way of approaching nuclear issues in the United States.

The aim here is not simply to offer yet another description of this body of thought. The real goal is to try to give some sense for how this intellectual tradition took the shape it did—what caused it to emerge, how the central ideas developed, and why, after an extraordinary period of intellectual productivity, these ideas by around 1966 or so seemed to have played themselves out. Why, in other words, did strategy hit something of a dead end in the late 1960s?

The focus will be on the basic tension that dominated the development of this set of ideas. It was as though the coming of the hydrogen bomb in 1952 had released two great shock waves in the world of strategic thought. There was on the one hand the fundamental point that when both the United States and the Soviet Union had obtained survivable and deliverable strategic forces, all-out war between these two powers would become an absurdity: with thermonuclear weapons, the overriding goal had to be to limit war, and in particular to reduce to a minimum the risk that the nuclear powers would launch massive attacks on each other's cities.

[1] Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 7.

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On the other hand, there was the equally basic notion that the threat of nuclear war could be used for political purposes that went well beyond deterring the use of nuclear weapons by an adversary. The idea that one could exploit the threat of escalation was a product of the early atomic age. But it was the coming of the hydrogen bomb that brought this problem into focus. Indeed, the way strategic thought developed—the very distinctive shape it came to have—was very much a product of the thermonuclear revolution.

It was not that separate factions rallied around each of these two poles; the history of American strategic thought during this period cannot be summed up as a dispute between those who believed in simple deterrence and those who wanted nuclear forces to play a more far-reaching political role. Strategic discourse during this period was not sectarian or doctrinaire. The striking thing was that the same people were attracted to both approaches, often at the same time. But these two basic ways of approaching strategy were in obvious conflict with each other. The fundamental question was whether there was any way this conflict could be resolved.

The Thermonuclear Revolution

It is perhaps odd that the most important work on strategic issues was done in the 1950s and early 1960s—or more precisely in the period from 1952 to 1966. One might have thought that the coming of the atomic bomb in 1945 would have marked the watershed. But even as late as 1950 or 1951, concepts of strategic bombing that had emerged before and during World War II continued to provide an adequate framework for thinking about how an atomic war would be fought. The early atomic bombs were not so powerful that numbers and accuracy were no longer important. Defense against bombers could still make a difference; base location would remain important because of its effect on the intensity with which the bombing campaign could be carried out; and armies and navies would continue to play a significant role in defending those bases and perhaps in blunting an enemy counterattack. A new war, it was assumed, would be a war of attrition, a war of endurance. Thus mobilization was still meaningful; it therefore still made sense militarily to try to destroy the enemy's war-making capability by destroying its economy. In other words, the atomic bomb, as important as it was, had not rendered the existing conceptual framework obsolete. This was true even after the Soviet Union had begun in 1949 to amass atomic forces of its own.

In the early 1950s, however, the situation was to change dramatically. By the beginning of 1952, it had become clear to those in the know that a thermonuclear weapon with an explosive force a thousand times as great as the bombs dropped on Japan "was soon to be tested and that success was virtually certain."[2] Viewed in a somewhat broader context, the hydrogen bomb can be seen as simply the most

[2] Bernard Brodie, introduction to "Towards a New Defense for NATO: The Case for Tactical Nuclear Weapons," National Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper No. 5 (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1976), 1.

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awesome of a whole series of developments in nuclear weapons technology that were reaching a climax at the beginning of the 1950s. Fission bombs had by this time become smaller, lighter, mass-producible and more efficient in their use of fissionable material. Maximum yields of even pure fission weapons had increased dramatically, rising from the twelve kilotons of the Hiroshima bomb to a half-megaton in 1952. "Boosted" weapons, where part of the explosive power derived from a fusion reaction, and which were being developed at the same time, produced a yield in the one-megaton range.[3] The result was that even if true thermonuclear weapons had never been deployed, the traditional basis for thinking about air warfare would in all probability eventually have been undermined.

In the minds of people at the time, however, the great revolution in military technology was dominated and symbolized by the huge thermonuclear explosives first tested in 1952. It is for this reason that the new conditions of warfare that were emerging in the early 1950s will be referred to here as the thermonuclear revolution. Certainly, for the small group of civilians at the RAND Corporation who had begun to think seriously about basic problems of nuclear strategy, it was the hydrogen bomb that marked the decisive break with the past.

Charles Hitch, for example, was at this time one of the leading figures at RAND, and in the summer of 1952 he and William Capron prepared a report on the implications of the new weapon. "We may," they wrote, "be able to absorb a large number of A-bombs and recover, particularly if the targets selected are not optimal or if bombing accuracy is poor; we cannot stand fifty 25-MT bombs if they are well-placed and the results are not very sensitive to the placing."[4]

Bernard Brodie, then also at RAND, was by this time arguing along similar lines. The ordinary atomic bomb, he said in a talk at the Air War College, was "not so absolute a weapon that we can disregard the limits of its destructive power." One still had to be concerned with bombing accuracy and with the physical vulnerability of the target. But with the H-bomb, concerns of this sort would count for "astonishingly little."[5] What, however, did this imply about strategy? Simply that the basic aim had to be deterrence—that the overriding goal had to be to prevent war through the threat of retaliation? The problem was that such a threat could carry weight only if one were prepared to follow through on it. Peace would depend, Brodie had argued even in the late 1940s, on a universal conviction "that war is far too horrible even to be contemplated. And the great dilemma is that

[3] See David Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960," *International Security* 7 (Spring 1983): 24.

[4] C.J. Hitch and W.M. Capron, "Implications of Potential Weapon Developments for Strategic Bombing and Air Defense: A Preliminary Study," RAND Research Memorandum RM-868, 10 July 1952, 28.

[5] Bernard Brodie, "Changing Capabilities and War Objectives," 10–11, 18–19, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 12, UCLA Library. This and a number of the other articles and papers cited here have been published in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., *The Development of American Strategic Thought*, 6 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988).

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that conviction can be sustained only by our making every possible effort to prepare for war and thus to engage in it if need be."[6]

The problem of deterrence could therefore not be divorced from the problem of use. What made this issue so difficult, Brodie stressed in 1952, was the realization that an atomic war would inevitably be a "two-way affair," and an all-out war with thermonuclear weapons might well be tantamount to national suicide. It was obvious "that national objectives could not be consonant with national suicide." Brodie had earlier thought that Carl von Clausewitz, with his insistence on the close linkage between political objectives and military means, had become obsolete: even the early atomic weapons were too destructive to be harnessed to rational political goals. But he had since come to see that Clausewitz had been "saying something very profound." He had been saying that "war is violence—to be sure, gigantic violence—but it is planned violence and therefore controlled. And since the objective should be rational, the procedure for accomplishing that objective should also be rational, which is to say that the procedure and the objective must be in some measure appropriate to each other." Brodie's views had been moving in this direction even in 1949 and 1950. But the imminent arrival of the hydrogen bomb had made this sort of thinking particularly salient; a suicidal strategy could never be an appropriate means of supporting rational, political goals. It followed that one had to think about strategies that were not suicidal—that the means of violence had to be controlled and limited.[7]

Brodie's problem in the early 1950s was to think out how the atomic bombs should actually be used in war, and in particular how the "threat value" of nuclear weapons could be exploited. What he objected to was the assumption that the bombing attack should be as swift, as concentrated and as massive as possible. The general idea that there might be a better way to use nuclear weapons than simply launching the kind of concentrated "atomic blitz" called for in the war plans had been actively discussed at RAND even in the late 1940s.[8] But it was Brodie who gave the idea written expression; it was in fact to become a major theme in his writings. He laid out the argument, for example, in his paper "Must We Shoot from the Hip?" which he wrote at RAND in late 1951. The aim, he said, should be to continue to exert pressure—and by that he meant political and psychological pressure—until the war reached a conclusion. But existing policy would make this impossible: "Under present conceptions, it is not too much to say that we shoot our bolt and then wait for something to happen, being then quite unable to affect what will happen."[9]

[6] Bernard Brodie, "New Techniques of War and National Policies" in William Ogburn, *Technology and International Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 167.

[7] Brodie, "Changing Capabilities," 3–4, 21–22. On Clausewitz, see Brodie's 1946 Harris Foundation lecture, "The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy" in Quincy Wright, ed., *A Foreign Policy for the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 89.

[8] Author's interview with Andrew Marshall, 19 March 1987.

[9] Bernard Brodie, "Must We Shoot from the Hip?" RAND working paper, 4 September 1951, 14, 16.

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This was, however, more an argument that the level of violence should be *controlled* than that it should be *limited*. Brodie was not arguing at this point that urban-industrial targets should not be attacked except in retaliation for a similar attack on our own cities. He was simply arguing against what came to be called a spasm attack: the atomic offensive had to be conducted in a more deliberate way in order to serve basic political goals.

What exactly was new here? Limited war thinking, of course, had certain precursors in the late 1940s. There were various proposals aired at the time for outlawing the use of nuclear weapons, or at least for ruling out attacks on cities. But whatever appeal these simple limited war arguments had, the problem was that strategic bombing had emerged during the immediate postwar period as the dominant form of great-power warfare. Given the technology of the late 1940s and the resources that could be mobilized at the time, an air-atomic war was actually fightable: the devastation would be terrible, but the war could in theory be won and societies could survive even an unrestrained conflict of this sort. With the tremendous increase in the destructiveness of nuclear weaponry, however, the strategy of massive air bombardment of urban-industrial areas became, or was certainly well on the way to becoming, a victim of its own technical success. What was new, in other words, was the sense that in the very near future the level of devastation would be so incredibly great that unrestrained warfare no longer made any sense at all; there had to be some limit on the level of violence.

For Brodie in particular, the thermonuclear revolution marked an important watershed. In the early atomic age he had not argued that we should hold back from using nuclear weapons—in general, or simply against an enemy's cities—provided the enemy respected a similar set of restraints. Nor had he argued for major limited warfighting capabilities. In his writings at the time, military efficiency was the main concern. The assumption was that if war came, one would use whatever one had. In 1948 he in fact made exactly the kind of argument that just a few years later he was to view as the height of unwisdom.

> We cannot forever go on planning for two drastically different kinds of large-scale war. Considerations of economy and of getting the most possible fighting strength out of our military resources will dictate that we make up our minds at an early date whether or not we will use the bombs in war and adjust accordingly. There is not much doubt about what that decision will be, especially since the general expectation is that—failing the setting-up of an effective international control system—our major rival will begin to make atomic bombs within the next ten to twenty years.[10]

It was only the imminent arrival of thermonuclear weapons that forced him to consider whether there should be any limitation on the level of violence: it was the revolution in the means of warfare that brought about his break with the past. Objectives had to be limited, he said, because the means of warfare had to be limited, "and not the other way around."[11]

[10] Brodie, "New Techniques," 163.

[11] Brodie, "The Meaning of Limited War," RAND Paper P-1222, 10 June 1958, 7–8.

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But these two arguments—for war limitation and for using the nuclear threat to support basic political goals—almost at once began to pull in opposite directions. Strategy, Brodie wrote in early 1952, should be concerned with "determining what *not* to hit as well as what to hit"; the central goal now was to figure out what could "be achieved by war, and in what way, other than by unloosing destruction on an unlimited basis."[12] But was the aim to determine what not to attack *initially*, so that the threat of further destruction could be exploited for political purposes—that is, used to bring about an acceptable end to the war? One would in that case have to be ready to escalate the war eventually—to use nuclear forces against an enemy's homeland, and even against cities, even if one refrained from attacking American cities first. Or was the fundamental goal to decide what not to attack *ever*, or at least as long as the enemy abided by a similar set of restraints? In both cases, the massive, concentrated attack was rejected as a strategy. But the fact that both approaches were linked to a critique of the strategy of the single, massive, all-out strike simply obscured the fact that these two lines of argument represented two very different and ultimately contradictory approaches to the nuclear question.

This central tension was already apparent in Brodie's April 1952 talk to the Air War College. Nuclear forces, he argued, provided they could survive an enemy attack, would in general be a "very good deterrent." But what if deterrence broke down and we got involved in a full scale war?

> I've been toying with an idea about that. If I had heard it from anyone else I should have called it a crackpot idea, but I offer it to you for what it may be worth. The atomic bomb thus far has achieved really great successes; it helped end the Pacific War, and it has so far deterred the Soviet Union from aggression. At least, there is nothing else visible to us, that is, nothing physical, that has deterred the Soviet Union from aggression. Notice that the deterrent value has resulted from the threat value. I submit that even the ending of the Pacific War resulted not from the two cities we destroyed, but rather from the threat value of the nonexistent additional bombs which the Japanese didn't know we didn't have—from the threat of more to come. According to our present concepts, this threat value of the atomic bomb is the first thing we plan to throw away the moment that hostilities open. A bomb which has been used no longer has threat value. A city which has been destroyed is no longer worth entering into surrender negotiations for the sake of preserving it. I submit that if we decide through intensive study of the situation that our nuclear weapons would actually enable us to break and burn the Soviet armies on the ground wherever they might commit aggression, we might decide that it was possible to secure our objectives without bombing enemy cities. And provided we communicated that idea in advance and provided we retained a powerful and invulnerable SAC to lay down the ground rules and make sure that they were observed, we could say, "We will not bomb your cities except in retaliation." This, of course, would be sacrificing the prospect of total victory, but for the future that might be a small price to pay for the sake of avoiding total war.[13]

[12] Brodie, Naval War College lecture, 17 March 1952, Brodie Papers, Box 10.
[13] Brodie, "Changing Capabilities," 28-29.

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But note how two very different arguments are brought together here: the argument about exploiting the threat value of nuclear weapons—the threat of destroying cities if the enemy does not accommodate us—which had been taking shape in Brodie's mind during the previous few years, and the new argument about limited war—about not bombing enemy cities except in retaliation for an attack on American cities, which was essentially a product of the thermonuclear revolution.

The tension between the two lines of argument was fundamental. It was as though two poles had emerged that were to give the strategic debate its basic structure. Do we want to exploit the risk of escalation, even for essentially defensive purposes, or should our central goal be to minimize it? Should nuclear forces simply cancel each other out, or do they have a broader political function to play? War between the United States and the Soviet Union was not impossible; and if it did break out, there was no guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used. It was thus important to think about how they might be used, about what might happen "if deterrence failed." But the way we planned to use them might have a major influence on the kind of political effect they had, even before war broke out—if only because of the effect these plans had on the kinds of forces that were created. The question of deterrence could not be divorced from the question of use. The problem of target selection was, therefore, of fundamental importance.

These problems were all very new, but already in 1952 one thing was clear: the targeting philosophy that had developed before and during World War II was becoming increasingly problematic. Indeed, the basic point about the absurdity of all-out war when each side had developed the means of utterly devastating the other must have been tremendously disorienting for professional military officers. It was clear, to the more discerning officers at any rate, that there were very basic and difficult problems here and that no one as yet had any really satisfactory answers. General John A. Samford, for example, the air force director of intelligence, wrote in 1952 that existing ideas on air power were inadequate and rested on "too narrow a base"; he therefore asked the president of RAND to allow Brodie, whose work he liked and with whom he had been in contact, to "produce a basic treatise on air power in war." Since RAND was under contract to the air force, this was in effect the authorization that enabled Brodie to do the work that culminated in his important 1959 book, *Strategy in the Missile Age*.[14]

Brodie and the other civilian strategists were not awed by the expertise of professional military officers. There was a sense that nuclear weapons had wiped the slate clean, that the field was wide open, and that no specific form of credentialing was needed for one's ideas to be taken seriously. If anything, there was a certain bias against the military, which was condemned for its excessive offense-mindedness and its consequent neglect of the importance of defense, especially the defense of nuclear forces. The armed forces were viewed as too conservative, incapable of adjusting swiftly to technological change; and the services were blamed also

[14] Samford to Collbohm, 18 April 1952, and Brodie to Samford, 20 August 1959, Brodie Papers, Box 2.

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for not taking strategy seriously enough, for viewing it, when they thought about it at all, as essentially tactics writ large, more technical than political in nature.[15]

There was one other profession whose function in the area of strategy was dramatically affected by the coming of thermonuclear weapons. Beginning with World War II, the economists had played a central role in strategic bombing. In a bombing campaign, target selection was crucial. But the problem of maximizing the impact of the attack on the enemy's war-making potential was in essence an economic problem—and thus the kind of problem that professional economists were best equipped to deal with. It was in this way that a number of economists, people like Carl Kaysen and Charles Hitch, first became involved with air strategy. The insights and body of lore accumulated during the war were still applicable in the early atomic age. But after 1952, all of this was obsolete: the problem was no longer how to maximize the amount of devastation that bombers could inflict. It was "all too easy" to destroy an enemy's cities. But by the same token it would not be difficult for the enemy to destroy America's cities as well.[16]

In this kind of world the economists still had a role to play, a very basic role in fact. It was not their skill in handling quantitative data that proved to be crucial. As Hitch himself pointed out, their basic contribution "turned out to be the far more critical one of helping to formulate the problems themselves—as economic problems—and to design analyses to solve them." His main example had to do with what he called "widespread" but (to the economists) "incredible" misconceptions about the "nature of costs." People often assumed that costs should not matter: "military requirements" alone should determine the size of the effort. On the other hand, it was also frequently taken for granted that costs were "simply a constraint." But both approaches really missed the point: requirements were not absolute; they depended on costs; and in "choosing among alternatives," costs were therefore "as essential as objectives."[17]

To an economist, or to someone who has had some training in economics, all of this is quite obvious. But since it was far from obvious to many other people, the economists enjoyed a certain comparative advantage. They had a way of getting a handle on an important class of strategic problems—those that were more than just technical yet not quite political in nature. This meant that they would play a central role in the whole area of military policy.

What made all this particularly important was a certain shift in perspective that took place in the 1950s. In the immediate postwar period, and even in the early 1950s, there was a very widespread sense that a nuclearized world was inherently unstable—that a policy of drift and an unconstrained nuclear arms race would almost inevitably lead to disaster. This led to a certain willingness, even among

[15] These were common themes in Brodie's writings. He was particularly blunt in unpublished memoranda and correspondence; see especially Brodie to Hans Speier, 23 November 1954, Brodie Papers, Box 4, file "Washington Office," where he sets out his views about the military.

[16] On the role of the economists, see for example Brodie, "The American Scientific Strategists," RAND Paper P-2979, October 1964, 20–22.

[17] Charles S. Hitch, "The Uses of Economics," RAND Paper P-2179-RC, 17 November 1960, 3, 21.

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some of the RAND strategists during this period, to consider such extreme solutions as preventive war.[18] With the passage of time, these basic anxieties began to fade. It was gradually becoming evident that the world could live with nuclear weapons. There were terrible dangers of course, but there were advantages as well. Especially when one considered the alternatives, the situation on balance was by no means intolerable. Very serious problems remained, but the sense began to take hold that the United States and the Soviet Union were settling into a long-term rivalry. As a result U.S.–Soviet relations came to be perceived increasingly in interactive terms: if we did something, they would have time to respond, and the nature (and relative cost) of their response should, therefore, rationally be factored into our original calculations. Thus the game-like aspects of military policy became increasingly salient; and this way of thinking was clearly linked both to the presence of formal game theory as part of the intellectual culture at RAND and to the great interest people at RAND took in many forms of gaming.

Finally, there was a special shift in the political environment during this decade that had a great effect on both strategic thought and military policy. At the beginning of the 1950s, the Korean War was on everyone's mind, and the Eisenhower administration's emphasis on nuclear weapons probably had a good deal to do with the lessons it drew from the Korean conflict. But by the end of the decade, the Berlin Crisis was at the center of international politics, and the problem of the defense of Berlin was a matter of great concern. In this case, for all the obvious reasons—the local indefensibility of the city and the great importance of Europe in comparison with most other regions of the world—normal, military, warfighting considerations simply did not apply. The effect was thus to highlight the war-of-nerves aspect of international conflict.

Putting all these things together, what the argument boils down to is this: there was an intellectual vacuum in the whole national security area. The economists and people heavily influenced by their style of thinking were for a variety of reasons drawn into this vacuum. What they had was something very general, a way of approaching issues, rather than anything that in itself suggested substantive answers that went right to the heart of the strategic problem. But this meant that a constituency existed—in their own terms, a market existed—for ideas from economics that would have some substantive bearing on the very new problems of strategy that were to emerge in the 1950s.

The Manipulation of Risk

It was a question of intellectual ecology: a niche had taken shape, and then Thomas Schelling came along. The ideas in question were the notions about bargaining that had developed mainly out of the theory of imperfect competition. Schelling's "Essay on Bargaining," which appeared in the *American Economic Review* in June

[18] See esp. John Williams, "In Response to Paxson's Memo on the Probability of War," 3 February 1953, and his "Regarding the Preventive War Doctrine," 27 July 1953, unpublished RAND working papers.

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1956, was in large measure based on the theory of oligopoly, as represented most notably by William Fellner's *Competition Among the Few.* This way of thinking was to mesh perfectly with the notions about war limitation and the "threat value" of nuclear weapons that Brodie, as he put it, had been "toying with" since the early 1950s.

Once again, the thermonuclear revolution plays an important role in the story. A war with hydrogen weapons would be short, much shorter than the kinds of wars that were possible even in the early atomic age. Industrial mobilization could therefore not have anything like the importance it previously had. In World War II, Brodie pointed out, strategic bombing was militarily meaningful only because a ground war was going on at the same time; the bombing served to deprive the Germans of commodities "which the ground battles were using up." In a future world war, "there wasn't going to be a ground battle." What was the point, therefore, of attacking the enemy's industrial base?[19]

In other words, if there was no urgent military need to destroy industrial targets, the destruction of cities no longer made sense in traditional military terms. If mobilization essentially does not matter, what was the point of still trying to destroy the enemy's industrial base? For those few individuals who really grasped the fundamental point—it certainly was never reflected in the war plans—what this implied was that the real function of countercity targeting was punitive and coercive, and not military in the traditional sense. It therefore had to be analyzed explicitly in those terms. For Schelling in particular, the threat of inflicting pain lay at the heart of nuclear strategy. The point was repellent, but it was important to face the fact that this was what the targeting of cities was all about. The whole issue of threat manipulation—of the efficient exploitation of nuclear risk—therefore came to be treated in a much more overt and straightforward way. Schelling quite explicitly set out to analyze how the "power to hurt" could be exploited for political purposes.

Brodie had assumed at the beginning of the 1950s that an enemy might be coerced by the threat of a *deliberate* escalation of the war. But a deliberate escalation was something that Schelling, who came on the scene toward the end of the decade, found hard to imagine. His problem, he wrote, was to explain how it could be "when almost nothing that ever arises is really worth a general war," that "strategic forces [could] have any influence on decisions." The answer he came up with was "the threat that leaves something to chance": one needed some mechanism, "involving uncertainty aud unpredictability, of a potential progessive loss of control over the situation by both sides—in order to make any connection between the strategic background and the local foreground."[20] It might be absurd for anyone "coolly and deliberately" to order an all-out attack "in response to some enemy transgression"; but one could plausibly threaten actions that might set off a semi-uncontrollable chain of events that just might culminate in a thermonuclear holo-

[19] Brodie, "Changing Capabilities," 12–13.

[20] Schelling to Brodie, 22 February 1965, Brodie Papers, Box 2, file "Schelling."

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caust. The threat value of nuclear weapons could thus be exploited even in a situation where, because of the prospect of retaliation, a deliberate attack on an enemy might be totally irrational.

The assumption was that the degree of risk could be manipulated, and Schelling in fact at one point spoke of the "controlled loss of control."[21] But these methods could be used by both sides in a conflict. International politics, in time of crisis or especially after the outbreak of hostilities, would then be a "competition in risk taking, characterized not so much by tests of force as by tests of nerve."[22] This, of course, was not a world of certainty, of predictability, and of near-perfect rationality, where the level of violence could be easily controlled, although deterrence theory is often caricatured in this way.[23] It was rather the existence of uncertainty that created risk; and risk, for Schelling especially, was what made it possible for nuclear forces to play a political role.

This whole approach to strategy was in fact very new and differed dramatically from more conventional ways of dealing with military problems. To those in the armed forces especially, it had been natural to assume that what happened on the battlefield was of prime importance, that military action should be "decisive," that control and initiative are desirable in themselves. But now it seemed that everything was being turned on its head. The manipulation of risk was much more important, Schelling insisted, than securing tactical advantage on the battlefield; military action was seen in terms of a bargaining process and would therefore have to be limited, rather than decisive, in nature. Most perplexing of all, there was the argument that perhaps too much control might not be a good idea; there were advantages in making sure that one's choices were limited and that the enemy was the one who had to make the really difficult decisions.

For Schelling, the concept of risk was central. His whole argument was built on the insight that a general war need not result from a deliberate and cold-blooded decision. Events, that is, might have a momentum of their own, quite apart from the conscious intent of political leaders. This line of reasoning, therefore, led to an intense interest in the logic of escalation. Why exactly was there, in certain circumstances, a serious risk that matters might get out of hand?

The Logic of Preemption

It was at this point that the intellectual tradition represented by Brodie aud Schelling merged with a rather distinct line of thought, also associated with RAND; the

[21] Thomas C. Schelling, "The Role of Theory in the Study of Conflict," RAND Research Memorandum RM-2515-PR, 13 January 1960, 28.

[22] Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale Univesity Press, 1966), 94.

[23] This is a common criticism leveled against this group of strategists. But it is hard to imagine how Schelling, at least, could have been more explicit about these matters. See esp. *Arms and Influence*, 92–93. Brodie and Wohlstetter in their writings also took it for granted that a war could easily get out of control. See, for example, Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, 355; and Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country," *Foreign Affairs* 39 (April 1961): 378–379.

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most prominent figure here was Albert Wohlstetter. In the early 1950s, Wohlstetter had been asked to work on the problem of base selection, and this led him and his associates into a detailed, quantitative analysis of what might happen in an air war.[24] The Wohlstetter approach by its very nature assumed that numbers mattered; the atomic bomb was not an "absolute weapon." If its effects were measurable, they were finite and thus limited; it therefore made an important difference how such a war was fought, and especially how well America's nuclear forces would be able to survive a surprise enemy attack.

Again, what exactly was new here? The general point about the importance of defending America's strategic forces had been made before. Brodie, in particlar, had argued repeatedly in 1946 (in *The Absolute Weapon*) that it was crucial to make sure that the United States would be able to retaliate in kind—that it was necessary "to explore all conceivable situations where the aggressor's fear of retaliation will be at a minimum and to seek to eliminate them."[25] It was clear also that Brodie was thinking in terms of what would be left after a surprise attack: "our most urgent military problem is to reorganize ourselves to survive a vastly more destructive 'Pearl Harbor' than occurred in 1941."[26] He even speculated on how the ability to strike back could be guaranteed: the nuclear retaliatory force, he said, should be "spread over a large number of widely dispersed reservations, each of considerable area, in which the bombs and their carriers are secreted and as far as possible protected by storage underground."[27]

Thus Brodie in 1946 clearly understood that nuclear weapons might be used against an enemy's strategic forces; indeed, another passage even touched on the idea of tactical use on the battlefield.[28] But Brodie was terribly inconsistent in this book; at other points he simply took it for granted that the bomb would only be used against cities, that it was "inevitably a weapon of indiscriminate destruction."[29] One has the sense that at this point he had really not yet come to grips with these issues.

Wohlstetter's approach was very different. The most important thing about it was its empirical depth and sensitivity to operational detail. Wohlstetter went to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases to get as much information as he could on force readiness, on warning time, on all those things that would bear on the ability of the strategic forces to survive a surprise attack and conduct a retaliatory strike. What was distinctive about his analysis was that instead of assuming that enemy attacks would be massive (and that a degree of warning would thus prob-

[24] On Wohlstetter's work, see, for example, Bruce Smith, "Strategic Expertise and National Security Policy: A Case Study," *Public Policy* 13 (1964); and E.S. Quade, "The Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases: A Case History" in Quade, *Analysis for Military Decisions* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

[25] Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 77.

[26] Ibid., 87–88.

[27] Ibid., 91.

[28] Ibid., 83.

[29] Ibid., 46–47.

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ably be available), Wohlstetter paid a good deal of attention to attacks that were small in scale, unconventional in nature, and focused on a discrete range of targets—especially on air bases. The assumption, in other words, was that the enemy was intelligent and would (if he attacked at all) try to exploit those areas where America's defenses were weak. It was extraordinary for a civilian to proceed in this way. It gave Wohlstetter's work a cogency aud a power that those who argued along more casual lines were just not able to achieve.

Brodie, for example, was by this time thinking along parallel lines. He argued strongly for "reducing the almost comic opera vulnerability of our military structure." It was absurd, he said, for SAC aircraft to be concentrated on only about sixteen air fields in the continental United States. He could not understand why America's nuclear weapons "should be stored in only three or four sites, the locations of these being very well known to the enemy and each individually being very slightly guarded." He had recently heard, in fact, with regard to one of these sites, that an airline "which flew over that area used to point out the storage site to the passengers as one of the sights along the way."[30]

The problem was that casual argument of this sort simply did not cut very deep. Wohlstetter was able to show in much greater detail just how vulnerable America's strategic forces were. But for present purposes, the more important point is that thinking these issues through at that level of detail led to certain general conclusions about strategy—conclusions that were to be enormously influential.

Then as now there were those who argued that it hardly mattered if the enemy was able to destroy the great bulk of the American retaliatory force in a surprise attack. What difference would it make if even 85 percent of SAC was wiped out? The remaining 15 percent, for the period Wohlstetter considered, "could still have destroyed roughly 600 targets," and this was more than enough for deterrence.[31]

But one of the basic conclusions Wohlstetter reached was that this kind of approach was fundamentally flawed. Indeed, as soon as one began to think in operational terms, one could see what the problems were. It was one thing to say that 15 percent of the bombers would survive an enemy's first strike, and quite another to say that they would all be able to destroy their targets. There was the problem of getting through fully-alerted defenses, and the related problem of coordinating the retaliatory strike when command and control facilities were in a state of complete disarray. How would a commander know which targets to hit, when and how to attack, or even whether to strike at all? It was obviously impossible to know in advance which aircraft would survive, so contingency planning would always be inadequate. The simple "minimum deterrence" approach ignored problems of this sort, but when one began to think about them at the operational level, the overall issue took on a very different cast.

To Wohlstetter, the fundamental point to emerge from the empirical analysis

[30] Brodie, "Changing Capabilities," 27.

[31] The quotations are from Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 108–109, but arguments of this sort were very common in the 1950s as well.

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was that the mere possession of significant numbers of thermonuclear weapons by both sides did not in itself create a stable balance of terror. The weaponry did not necessarily create a "stalemate" which would make general nuclear war "impossible." Mutual deterrence was not automatic; the nuclear balance was therefore "delicate," and it would take a serious and continuing effort to sustain it. These fundamental conclusions grew out of the operationally-oriented work Wohlstetter did in the 1950s and came to be shared very widely at RAND. At the end of the decade Wohlstetter laid out these basic ideas in "The Delicate Balance of Terror," probably the single most important article in the history of American strategic thought.[32]

What made the argument about vulnerability so powerful was the related assumption that vulnerability might in itself be a primary cause—perhaps *the* primary cause—of war. This assumption was rooted in several distinct lines of argument. There was first the idea that their Bolshevik ideology would compel the Soviets to strike if American forces were vulnerable. "If the Soviet leaders," Brodie asked, "should ever decide that by a surprise attack they could confidently count on destroying our strategic retaliatory force, whose very purpose it is constantly to theaten their existence, would it not be their duty as good Bolsheviks to launch that attack?"[33] Brodie made this point frequently in the 1950s; this argument was based explicitly on the work of his friend Nathan Leites, one of the leading Kremlinologists at RAND.[34] This was, incidentally, one of the very few cases where the work of the Soviet specialists had a direct impact on mainsteam strategic thought.

The point about the danger of a Soviet strike was undoubtedly related to the fact that in the late 1940s and early 1950s preventive war thinking was surprisingly common on the American side. Brodie, for example, frequently came into contact with it at RAND and during his visits to the Air War College, where it was, as he put it, for several years the "prevailing philosophy."[35] Nor was the idea limited to RAND and military circles. The famous physicist Leo Szilard evidently had made a preventive war argument at the very beginning of the atomic age: it was "from the lips of Leo Szilard," Brodie wrote, that he had "heard, in October of 1945, the first outright advocacy in my experience of preventive war."[36] The fact that this kind of thinking was not limited to the lunatic fringe had important implications. Chief among them was the idea that if serious Americans supported

[32] Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 37 (January 1959); an earlier and more complete version dated December 1958 is available as RAND Paper P-1472.

[33] Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, 355.

[34] Ibid., 355n. See also Brodie, "More About Limited War," *World Politics* 10 (October 1957): 121; and Brodie, Hitch, and Marshall, "The Next Ten Years," unpublished RAND working paper, 30 December 1954, 17.

[35] Brodie, "A Commentary on the Preventive-War Doctrine," unpublished RAND paper, 11 June 1953, 1.

[36] Brodie to Schelling, 8 January 1965, enclosure, Brodie Papers, Box 2.

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the strategy, then the Soviets, if they were in a position to pull it off, might also find a preventive war policy very attractive.[37]

In the development of American strategic thought, however, there was a far more important argument that had nothing to do with ideology or preventive war, but focused instead on the "logic of preemption." Here once again Wohlstetter played a central role. The vulnerability of strategic forces had been a great source of concern to him even before the thermonuclear revolution. But with the coming of the hydrogen bomb, it was clear that counterforce would play an increasingly important role. On the one hand, since there was no really effective defense against an unrestrained thermonuclear attack once it was launched, the only way to survive an all-out war was to destroy the enemy's forces before they left the ground. On the other hand, because these new weapons were so powerful, and because industry was concentrated in a relatively limited number of cities, only a fairly small number of hydrogen weapons had to be allocated to urban-industrial targets. The rest of the expanding stockpile would be targeted on the enemy's military forces. It was simply a question of numbers: in the natural course of things, military targets, and especially counterforce targets, would, as Wohlstetter and Fred Hoffman predicted in early 1954, come to dominate the plan for general war.[38] And if this was true for the United States, it would, within a relatively short period of time, be true for the Soviet Union as well.

The effect of this line of argument was thus simply to underscore the fundamental importance of protecting strategic forces, and throughout the 1950s Wohlstetter conducted what amounted to a campaign on the vulnerability issue. In the process he developed many arguments, but one in particular was quite distinctive. This was the point that American vulnerability was not only dangerous to us, but was dangerous to its adversaries as well, since it might lead the United States to preempt—that is, to strike first in a crisis. If strategic forces became vulnerable to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack, he and Hoffman argued in early 1954

> then our advertised capability for retaliation will be fictitious. We could not expect to hurt the Russians very much, unless we could be sure to strike the first blows. This should make us rather trigger happy, particularly if we were to couple this fragile strategic capability with an announced policy of relying mainly on a threat of major strategic atomic attack to deter even minor war. It would appear also to make the Russians equally trigger happy. Because in this case striking the first blow is the only means of defense, any delay in striking the first blow by either side risks the chance that the enemy will be the one to have this prerogative. With a defense of SAC against the I[C]BM and any other likely

[37] As Brodie put the point, one reason for considering the preventive war issue was that the discussion might "help sensitize us to the factors that could cause it to become Soviet policy." *Strategy in the Missile Age*, 228–229.

[38] Albert Wohlstetter and Fred Hoffman, "Defending a Strategic Force after 1960," unpublished RAND working paper, 1 February 1954, 18.

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> menace, on the other hand, we can assure ourselves and Russia that whether we strike first or second we can lay waste a large proportion of the Russian economy and the Russian population. This will make a decision to strike the first blow extremely unpleasant for the decision-maker as well as for the recipient of the blow.[39]

It followed (although Wohlstetter did not make this argument at the time) that by the same token their vulnerability would be dangerous for the United States. But he did, in "The Delicate Balance of Terror," consider the extreme but symmetrical case where

> both the United States and the Soviet Union had the power to destroy each other's retaliatory forces and society, given the opportunity to administer the opening blow. The situation would then be something like the old-fashioned Western gun duel. It would be extraordinarily risky for one side *not* to attempt to destroy the other, or to delay doing so, since it not only can emerge unscathed by striking first but this is the sole way it can reasonably hope to emerge at all. Evidently such a situation is extremely unstable. On the other hand, if it is clear that the aggressor too will suffer catastrophic damage in the event of his aggression, he then has strong reason not to attack, even though he can administer great damage. A protected retaliatory capability has a stabilizing influence not only in deterring rational attack, but also in offering every inducement to both powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.[40]

A draft of the "Delicate Balance" was circulated among the American experts preparing for the 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference, and that was how Schelling first heard of the idea.[41] He in fact became fascinated by the logic of preemption—that is, with the problem of "accidental war" resulting from the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack." This was how war could come without a "cool and deliberate" decision to launch an attack "in response to some enemy transgression." This was what generated the nuclear risk, whose "manipulation" was for Schelling what strategy was all about.[42]

"The premium on haste," Schelling wrote, was "the greatest source of danger" that peace would "explode into all-out war." "The whole idea of accidental or inadvertent war" rested on the "crucial premise" that there was a great advantage to striking quickly: "It is hard to imagine how anybody would be precipitated into full-scale war by accident, false alarm, mischief, or momentary panic, if it were not for such urgency to get in quick."[43] The process of escalation might be very complex; but what does seem clear is that for Schelling the fear of losing the enormous advantages of getting in the first blow would lie at the heart of the es-

[39] Ibid., 3.

[40] Wohlstetter, "Delicate Balance of Terror," 230. Note also Schelling's use of the Old West metaphor in "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1959, 414; and Brodie's use of it even earlier in "Unlimited Weapons and Limited War," *The Reporter*, 18 November 1954, 18.

[41] Author's interview with Thomas Schelling, Cambridge, Mass., 3 October 1983.

[42] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, chap. 3, esp. 97.

[43] Ibid., 227.

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calatory process, especially if one knew one's adversary were subject to the same pressures, and that he knew that you were tempted to preempt for these reasons. This logic could be sufficient in itself: there was no need for a " 'fundamental' basis"—that is, a real political cause—for the war.[44] A situation of this sort was thus more unstable, in the sense that things could more easily get out of hand, than a situation where retaliatory forces were secure and where there was thus no incentive to preempt. The "delicacy" of the balance was therefore the source of instability; a war might come essentially because strategic forces were vulnerable to enemy attack.

The result was that a theory of war causation took hold in which military factors loomed very large. The assumption was, as William Kaufmann, another member of the RAND group, put it in 1958, that deterrence "has become essentially unstable," that "increasingly military conditions are becoming such that catastrophe can descend on us as a bolt from the blue."[45] It was clear, therefore, that American forces had to be made more secure.

But beyond that—and here is where the argument really began to break new ground—it seemed to follow that Soviet forces should perhaps not even be targeted, and maybe American cities should not be defended, even if a defense of populations some day became feasible. For if the vulnerability of our forces made us more trigger-happy and was thus a danger to them, then by the same logic their vulnerability was a danger to us. We should, therefore, not threaten their strategic forces, either directly by targeting them, or indirectly by defending our cities and thus effectively neutralizing them. Such was the essence of the doctrine of "strategic stability," or "mutual assured destruction," as it has bizarrely come to be called, that emerged with great force and suddenness at the end of the 1950s. Wohlstetter himself never really accepted it, but others embraced the doctrine enthusiastically. In particular it came to provide the conceptual basis for American thinking on arms control: by mutual agreement, one might be able to achieve a world where each side's strategic forces were secure. Schelling, using his idea as a point of departure, co-wrote a seminal work on arms control in 1961; the two other important books on the subject that appeared that year were also, to one extent or another, inspired by the same idea.[46]

The stability doctrine thus developed in a fairly natural way out of the body of thought that had been concerned primarily with strategic vulnerability. It did not emerge as the by-product of shifting political views; a "stable" strategic relationship was not sought originally as the military counterpart to political détente.

[44] Schelling, "The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack," *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 207.

[45] William Kaufmann, "The Evolution of Deterrence," unpublished RAND working paper, 2 October 1958, 28, 26.

[46] Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1961); and Donald Brennan, ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (New York: George Braziller, 1961).

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In fact, one of the most striking features of this body of thought is the apolitical and often abstract nature of its approach to strategy. Military problems were only remotely connected to the world of international politics. If a crisis came up, or a war broke out, decisions about military policy would of course be relevant. But it was as though they had little bearing on the normal dynamics of international political life. They certainly were not analyzed in those terms. It might be admitted in theory that war is the outcome of a political conflict that unfolds over a long period of time; but it was not taken for granted that the primary purpose of military policy was to influence the course of that conflict. To gain this kind of leverage, military policy would have to be made to depend, at least in some important way, on the political behavior of one's adversary. But in this body of thought, basic problems were defined in general and hypothetical terms; and the relevant data were technical and essentially military in nature. Political considerations, beyond those captured by the basic notion of deterrence, were thus simply factored out of the analysis.

Nuclear Warfighting

There was, of course, more to strategy than assuring the survival of strategic forces. Once the forces were able to ride out an attack, one would still have to face the question of how they should be used. If forces were survivable, there would be less pressure to launch an all-out attack at once; they could, in theory at least, be used in a more controlled way.[47] Moreover, if a general war was going to be preeminently a counterforce war, it made sense, especially for people working for an organization like RAND, to be concerned with how this strategy could be rationalized—that is, with what the most rational way to fight a counterforce war was. In any case, the nuclear threat lay at the heart of American foreign policy: if Europe was to be defended, it was important that nuclear forces do more than simply cancel each other out. Given assumptions about a more or less permanent Soviet conventional superiority, it was vital that they cast a broader political shadow, and this was possible only because there was a risk that in some situations they might be used. Indeed, the kind of political effect might depend on the sort of employment strategy that was adopted, and in particular on how rational and, therefore, how credible it was. Operational strategy might also have an important impact on how a war actually ran its course—on what would happen if deterrence failed.

The basic idea to emerge out of this kind of thinking was the notion that if nuclear weapons had to be used, they should be used in a controlled way; the attack should never be indiscriminate or spasmodic. It was not that the people at RAND in the 1950s or early 1960s were under any illusions about how easy it would

[47] See, for example, Albert Wohlstetter, "Analysis and Design of Conflict System," in Quade, *Analysis*, 127; and Thomas Schelling, "Les armements nucléaires, l'OTAN et la 'nouvelle stratégie,'" *Politique Etrangère* 28 (Summer 1963): 136.

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be to effect this sort of control.[48] It was simply that the alternative of just throwing up one's hands and settling for a single, massive, all-out attack as the country's only general warfighting option was patently unacceptable. By the end of the 1950s, this sort of thinking had begun to revolve around the idea of city-avoiding counterforce warfare.

Ideas of this sort were of course closely related to Brodie's earlier notions about threat value and preserving cities as hostages, and later with Schelling's ideas about the manipulation of risk. This line of thought had a noticeable effect, even though neither Brodie nor Schelling was ever particularly keen about the idea of counterforce.[49] For most of the 1950s, however, they were simply ideas—part of the intellectual culture at RAND, arguments that deserved to be taken into account, but which by no means automatically added up to an argument for a no-cities counterforce strategy. Things were still in a state of flux; ideas had not hardened into strategic dogmas. The risk manipulation approach could co-exist and freely interact with the more straightforward counterforce/nuclear warfighting strategy. The difference between the two was more one of emphasis than anything else: how important in a war were such things as resolve and signaling as opposed to the shifting balance of military forces? Later, the lines would become more tightly drawn. The different approaches would come to be seen as alternative strategies; but in 1960 all of this was still very much in the future.

One of the most striking things about this period, in fact, is a real intellectual openness, an absence of doctrinal rigidity. It is important to note, for example, that there had been no headlong rush to counterforce at RAND in the 1950s. Reading the RAND documents from the first half of the decade, what comes across is a certain skepticism about counterforce. The Wohlstetter basing study, for example, was primarily concerned with the ability of SAC to carry out an attack on urban-industrial targets; the "counterair" or "blunting" mission was discussed only briefly and pessimistically at the end of the report. (The skepticism was in large part rooted in the assumption that American target intelligence was not only inadequate for counterforce purposes, but was probably even getting worse.) One might have thought that a concern with American vulnerability would have been linked to an interest in exploiting Soviet vulnerability, but Wohlstetter deliberately chose not to develop the argument in that direction. The protection of the retaliatory force was so basic that all other considerations paled in comparison; Wohlstetter did not want to distract attention from the great need to assure an American "second strike capability."[50]

[48] See, for example, William Kaufmann's discussion of the problem of escalation in Charles Hitch et al., "The Crisis in National Security," unpublished RAND working paper, 18 April 1958, 18. This collection of talks comes as close to summing up the mainstream RAND position on security issues as any single document I was able to see.

[49] See Brodie to S. Jones, 25 February 1955, Brodie Papers, Box 1, and Schelling to Brodie, 22 February 1965, Brodie Papers, Box 2.

[50] See esp. A.J. Wohlstetter et al., "Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, 365–369; and Wohlstetter to the author, 23 October 1984, commenting on this passage.

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The same general point is true of another important RAND document from this period, "The Next Ten Years," written at the end of 1954 by Brodie, Hitch, and Andrew Marshall. Far from being an argument for counterforce,[51] or for controlled nuclear warfighting, this document was essentially a *tour d'horizon*—a survey of a wide range of possible American strategies.[52] A counterforce strategy was discussed, and it included a no-cities component. It was recognized that the strategy had certain attractive features, but the authors seemed more interested in talking about all the problems with this policy. As in Wohlstetter's case, one of the greatest problems had to do with the supposed inadequacy of target intelligence.[53]

It is not surprising, therefore, that when new information about strategic intelligence began to filter into RAND beginning in 1955, attitudes toward counterforce—and in particular toward city-avoiding counterforce—began to shift. The key person here was Joseph Loftus, who during the Korean War had been the chief civilian target analyst for the air force. He eventually took a position with RAND, working for a while out of RAND's Washington office. It was there that he read "The Next Ten Years" and was struck by the very pessimistic attitude about target intelligence that prevailed at RAND in the early 1950s and was reflected in that document. These people, he thought, simply did not know what they were talking about. The air force had much better information about Soviet strategic targets—that is, counterforce targets—than the people at RAND seemed to realize.

Loftus reacted by writing a short paper called "Ten Minutes on the Next Ten Years," which implied that maybe the counterforce mission was not quite as hopeless as Brodie, Hitch, and Marshall had assumed. Perhaps for internal bureaucratic or political reasons the Soviets had structured their forces in such a way as to make their strategic forces more vulnerable than they otherwise might be. After all, he said (pointing to the McMahon Act), even the Americans had been reluctant to put nuclear weapons directly in the hands of the military. The same sort of thing might be going on with the Soviets, perhaps with even greater effect. Their tendency to overcentralize control might have some bearing on the vulnerability of their strategic forces.[54]

Marshall had worked on target intelligence in the past, and now he, together with Loftus, began to study these issues in much greater depth. Their collaboration was to last for nearly a decade. Perhaps the most striking thing to emerge from their work was the extraordinary vulnerability of the Soviet air force. The "irrationality" of Soviet basing, Marshall told a small group in 1960, was "fantastic." "It takes six to eight hours to load the planes," he said. "In those circum-

[51] As implied by Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, 207.

[52] Brodie, Hitch, and Andrew Marshall, "The Next Ten Years" has recently been declassified.

[53] Brodie et al., "The Next Ten Years," 13–14, 24–26, 30.

[54] Joseph Loftus, "Ten Minutes on the Next Ten years," unpublished RAND working paper, 14 February 1955.

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stances, they are just sitting ducks."[55] This may not have been the only channel through which information about intelligence was affecting attitudes toward counterforce, but what does seem clear is that information of this sort played a pivotal role. Counterforce was not nearly as hopeless as had earlier been assumed. And with good intelligence, targets could be pinpointed and yields could be reduced dramatically; a strategy that aimed at minimizing collateral damage might therefore be feasible.

To digress briefly, it is interesting to note that this information on Soviet vulnerability had a significant effect in an entirely different area. It was intimately related to the rise of the bureaucratic-politics paradigm, which eventually was to have an important influence on the structure of the nuclear debate. Already in 1955 – in fact, even earlier – Loftus had come to interpret the inefficiencies of the Soviet system in internal bureaucratic terms; and by 1963 he and Marshall had developed the argument in some detail. The Soviets, it appeared from their work, had been very reluctant to marry nuclear warheads to their delivery vehicles. Warheads were generally kept isolated from missiles – for medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM)s, the storage sites were fifty miles away on the average. Of the five main Soviet bomber bases, only three were defended by SA-1 batteries, and even they were not deployed for quick reaction. The Soviets, moreover, did not go in for the kind of alert measures that were common practice in the American air force, and the situation evidently did not change much even during times of crisis. With regard to their ICBM force, the kinds of missiles they built and the sorts of systems that supported them suggested that this force had not been designed for quick reaction.

How was the astonishing vulnerability of the Soviet nuclear force to be explained? The Soviet intercontinental force had evidently been starved for resources. The odd thing here was that the Soviets had spent more, by American estimates, on anti-aircraft artillery alone since 1945 than on their strategic forces – heavy bombers, missile submarines, and ICBMs. The explanation for this bizarre behavior, Loftus and Marshall argued, had to do with established patterns of resource allocation rooted in the balance of bureaucratic power within the Soviet military establishment.

The bureaucratic-politics argument became an important theme in Marshall's writings and in the work done by other people at RAND.[56] Of course, the argument that bureaucratic interest went a long way toward explaining government behavior had been made many times before, and the general point had no doubt occurred to a great many people who at one time or another had served in some

[55] Quoted in Daniel Ellsberg and Paul Kecskemeti, "Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense," 19–21 July 1960, unpublished RAND working paper, vol. II, 20.

[56] See especially A.W. Marshall, "Bureaucratic Behavior and the Strategic Arms Competition," Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, October 1971; and James Schlesinger, "Arms Interactions and Arms Control," RAND Paper P-3881, September 1968.

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official capacity. But the case of Soviet military policy was so striking that it suggested in itself that the bureaucratic-politics approach could really be developed into a central explanatory model. And it does seem that Marshall played a direct role in the emergence of the paradigm. In the mid-1960s he was a major influence in the "May Group," a seminar led by the Harvard historian Ernest May; Morton Halperin and Graham Allison, who were to play leading roles in the articulation of the bureaucratic politics paradigm, also took part.[57]

All this is worth talking about only because of the effect it had. The rise of the bureaucratic-politics model had an important influence on the way the debate on military policy was structured. There was on one side the rather straightforward theory that the strategic arms competition was dominated by an "action-reaction mechanism," where each power was reacting rationally to moves made by its opponent. The bureaucratic-politics approach took issue with that interpretation. The interaction process was not nearly as smooth or as governed by rational strategic calculation as simple models of the arms race would have it. It was in this way that the parameters of the debate became established: an externalist interpretation, the action-reaction mechanism, battled an internalist explanation, the bureaucratic-politics model.[58] In a debate of this sort, an interpretation of the military competition in terms of the ebb and flow of international political conflict simply had no place.

Stability versus Counterforce

By the end of the 1950s the civilian strategists working mainly at RAND had developed two distinct sets of ideas, two radically different ways of looking at nuclear issues. On the one hand, there was the stability doctrine, at the heart of which was the idea that the vulnerability of strategic forces was destabilizing because of the premium it would place on preemption. The doctrine, however, was by no means limited to this basic idea: a whole conceptual superstructure had been built on this fundamental concept. From the point of view of the stability doctrine, the risk of nuclear war was the central danger. This risk derived essentially from the vulnerability of strategic forces—not just American, but Soviet forces as well. The basic goal, therefore, was to reduce this vulnerability; and this implied, among other things, that counterforce targeting was to be avoided, above all if it were massive enough to make a meaningful difference in the amount of damage that

[57] Note also the references to Marshall in Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), ix, x, 98, 301 n. 44, 315 n. 59; see also Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), xii.

[58] See, for example, Graham Allison, "Questions about the Arms Race: Who's Racing Whom? A Bureaucratic Perspective" in Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., ed., *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974). Marshall, it should be noted, later placed increased emphasis on other factors, especially the distinct Soviet way of looking at the world.

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would be suffered in the event of an all-out war. Strategic superiority, which implied a strong counterforce capability, was therefore not to be sought – especially since negotiated arms control might be an important way of assuring stability, and negotiated agreements could be reached only on the basis of a kind of rough parity. But all this implied that it would be difficult to rely on the threat of nuclear war, overt or implicit, as the ultimate basis of policy.

On the other hand, there was the new concept of controlled and discriminate general war. The aim in such a war would be to destroy military targets and spare civilian populations, preserving them in fact for their hostage value. This would be a war of coercion and bargaining, not of pure destructiveness or mindless violence. The outcome of the war would be governed in part by the shifting strategic balance resulting from the counterforce campaign, and in part by the sheer terror that such a war would inevitably generate. With a strategy of this sort, a nuclear war would not necessarily be tantamount to national suicide; nuclear forces would, therefore, carry more political weight – perhaps a good deal more – than they otherwise might.

One obviously could not have it both ways; the two lines of argument were fundamentally inconsistent. But from the very beginning, people were drawn in both directions. On the one hand, there was a sense that a general nuclear war might well be virtually tantamount to mutual suicide, that the risk of things getting out of control was so great and the destructive power of the weapon so enormous that it did not much matter exactly how such a war would be fought. The important thing, from this point of view, was to prevent a nuclear conflict and thus to keep the lid on any wars that were fought. And this implied that it was dangerous to try to use nuclear threats to support general political goals.

On the other hand, if the possibility of armed conflict between nuclear powers could not be ruled out completely, and if there was an ultimately irreducible risk that a major conventional war could get out of hand and lead to a nuclear exchange, it was important to think through just how a nuclear war might be waged. Escalation, after all, need not be totally automatic; and how such a war might be fought could make a big difference. The strategic balance might then be politically meaningful; nuclear forces could serve purposes beyond merely deterring their use by others.

The tension was fundamental. One is struck by how pervasive and how persistent it was, and by how ambivalent people's feelings were on these issues. Take for example the first serious examination of the implications of the atomic bomb, Brodie's two chapters in *The Absolute Weapon*. The first chapter reflected the assumption that there was no meaningful defense against the bomb, that the weapon would be used mainly against cities, that because the bomb was relatively cheap to produce and deliver, any world power possessing a nuclear arsenal could destroy the cities of its enemy. Under such circumstances, numbers of bombs, or even gross disparities in delivery systems, would not matter greatly; in fact, it did not particularly matter how such a war would be fought, and so strategy as such

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no longer existed.[59] But in his second chapter, he took a completely opposite line: numbers here do matter, defense can make a difference, superiority is still a meaningful concept, and the bulk of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of how atomic war should be fought.

By 1959, when *Strategy in the Missile Age* was published, Brodie had been thinking about these issues full-time for many years. But again he failed to take a clear line. If all we sought was to maximize the pre-war deterrent effect, he wrote, we should "assign the hard-core elements in our retaliatory force to the enemy's major cities, provide for the maximum automaticity as well as certainty of response, and lose no opportunity to let the enemy know that we have done these things." The problem was that "what looks like the most rational deterrence policy involves commitment to a strategy of response which, if we ever had to execute it, might then look very foolish." "For the sake of deterrence before hostilities," he argued, "the enemy must expect us to be vindictive and irrational if he attacks us"—even if his attack took care to spare our populations and successfully destroyed much of our retaliatory force; but "a reasonable opposing view" was "that no matter how difficult it may be to retain control of events in nuclear total war, one should never deliberately abandon control."[60]

Brodie understood that the basic issue in nuclear strategy was target selection. And the central problem here was whether the attack should focus on destroying the enemy's retaliatory force, sparing to the maximum extent possible the enemy's population, in order to preserve its hostage value—or whether the enemy's strategic forces should not be targeted at all, since the ability to destroy them might lead the enemy to preempt and thus be destabilizing. Brodie simply laid out both sets of arguments and made no serious attempt to resolve the issue. He had "given relatively little space," he said in his conclusion, "to the matter of how to fight a general war if it should come," because "the strategy of a total war is like an earthquake in that all the forces which determine its occurrence and its character have been building up over time, as have almost all the factors which determine how it runs its course."[61] The implication here was that rational analysis could make no real difference. And similarly, on the basic issue of limited war strategy—the question of tactical nuclear weapons—Brodie again simply laid out the pros and cons and drew back in this book from taking a position on the issue himself.[62]

Wohlstetter at this time was also fully aware of the problem, but unlike Brodie he actually tried to come up with an answer. His solution was second-strike counterforce. In 1959, in response to a request from General Thomas White, the air

[59] Note also Brodie's remarks in "The Security Problem in the Light of Atomic Energy," 89, 101.

[60] Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, 291–293. Compare also his scepticism about counterforce/"no-cities" on 155–156 with his comment on 310 that "It is certainly conceivable that strategic bombing could be carried on in a restrained and discriminatory fashion; one could argue it *ought* to be, for strategic as well as moral reasons, if carried on at all!"

[61] Ibid., 156, 289, 292–293, 303, 310, 401–402.

[62] Ibid., esp. 329–330.

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force chief of staff, he and his RAND colleague Henry Rowen outlined some of their basic ideas on strategy.[63] Counterforce, they argued, was desirable as a form of insurance. It was unlikely that a rational enemy who chose to attack would use anything more than a small portion of his total force in the first wave. This was because, first, he would seek to "avoid giving warning," and, second, because "a rational strategy, both for ourselves and for the enemy, requires the ability to pose a military threat not only before the opening strike but after it." Hence strategic forces would be reserved, and there would be something meaningful to counter. If the enemy had a complete "free ride," the country might be literally wiped out in the course of the war; but the kind of counterforce and defense capabilities Wohlstetter and Rowen had in mind might "make a significant difference in the size of the disaster suffered by our population." "By 'significant,'" they added, "is meant the difference, for example, between 60 and 160 million dead, and an even greater difference in damage to structures, equipment and stocks."[64]

This argument, Wohlstetter and Rowen insisted, was "quite different" from the usual one put forward by defenders of counterforce. They did not want anything like a full counterforce capability. Both counterforce and city defense carried with them "some danger of destabilizing the deterrent balance." Measures of this sort, while valuable as insurance "in case deterrence fails," nevertheless would place "an extra burden on the deterrent itself." The argument was that as long as these capabilities were limited—as long as counterforce and strategic defense capabilities did not "remove [the enemy's] power to deter us"—the stability problem would be manageable: "If the counterforce capability and a hardened defense might make the difference between 40 and 160 million dead, the answer to the question of destabilization is that the lower limit to which we might aspire is still a catastrophe so large that we would hardly undertake it lightly. If so, then the amount of instability introduced by the counterforce and by city defenses appears no more than tolerable."[65]

As for Schelling, he too was being pulled in both directions. In a paper dated April 1960, he argued for the "no-cities"/counterforce strategy. But just a few months later he was making a case in a small meeting in Monterey for a strategy of controlled counter-city warfare—a strategy which "consciously eschews counterforce capabilities."[66] Soviet vulnerability, which Marshall had been describing at this meeting, was for Schelling not an opportunity but a problem. "We can tell them," he said, "that we are scared by their vulnerability." What he wanted was

[63] Albert Wohlstetter and Henry Rowen, "Objectives of the United States Military Posture," unpublished RAND working paper, 1 May 1959, 15.

[64] Ibid., 13.

[65] Ibid., 15, 17.

[66] Thomas Schelling, "Reflections on Active Defense in the Missile Age," unpublished RAND working paper, 8 April 1960; and "Les armements nucléaires," 134; note also the related argument in his "Dispersal, Deterrence, and Damage," *Operations Research* 9 (May-June 1961): 363–370. Ellsberg and Kecskemeti, "Minutes of the Monterey Seminar," I, 3–14.

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a strategy that would make it possible to bargain with the enemy, something that would allow each side to generate fears and thus to put pressure on its adversary while keeping the door open to a negotiated end to the war. Paul Nitze asked him whether counterforce could be used for purposes of demonstration and bargaining. A counterforce strategy, he replied, "would force the tempo of the war and obliterate the environment in which bargaining can take place."[67]

Actually, what Schelling really objected to was a full counterforce capability. A limited counterforce capability might be an important way to manipulate risk and engage in a strategy of bargaining: "We want to reduce the urgency of striking, the feeling that one must use his strategic force lest it be wiped out. The main thing is not to aim at *complete* counterforce success. One can mount counterforce missions on various levels: the important thing is to preserve the character of limited war."[68]

What created a special problem for Schelling was the key role that the manipulation of risk and the "threat that leaves something to chance" played in his system. For Schelling, the suffering inflicted on civilian populations was important not so much in itself. It was the specter it raised of more agony, of pain on an even greater scale, that would generate the emotional forces governing the outcome of the war. The pain, he stressed, did not have to be inflicted directly; it could come "in the guise of 'military tactics.'" Indeed, it might come into being not as a result of design but as an unavoidable by-product of the "more 'tactical' kind of war."[69] Nevertheless, it was the civilian suffering and not the damage sustained by the military forces that was crucial.

The basic problem here, however, was whether such tactics would be employed even if they did not make military sense—that is, to take the most important example, if counterforce attacks did not make a meaningful difference in the size of the enemy's nuclear forces. If in fact there was no real military logic at work, then there would be no semiautomatic mechanism that would create a risk of things getting out of control. The strategy of inflicting pain would in that case have to be carried out "coolly and deliberately": this would be a simple, although obviously terrifying, war of endurance, and not the kind of risk manipulation that Schelling had considered so vital in the third chapter of *Arms and Influence.*

The problem seemed inherent in the nature of strategic nuclear warfare. The level of risk could not be finely calibrated for bargaining purposes. The military mechanism, and especially the desire to strike before being struck, which for Schelling was the great generator of risk, had a kind of all-or-nothing character. If the mechanism counted for anything at all, it might be too springloaded, and once set off might quickly take things to their ultimate limit.

This problem emerged as soon as people began to consider the operational im-

[67] Ellsberg and Kecskemeti, "Minutes," I, 16.

[68] Ibid., 17.

[69] In Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, eds., *Limited Strategic War* (New York: Praeger, 1962), 255; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 181–182, 194.

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plications of these warfighting strategies. If the counterforce campaign was to have a meaningful impact on the other side's military capabilities, then large numbers of people might be killed and enemy command-and-control facilities might be destroyed. Everyone knew that there were serious problems with America's command-and-control system. Hitch in 1960 called it the "weakest point" in America's "capability for waging actual war"; it was "hardly capable," he said, "of giving a 'go' order."[70] In their report for General White, Wohlstetter and Rowen viewed the problem as very serious and discussed it at some length; Schelling in 1960 also stressed the need for studying "the requirements for reconnaissance, communication and control in bringing the war to any kind of close other than through the sheer exhaustion of weapons on both sides."[71] But there just did not seem any way to control a full-scale counterforce war. The tempo would be too fast, the command facilities on both sides were too fragile. "A really vigorous counterforce campaign," Schelling wrote Brodie in 1965, "may just make it impossible to observe the restraint and targeting care and so forth that would be needed to make the 'no-cities' strategy work."[72]

Schelling, therefore, turned to the strategy of controlled countercity warfare, to a strategy of "pure coercion" and "pure pain."[73] If a general nuclear war had to be fought, this was the way to fight it. Maybe it seemed cruel to deliberately inflict pain for political ends, but was the policy of massive retaliation any better? A single all-out attack, he said, "may seem less cruel because it does not have a cruel purpose—it is merely purposeless—compared with deliberate, measured violence that carries the threat of more." But "a purely destructive war" was "neither clean nor heroic," and it was irresponsible for violence to be purposeless, since "coercion is the business of war."[74]

What did all this amount to? Here were some of the brightest people in America spending years wrestling with the most basic problems of strategy in the nuclear age. And yet what they finally came up with was not terribly satisfactory. Brodie, on the most central issues, did not even pretend to give answers. Schelling, on the other hand, embraced the strategy of controlled counterpopulation warfare, which he knew struck many people as cruel or bizarre.[75] As for the approach that Wohlstetter had settled on in 1959, the whole notion of second-strike counterforce seemed to raise as many problems as it solved. The first wave of an enemy attack might be limited, as Wohlstetter argued, in order to preserve the advantages of surprise. But a strong second-strike counterforce capability might simply convince an enemy

[70] Ellsberg and Kecskemeti, "Minutes," I, 11.

[71] Wohlstetter and Rowen, "Objectives of the United States Military Posture," 20–21, 29–32, 36–37; Schelling, "Reflections on Active Defense," 30.

[72] Schelling to Brodie, 22 February 1965, 4, Brodie Papers, Box 2.

[73] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 199, 201.

[74] Ibid., 202, 216.

[75] Thus the defensive tone of the passages where the idea is discussed in Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 177, 178, 202–203, 215–216.

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to launch a more massive and more rapid follow-on attack than he otherwise might—that is, to use the forces he was holding in reserve before they were destroyed. This might force an enemy to make all-or-nothing choices, and thus, in the usual fashion, to contribute to deterrence: the "all" being virtually suicidal, "nothing" would emerge as the preferred choice. But from the point of view of actual warfighting, second-strike counterforce made less sense: would the enemy attack in the first place unless it knew, with a high degree of confidence, that the strategic balance at the end of the exchange would be very lopsided and very favorable to it? It is hard to see how following such an attack the United States would be in a position to pursue any sort of successful military strategy. If, on the other hand, the United States was so strong that even after absorbing an enemy attack it would be able to pursue a counterforce strategy able to support its political goals, then what would this imply about its first-strike capabilities? If America were able to hold fatalities down to 40 million, even if the enemy struck first, the same capabilities might enable the United States to keep damages at much lower levels if it were to strike the first blow, thus again raising the problem of "stability."

It was as though whichever way one turned the problems were unavoidable. And of course the leading civilian strategists were all fully aware of these difficulties. This comes out above all in the tone they took in their writings. The strategists are often criticized for being too blasé or cavalier in their approach to nuclear war, for being too ready to assume that nuclear war is controllable or that such a war could be fought rationally. Herman Kahn was, I think, the only strategist in the RAND group who ever took anything like a nonchalant tone when dealing with these questions. But the strategists as a whole never approached these nuclear issues light-heartedly. All of the different possible strategies had problems of which everyone was aware. It was as though one settled on a preferred strategy by a process of elimination—not because one would ever want to execute it, or because there was any great enthusiasm for it, but because the alternatives had been even more discredited. James Schlesinger, for example, in a 1968 RAND document heavily influenced by Schelling's ideas, laid out the rationale for a flexible nuclear warfighting strategy—for what were eventually to be called during his tenure as secretary of defense "limited nuclear options." "The argument for sub-SIOP options"—that is, options more limited than those spelled out in the Single Integrated Operational Plan, the basic American plan for a massive nuclear attack on the Soviet bloc—"is not that they are especially appealing," Schlesinger wrote, "but only that such options may be less miserable than the other alternatives under given circumstances. The sub-SIOP option may be compared to playing Russian roulette with three chambers filled, hardly an enticing prospect for decisionmakers." But executing the full SIOP—that is, launching a massive attack—would be like playing with all six chambers filled.[76]

[76] James Schlesinger, "Rationale for NU-OPTS," RAND Report R-1608-Pr [limited distribution]. The references to Schelling are on 18 and 22; the passage quoted is on 5.

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Strategy Hits a Dead End

The nuclear debate in the 1950s and early 1960s was lively and exciting because the problems themselves were so hard to resolve. It was common for people to talk about "paradoxes" and "dilemmas"; the answers were not easy or obvious. It was for this reason that the ideas that emerged at this time, especially at RAND, hardly amounted to a dogma. Instead, people felt themselves to be grappling, as Brodie put it, with "problems of terrible intellectual difficulty."[77] The mark of sophistication was a sense for what those difficulties were. It was easy to criticize those, both on the right and on the left, who thought that the answers were simple. In fact, it was the campaign against the official policy of the 1950s—the strategy of massive retaliation—that gave this body of thought its focal point, political identity, and intellectual coherence.

But as the 1950s progressed, the strategy of massive retaliation was viewed increasingly as bankrupt, even at the highest levels of the administration, although a certain effort was made to conceal this from the outside world. At the beginning of 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gave his famous speech setting out the new doctrine. But by the end of that year Dulles was already questioning in a letter to President Eisenhower whether America was "prepared to deal adequately with the possible 'little wars' which might call for punishment related to the degree and locality of the offense, but which would not justify a massive retaliation against the Soviet Union itself."[78] During the mid- and late 1950s, the doctrine was in constant retreat, as one can see, for example, by reading the series of annual Basic National Security Policy papers—documents that were taken quite seriously during the Eisenhower period.[79]

By 1958 Dulles was in fact leaning toward finite deterrence. The United States, he told the National Security Council, "should not attempt to be the greatest military power in the world although most discussions in the Council seemed to suggest that we should have the most and the best of everything. Was there no group in the government which ever thought of the right kind of ceiling on our military capabilities?"[80] On the question of limited war, Dulles simply felt that it was dangerous to permit any

[77] Brodie, Asilomar talk, 29 April 1960, Brodie Papers, Box 17.

[78] Dulles memo of 22 December 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kanas, White House Memoranda Series, Box 1, file "Meetings with the President." Copies are available at the J.F. Dulles Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. See also Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Review of Basic National Security Policy," (BNSP) 17 November 1954, JCS 2101/172, 18 November 1954, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 48, Modern Military Branch, US National Archives, cited in Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 50.

[79] For the Eisenhower period, the following BNSP papers are available at the Judicial-Fiscal-Social Branch of the United States National Archives, Washington, D.C.: NSC 162/2, 5422/2, 5501, 5708/8, 5810/1.

[80] "Discussion at the 363rd Meeting of the National Security Council, 24 April 1958," Declassified Documents Collection, 1980: 384B.

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> doubt as to the willingness of the United States to resort to massive nuclear retaliation until such time as we have something to take its place. The massive nuclear deterrent was running its course as the principal element in our military arsenal, and very great emphasis must be placed on the elements which in the next two or three years can replace the massive nuclear retaliatory capability. In short, the United States must be in a position to fight defensive wars which do not involve the total defeat of the enemy. . . . If we have to keep our basic policy paper in the form and language that it presently has in order to avoid showing our hand, this was ok with Secretary Dulles. But we must do everything that is necessary in order to develop the supplementary strategy of which he had spoken.[81]

And indeed by the time the administration left office at the beginning of 1961, outgoing Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates felt very confident about America's "limited war capabilities."[82] One has the sense in fact that by this point, massive retaliation would only be considered in the context of a major U.S.–Soviet war in Europe—as an initial response only to a massive attack on Western Europe, or, even more remotely, an attack on America itself. Brodie, one should note, more or less accepted massive retaliation as the proper strategy for such extreme cases.[83]

Reading the documents, one sometimes gets the sense that Eisenhower himself was one of the last true believers. To him, even as late as 1960, a major U.S.–Soviet limited war was an absurdity.[84] His "basic philosophy," he said during the Berlin crisis in 1959, was that America had "to be willing to 'push its whole stack of chips into the pot' when such became necessary. . . . He expressed the conviction that the actual decision to go to all-out war will not come, but if it does come, we must have the crust to follow through."[85] Eisenhower could on occasion be extremely assertive, but on many issues he was also willing to allow his government to take its own course. He thus acquiesced in the drift away from massive retaliation, but in his heart remained skeptical: as terrible as it was, there was no getting away from the massive strike as the ultimate basis of policy; it was just self-deception to pretend otherwise.

In the 1950s, when massive retaliation was the country's official policy, the strategists had new and important things to say. Eisenhower had given these people

[81] "Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 1 May 1958," Declassified Documents Collection, 1980: 384C.

[82] Clifford to JFK, January 24, 1961, President's Office Files, Box 29a, folder "Eisenhower, D.D. 1/17/61 - 10/9/61," John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.

[83] Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, 341, 354–355. Note also the famous article by William Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence" in W. Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), 26–27.

[84] George Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist at the White House* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 400.

[85] "Memorandum of Conference with the President," 8 March 1959, Declassified Documents Collection, 1981/598A.

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something to react to, a target for their fire. But in 1961 the situation changed dramatically. Under John F. Kennedy, the strategy of massive retaliation was explicitly rejected. Although the change in the formal war plans was not nearly as great as the shift in doctrine seemed to imply, it was clear that the Kennedy administration generally shared most of the ambivalences of the strategists on nuclear issues. Indeed, many of the strategists who had worked at RAND in the 1950s played a key role in shaping the military policy of the new administration.[86] But what this ultimately meant was that the theorists were losing their target, which was a lot fuzzier now than it had been during the Eisenhower period. And with the Vietnam war in the late 1960s, they began to lose their self-confidence as well.

The role that the ideas developed by the nuclear strategists, especially Schelling, played in shaping American policy in Vietnam, can easily be exaggerated.[87] It is clear that ideas about signaling through military action and warfare as a kind of bargaining process played a certain role. But the American bombing policy, for example, was not based on generating a sense that matters were getting out of control—on exploiting a threat "that leaves something to chance." In fact, one of the most striking things to emerge from the study of the American air war is the way proposals for a relentless and ominous increase in the destructiveness of the air war were rejected when the bombing policy was worked out.[88] But clearly something had changed after Vietnam. It was not so much that the logic had been revealed as defective; it was the relevance of this body of thought that now came to be questioned. There was a sense that it was somehow out of touch with reality.

For Brodie especially, there was a great shift in perspective. The military problems the strategists had focused on, he now came to feel, were really of secondary importance. The strategists as a group had vastly overestimated the extent to which war could result from essentially military factors: the problem of "strategic instability" had been greatly exaggerated. He even went so far as to claim that he had never believed in the "delicacy" of the balance, although this was certainly untrue.[89] The whole concept of an "accidental" nuclear war, which had played such

[86] See esp. Brodie, "The McNamara Phenomenon," *World Politics* 17 (July 1965); Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 31–34; and Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, esp. chaps. 15–18.

[87] Kaplan, for example, claims (on 332) that Schelling's "concept of coercive warfare" shaped American strategy in Southeast Asia.

[88] See Wallace Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 2 (esp. n. 5), 3, 85–86, 88, 93.

[89] Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security* 2 (Spring 1978): 69. Compare this, for example, with the final paragraph of his "The Anatomy of Deterrence," *World Politics* 11 (January 1959), and esp. his "Strategic Objectives and the Determination of Force Composition," unpublished RAND working paper, 9 June 1959, 11.

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an important role in the arguments about preemption and stability circa 1960, he now dismissed as "ludicrous."[90]

Looking back at this body of thought as a whole, it is clear that the publication of Schelling's *Arms and Influence* in 1966 marked something of a climax. After 1966 the field went into a period of decline: the well seemed to have run dry, the ideas were by and large no longer fresh or exciting, or to use a phrase that Brodie had himself used in a different context in 1955, strategy had hit a dead end.

Was this to be attributed simply to the way the world was changing in the 1960s—to the shift in nuclear strategy under Kennedy and to the Vietnam war? The problem in fact had deeper roots. The most basic issues were analyzed on a very abstract level. One could work out in general terms the argument for strategic stability, or for various nuclear warfighting strategies. But at this level of abstraction there were no final answers; at this highly abstract level of conceptualization the most basic intellectual tensions could not be resolved.

What, therefore, had this body of thought amounted to? On the one hand, the strategists had developed a way of thinking about nuclear issues—not a technique for processing hard, especially quantitative information, and mechanically grinding out answers. For it was universally recognized that the really interesting questions were those with a political dimension, the kind that did not lend themselves to a purely technical analysis. In fact, the particular answers that were given were not especially important in themselves; to someone like Brodie, it was not even clear whether there were any right answers, although there were certainly plenty of wrong ones. What was important was the often counterintuitive nature of the argument, the questions it raised, and the depth of insight it made possible.

On the other hand, there was something strange about this intellectual tradition. For Schelling especially, but to a certain degree for the others as well, the emphasis on risk meant that the manipulation of risk became perhaps *the* central concern of strategy. Ironically, given the hostility of these strategists to the military policies associated with Eisenhower and Dulles, the bottom line here was a defense of "brinkmanship." "Until we can manipulate the risk of general war and engage in competitive risk-taking with the Soviets," Schelling said in 1963, "I don't think we are going to learn to take care of Berlin, much less to take care of Indonesia and Finland when the time comes."[91]

The effect, at least in Schelling's case, was to transform strategy once again into tactics writ large—not military tactics this time, but bargaining tactics. For the group as a whole, the great problem of international politics, the problem of war and peace, was reduced to the problem of behavior during times of crisis and after

[90] Brodie, "How Much is Enough? Guns Versus Butter Revisited," California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, August 1975, 20.

[91] David Abshire and Richard Allen, eds., *National Security: Political, Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 646.

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the outbreak of hostilities. The purely military side of war causation, as Brodie later complained, became the focus of analysis, as though war itself were not in essence a political artifact, as though the basic insight of Clausewitz, whom they all respected, was somehow obsolete. It was not that the issues they focused on were meaningless or irrelevant. The problem, for example, of accidental war resulting from the reciprocal fear of surprise attack was certainly worth thinking about. It was simply a question of balance, of not allowing the tail to wag the dog; and this depended on the sophistication of one's theory of war causation.

"Strategy," Brodie wrote, "is a 'how to do it' study, a guide for accomplishing something and doing it efficiently."[92] It was concerned above all with certain hypothetical situations: If war breaks out, what should we do? If Soviet armies attack western Europe or cut off West Berlin, how should we respond? If we get involved in a crisis, how should we handle it? The central issues of military policy were analyzed in this context. What sort of military policy would put us in the best position for dealing with these situations once they arose? The focus was not on war, or even crisis, as the outcome of an historical process unfolding over a period of years. Policy was, therefore, not analyzed in terms of the manipulation of that process—the shaping of hopes and anxieties so as to influence the course of great power politics. It was as though a whole dimension of strategy had somehow disappeared. A broad range of strategic issues having to do with the way the political and military spheres interact with each other, not just in time of war or crisis, but in more normal times as well, was never really closely examined by mainstream American strategic thought.

These, in any case, are the kind of reflections that suggest themselves to someone trained to think in terms of traditional European great power politics. None of the strategists of the 1950s and 1960s came from that tradition. The small group of men who dominated the field were not people who had been thinking for years about how the international system operated, about what made for war, or about the role that military power played in international politics. Even Brodie, the most politically-minded individual in the group, was an isolated and to some extent an alienated figure in American political science. He was much more a student of military issues than of international politics in general. Given where they did come from intellectually, it was natural that their thinking on these basic issues should take place on a fairly abstract and apolitical level.

And it was apolitical in substance, I think, in large part because it was ahistorical in method. History, for the strategists, when they used it at all, was more a source of illustration than of insight. Brodie himself, a partial exception to this general rule, realized that this was a basic problem. "One of the distinctive weaknesses," he said, "of the otherwise spectacular kind of strategic analysis that has developed especially in the United States is that it often seems to be conspicuously

[92] Bernard Brodie, "Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?" *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1971–72): 161.

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lacking in something that I can only call historic sense or sensitivity."[93] But if the diagnosis is sound, the prescription seems inescapable: historical analysis has to move into the mainstream of strategic studies. History, as a scholarly discipline, has a basic role to play in the intellectual reinvigoration of the field.*

[93] Brodie, "Nuclear Strategy in its Political Context," February 1968, folder "Munich Conference," Brodie Papers, Box 20, 2.

* This article is based in part on research in classified material. Under the terms of the limited security access that the U.S. Air Force grants to scholars, I was able to see certain older documents up to the level of "secret"; the RAND Corporation also generously allowed me to see many of their documents from the period covered in this study. To both of these organizations, and especially at RAND to James Digby, Malcolm Palmatier, and Barbara Woodfill, I am deeply grateful for assistance and cooperation that went far beyond what a scholar working in this field has any right to expect. As part of the agreement authorizing access to these materials, the final manuscript had to be cleared for publication by both of these organizations. But it should be noted that no changes of any substance were required by either RAND or the air force. At no point did I ever feel that my freedom as a scholar was being constrained in any way. I also very much appreciate the help and criticism I received from a large number of individuals, and I would in particular like to thank Robert Jervis, Carl Kaysen, Joseph Loftus, Andrew Marshall, John Mearsheimer, Thomas Schelling, Stephen Van Evera, and Albert Wohlstetter. Finally, I would like to thank the Guggenheim Foundation for supporting the research on which this article is based.

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Book Reviews

Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years *by McGeorge Bundy. New York, Random House, 1988. 735 pp. $24.95.*

McGeorge Bundy has written a serious scholarly work. He draws upon the depth and richness of his experience within government, but his book is certainly more than a memoir. It is also more than the abbreviated, rapid-fire tracts that several former practitioners have written recently on nuclear issues. Bundy writes as an academic seeking to understand the decisions that led to the current strategic predicament. The extent and depth of his research are impressive, and his conclusions are thoughtful and balanced.

Perhaps Bundy's most important contribution is his elaboration of the idea of existential deterrence—a concept he introduced into the nuclear debate in 1983. This view holds that deterrence does not depend on a closely calibrated equality of nuclear forces, but upon the fear of the damage that could be done by even a few nuclear detonations. Because Bundy is one of the few individuals who have participated in decision-making processes that could have resulted in nuclear war, his observations must be taken seriously. Scholars and strategists who ponder levels of acceptable damage from the security of think tanks and research institutes would do well to incorporate his concerns into their deliberations. Yet one wonders about the robustness of Bundy's assertions. Is strategic superiority truly a meaningless concept, or is there a level of inequality in nuclear forces beyond which it would matter, either militarily or psychologically? Can we assume that all political leaders will be similarly inhibited by their fear of the damage that a few nuclear bombs can cause, or will differences in their background, experience, world view, and personality manifest themselves even in this context? If the band of parity is as wide as Bundy leads us to believe, then why have the superpowers viewed some discrepancies in the nuclear balance as intolerable but been willing to live with others? Bundy's work raises these issues, but it does not fully resolve them.

Bundy's belief in existential deterrence reinforces another important conclusion about the ineffectiveness of nuclear diplomacy in achieving specific foreign policy objectives. He argues that the value of atomic threats has often been exaggerated,

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and he prefers to credit adroit diplomacy or local military superiority for the favorable results obtained in crises such as Quemoy-Matsu, Cuba, and the Yom Kippur War. His arguments for some of these cases are more persuasive than others. However, as Bundy himself admits in his chapter on Nikita Khrushchev and the Berlin crises, it is impossible to answer this question definitively, given our current knowledge of Soviet and Chinese decision making.

Much of Bundy's effort is devoted to speculating about a number of historical "what ifs." Although he identifies a few instances in which a different choice might indeed have changed history, the main result of this endeavor is to underscore the strength of the forces that have shaped the nuclear status quo—particularly the conviction that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could tolerate the nuclear superiority of the other.

So large is the gap between Bundy's perceived requirements for deterrence and the requirements that have driven American and Soviet strategic planning that one would expect him to be quite pessimistic about humanity's chances for survival. Yet he remains hopeful about the future. Bundy bases his optimism in part upon evolving changes in the international and strategic spheres. Nuclear weapons have forced both superpowers to adjust to coexistence and created a mutual interest in avoiding armed conflicts between them. As the tradition of nonuse grows stronger, the role of atomic weapons in diplomacy will necessarily diminish. In addition, Bundy believes that human efforts can further reduce the risks and dangers of nuclear war; he particularly emphasizes the need to think more rigorously about strategies for ending a nuclear war with the least possible damage.

Perhaps the book's most serious fault is that, despite the breadth of its analysis, its selection of topics appears to be rather arbitrary at times. The Berlin blockade receives less attention than it deserves, whereas the injustices suffered by Robert Oppenheimer receive proportionately more attention. In addition, the quality of the historical chapters tends to drop off towards the end, where Bundy's access to archival material is limited. Nevertheless, despite its rather sensationalist title, *Danger and Survival* is a first-rate scholarly work that demands careful attention from all who wish to better understand the nuclear age.

ROBERT P. BESCHEL, JR.
Harvard University

The Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control *by Thomas Risse-Kappen. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 202 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

Shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the treaty banning intermediate range nuclear forces [INF], the *Economist* ran a wicked cover—a picture of NATO's Pershing II missiles with the caption "they gave peace a chance." Although Thomas Risse-Kappen is associated with the Peace Research Institute

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in Frankfurt, he would not disagree. While critical of the ideological conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic, his account of the intra-NATO discussions leading to first the deployment and then the agreement to remove INF also disputes any of the claims of the European Left. His conclusions will be more surprising to academics in his own country than to most American readers. The latter will benefit from the unusually full presentation of West German perspectives.

Risse-Kappen stresses the central role played by Germany throughout the history of the INF issue. To a significant extent, the deployment of INF was a response to an initiative by the West Germans, who later downplayed their role. According to Risse-Kappen, the West German government also originated the idea of zero option, which was then picked up by American officials who saw it as a way to comply with the earlier double-track decision to simultaneously negotiate and move ahead with deployment while in fact ensuring that negotiations would fail. West Germany also played a crucial role in the final stages of the negotiations: opposition from the Right and hesitancy from the Center delayed the final agreement several months.

As Risse-Kappen makes clear, consultation between the United States and its NATO partners was unusually close except—and these are major exceptions—for the American rejection of the walk-in-the-woods compromise of 1982 and the proposals discussed at the Reykjavik summit in 1986. Indeed, it is perhaps less accurate to talk of consultation than of "West European participation in the U.S. decision-making process" (pp. 179–80). Transnational alliances formed among the NATO security bureaucracies and each country sought, not always successfully, to understand if not manipulate others' domestic politics. Indeed, on this point Risse-Kappen makes an unusual error of omission. He fails to appreciate that a major motive for Paul Nitze's strong desire for a compromise settlement was his belief that West German public opinion would not permit deployment to proceed.

The INF was an unusual issue throughout. Few saw its potential military impact as great. As *The Zero Option* stresses, considerations of intra-alliance solidarity, political symbolism, demonstrating resolve, and domestic politics were paramount. The West Germans, although of course not of one mind, feared that the U.S. would ignore their interests, develop weapons that might drag them into a Soviet-American war, or, to the contrary, "de-couple" European and American forces and fates. Given the differences between German and American interests and perspectives, adroit Soviet diplomacy might have shaken NATO's unity. But the Russians never made an offer attractive enough to woo West German opinion but not so favorable as to win over American conservatives. And in the strangest end to a complex and paradoxical tale, the conflict was finally resolved by the accession to power of a Soviet leader who was willing to take positions that were unimaginable a few years before. Western patience was rewarded, even if its policy was not directly responsible for the desired result.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

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Rendezvous with Reality: The American Economy After Reagan *by Murray Weidenbaum. New York, Basic Books, 1988. 313 pp. $19.95.*

We should all be grateful to Murray Weidenbaum for having resisted the temptation, doubtless at some cost in royalties, to write yet another self-justifying memoir about who zapped whom in the economic policy infighting of the Reagan administration. Instead, he has written a lively, informative volume, giving his personal views on the serious economic policy issues facing the nation *after* the Reagan administration.

Weidenbaum is an articulate, forthright conservative who makes clear where he stands. He believes that free markets almost always work, that regulation is extremely costly, and that the decline of labor union power is a positive development. He is for free trade and smaller government, and against higher taxes. He would cut the federal deficit by lowering spending (including defense spending), not by enacting a broad-based consumption tax, which he fears would lead to more spending. He questions the whole concept of entitlements ("Why is anyone inherently 'entitled' to benefits from the federal government?" p. 33), although his suggested modifications of Social Security are modest. He would make its benefits fully taxable and tie increases to the gross national product (GNP) deflator, instead of the more volatile consumer price index. He believes the 1986 tax reforms were bad for investment, but would lighten the burden by indexing the capital gains base rather than by lowering the rate. Many of his policy suggestions involve harnessing the profit motive in the public interest, as in increasing competition in defense procurement, bribing communities to accept waste facilities, and reducing pollution by levying fees on hazardous discharges. There are no magic bullets in this book, just pragmatic suggestions for restructuring government rules to foster efficiency and favor economic growth.

In general, the tone is dispassionate and the author makes no special effort to defend Reagan administration policies. The exception is a surprisingly polemical and defensive chapter on the government and the poor. The chapter is hard to follow because it wanders back and forth among different concepts of social welfare spending without warning the unsuspecting reader. The basic theme is that the United States "has devoted extremely generous sums to supporting the poor without solving the fundamental problem of poverty" (p. 205). The reader is told repeatedly that "vast" or "exponential" increases in federal spending for social welfare have occurred over the last several decades and that such spending is taking "a far larger share of the nation's resources" than previously. This great generosity to the poor has undermined their willingness to work and perpetuated poverty. Moreover, Weidenbaum fears that "the financial burden of maintaining large social welfare programs will continue to dominate the federal budget" (p. 204).

Readers familiar with federal budget numbers will figure out that most of this alleged burden is simply Social Security and other retirement programs, not programs for the poor. Excluding Social Security, Medicare, veterans, and federal employees pensions, federal payments for individuals in cash and kind were about

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11 percent of the federal budget in 1988 or 2.4 percent of the GNP. It is hard to square these numbers with the alarmist tone of Weidenbaum's poverty chapter.

When Weidenbaum turns to the task of defending the Reagan administration against charges that it cut welfare benefits, he claims only that, while "significant cuts" were made in some means-tested programs, the safety net is still "largely intact." He also points to the irony that real benefit levels in public assistance declined more rapidly in the Carter administration than in the first half of the 1980s. He does not explain why, if real benefits for the poor have been declining for so long, he is so worried about the pernicious effects of these welfare programs on work effort. My advice would be: skip the confused poverty chapter, but read the rest of the book.

ALICE M. RIVLIN
The Brookings Institution

The Post-modern Presidency: The Office After Ronald Reagan *by Ryan J. Barilleaux. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1988. 175 pp. $35.95.*

Ronald Reagan's presidency has been the subject of a tremendous amount of academic and journalistic writing, ranging from insider accounts by former aides and officials to detached analyses of the evolution of the office of the president. This book provides a clear and useful summary of the state of the presidency bequeathed by Ronald Reagan to his successors. The presidency is described here as having reached a new, post-modern stage in its evolution, taking on a fundamentally different character from the "modern" presidency created by Franklin Roosevelt.

There are three developments that have rendered the office of the president "post-modern" and form the heart of the book. First is the rise of presidential prerogatives, the increased use of budgetary and other administrative initiatives by presidents to shape governmental activity. Post-modern presidents do not simply rely on their role in the legislative process as the primary tool for shaping public policy but take more direct action in guiding the activities of federal agencies. Presidents use the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to shape regulations and other policy actions of agencies and to impose their own budget priorities. In foreign policy, presidents issue unilateral policy declarations that permit them to overcome congressional inertia or opposition.

Second, the post-modern presidency uses the media to accomplish its policy initiatives. A primary task of the presidency is to manage the media's coverage of the presidency to ensure that the president's actions are viewed in the best possible light, that the presidential image is effectively reinforced on a regular basis.

Third, in order to accomplish its goals the presidency has developed an enormous bureaucracy of its own, a "general secretariat." The general secretariat is neither a "central chancery" that tries to run the entire executive branch, as Richard Nixon

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sought to do, nor is it a "clearinghouse" for what is otherwise decentralized, cabinet government, but a structure that provides the resources for presidential prerogative taking and media management. The key role in the president's secretariat is the chief of staff.

While Barilleaux does not add new material to the literature on the presidency, he provides a useful summary of recent changes in American government and politics and how those changes have helped shape the office of the president. He provides clear and common-sense advice to future presidents and their staffs who would be successful in the post-modern presidency in managing the White House and media relations. His analysis might have gone further, however, in at least four directions. First, his discussion of presidential prerogatives and secretariat only scratches the surface of the role of the Office of Management and Budget, and much more could be done to explore what goes on at OMB. The analysis could also examine the use by presidents of executive orders as a powerful policy-making tool.

Second, Barilleaux views presidential relianee on media manipulation as a reflection of the office's weakness in the policy-making process and as a threat to a real democratic politics. His solution is for Congress to challenge the president's media monopoly, but that does not solve the problem of a lack of real democratic discourse. Third, his discussion of the president's prerogatives and secretariat does nothing to assuage fears that a powerful presidency challenges constitutional values of the integrity of law and accountability. Finally, the contemporary presidency may be even more dependent on the political skills of its occupant than is argued in *The Post-modern Presidency.* Ronald Reagan's ability to perform before the camera and his articulation of clear, simple, and dramatic policy goals may account for much of the way the current presidency is viewed, rather than more permanent changes in the office.

GARY BRYNER
Brigham Young University

Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections *by Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III. Westport, Conn., Quorum Books, 1988. 122 pp. $35.00.*

Over the last generation or so, scholarly and popular writing on much of American government and politics has diverged greatly. One need think only of the contrasting bodies of literature on lobbying, interest groups, and campaign finance. This brief, scholarly volume about American campaign finance illustrates the generalization perfectly.

With a few important exceptions, recent reporting for popular consumption about campaign funding in the United States has been simplistic, judgmental, and

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reformist. Its practitioners focus on the activities and motives of contributors, especially political action committees (PACs), and they proceed from the assumption that money is the major factor determining the outcomes of elections and legislative battles. The collective picture of these PACs is cut of the same cloth: they are predatory, and as a group they are all pretty similar. The books come adorned with titles that convey the message; *Honest Graft* and *The Best Congress Money Can Buy* have been published just within the year.

Eismeier and Pollock reflect a more cautious, more sophisticated, and more detached view. Without being confrontational, they repeatedly challenge the received wisdom of the popular view. The corporate PACs, as they see them, are diverse in size, goals, strategy, and political capacity. They mix ideological/partisan goals with the pragmatic ones of getting along with Democratic majorities in the Congress, and they concoct that mix in very different ways. Nor are their goals and strategies firmly set; they often shift with the imperatives of the external political world. The corporate PAC "movement," in other words, is divided and heterogeneous, its goals often the conflicting goals of individual PACs.

Despite its brevity, the book's analytical texture is rich. The authors identify three basic types of corporate PAC: the accommodationists who favor legislative incumbents, the partisans who "give" Republican, and the adversaries who support issue or ideological purity. Type, furthermore, reflects the corporate parent's relationships with the state; old-style regulation is related to accommodationist giving to Democratic incumbents, but the new social regulation (for example, environmental laws) seems to produce more partisan and ideological giving. Type also reflects size. The authors find an unexpected localism, even provincialism, among the smallest PACs (the "dwarfs").

All of this analysis (and more) is set splendidly in the context of current American politics and corporate traditions. It is all very concise, for this is a short book; insights come and go rather quickly, and the analysis is fast-paced. It is a book for careful reading and thoughtful mining. In fact, it is one of those rare books that might well have been a little longer, both to let the authors spell out the context and analysis a little more fully and to allow them to incorporate a little more of the related analysis that has already appeared in their scholarly articles.

One has here, then, an elegant and subtle treatment of corporate PACs. It is well informed by other scholarship and by general political sophistication. It is also uncommonly well organized and written. In short, Eismeier and Pollock have written a book for people who would prefer to come to their own conclusions about PACs after looking at some evidence and after thinking about what else is going on in American politics. They have not played to popular prejudices or conventional wisdom. The result is an indispensible book for specialists and, for the serious citizen, a stimulating introduction to the baffling world of PACs.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

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New Federalism, Intergovernmental Reform From Nixon to Reagan *by Timothy Conlan. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1988. 274 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $15.95.*

The domestic programs of both Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Ronald Reagan are known by the same name—New Federalism. Nixon used the name often. Reagan did not use it at all. It was the press that tagged Reagan's program as a "new federalism," a designation he is said to have resisted, in part reflecting the considerable tension between these two Republican Presidents.

For close observers of the domestic policy scene, it is not easy to decide whether these two domestic programs are more similar or more different. The way I see it, Nixon's brand of New Federalism highlighted new spending programs (notably revenue sharing, block grants, and welfare reforms) that in every case involved substantial infusions of new revenue for both state and local governments, although the lion's share of new spending under revenue sharing and block grants was in the form of aid to local units. Reagan's brand of new federalism (note the lowercase treatment of the title) strongly favored the states and opposed and deeply cut direct federal aid to localities. Reagan eliminated the last vestiges of Nixon's revenue sharing program, the centerpiece of the earlier New Federalism (upper case). The strong emphasis of Reagan's approach to all federal aid policies under Reagan was to cut it, not increase it.

Tim Conlan, an assistant professor at George Mason University and formerly assistant staff director of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, has written a Brookings book on these two domestic programs. He is mindful of the differences between them, although he links them ideologically. Both programs, he says, "address important questions about conservative ideology" (p. 3). It is every author's right—indeed, responsibility—to come to conclusions on such central matters of interpretation. Despite the fact that I put a different spin on the interpretation of these events, it needs to be stressed that Conlan has done a fine, important service in providing a readable, richly documented, historical account of the evolution and composition of the domestic programs of Nixon and Reagan. It belongs in the library of all social science experts on domestic affairs and officials who labor in this vineyard.

The Reagan story is freshest in our minds. The Nixon story will be newer for many readers. How should we interpret his domestic policy? I think the best interpretation is one that fits Nixon's personality and personal style, indeed showing how important presidents are to the business of government. Nixon, as many accounts of him have stressed, was very changable. At some points he was expansive and outgoing personally; at others, brooding and uneasy. His aides record how he would fall "into and out of love" with his principal subordinates. My interpretation is that his record reflects a very similar pattern with regard to policy ideas, especially in the domestic arena. There were periods when Nixon's compassion about social issues exceeded that of his Great Society predecessor, Lyndon Johnson. In these periods, which predominated in terms of influencing events, Nixon's rhet-

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oric highlighted social problems and exuded confidence about our ability to solve them. Revenue sharing ($7 billion per annum, big money even in Washington) greatly enhanced social security and health benefits, welfare reform, the dramatic expansion of the food stamp program, added money ("sweeteners") for new block grants; and environmental and housing initiatives came to the fore in these periods. Over the course of his presidency, Nixon presided over a 50 percent increase in federal grants-in-aid in relation to gross national product, with the dollar figures rising from $55 billion to $87 billion adjusted for inflation, (1982 dollars). This percentage increase in relation to gross national product is greater than that under Johnson. Nixon was a centrist, not a movement conservative like Reagan, whose record, in sharp contrast, shows historic cuts in the terms just indicated. The two presidents saluted federalism as Republians are wont to do, but Reagan was a conservative, Tenth Amendment (state-oriented), dual federalist, compared to the pragmatic state and local managerial decentralization philosophy that undergirded Nixon's New Federalism approach.

Conlan's account of these events is an important contribution to the literature. The reader can draw his or her own conclusions from the evidence. I offer these comments to stimulate interest in reading and using this book, which serves so well to trace and describe the major elements and events of the two new federalisms. And as a bonus, readers get Samuel H. Beer's marvelous introductory essay, which in a sense offers still a third way of looking at the elephant, an appropriate animal when one is studying Republican presidents.

RICHARD P. NATHAN
Princeton University

Franklin D. Roosevelt's Rhetorical Presidency *by Halford R. Ryan. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1988. 206 pp. $39.95.*

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt continues to fascinate scholars. Besides his political skills, authors have focused on FDR's humor, character, health, campaign abilities, thinking, human side, friendships, controversies, advisers, secrets, propaganda, critics, death, and his legacy. Now we have a study of his rhetoric.

And rightly so. Roosevelt's oratorical skills and persuasive style have long been acknowledged and are still of interest. Public libraries still lend tapes and records of FDR's campaign and inauguration addresses as well as his fireside chats. In this well-researched book, Washington and Lee Speech Professor Halford R. Ryan carefully examines Roosevelt's use of rhetorical technique and a potent delivery style to persuade the public and Congress to either elect him or adopt his legislative agenda.

As an analysis of one President's communications relationship with a national audience, Ryan focuses upon the thirty-second President's orations on national

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and international issues, four inaugural addresses, and two unsuccessful rhetorical attempts to pack a recalcitrant Supreme Court and move a 1938 electorate.

Ryan puts Franklin D. Roosevelt into the context of other electrifying contemporaries—Father Charles Coughlin, Senator Huey Long, and Fuehrer Adolph Hitler. FDR's print voltage made the difference. Ryan says that Roosevelt attained the highest artistic achievement where "good written and oral style meld." Hallmarks for his eloquent diction were FDR's favorite stylistic techniques of alliteration, anaphora, and metaphor.

Ryan points to a purposeful convergence of alliteration and anaphora for a written-oral communication in the 1937 second inaugural address. There, Roosevelt stressed greater governmental effort as a solution to the nation's unfinished task:

"I see millions of families trying to live on incomes so meager that the pall of family disaster hangs over them day by day.

"I see millions whose daily lives in city and on farm continue under conditions labeled indecent by so-called polite society half a century ago.

"I see millions lacking the means to buy the products of farm and factory and by their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions.

"I see one-third of the nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished" (p.88).

Ryan also points to FDR's colorful figurative metaphors: the Tory press, the economic royalists, the neighbor's garden hose—each having enough ambiguity for the audience to interpret a selected image. He notes that the President preferred such graphic word pictures, rather than statistics, which were only used in the 1940 campaign when the actual numbers of bombers and battle ships were an issue. As Ryan says, "Numbers can be refuted, whereas images, being equivocal, are hard to controvert" (p. 162).

Unlike the textbook speech traditions of an introduction, body, and conclusion, FDR's addresses had few rousing beginnings. An exception would be, "Yesterday, December 7, 1941." Rather, as Ryan skillfully notes, they had only an introduction insofar as Roosevelt began his speech. Ryan explains that perhaps FDR knew that he already had the audience's attention by the mere fact that he was the President speaking. For Roosevelt's speech body, Ryan points to the scant attention paid to an organizational pattern, except for an avoided one, a built-in ambiguity as with the third term campaign speeches with appeals for peace and war.

Ryan's last chapter is particularly helpful. "Writing the Rhetoric" lists enough about the speech writers so that the reader wants more references to those first drafters who inserted, wrote, and influenced specific fireside chats or inauguration or campaign addresses. Ryan successfully argues that Roosevelt used his craftsmanship to draft or revise and edit, or as Ryan says, "personally make many of the word choices." He concludes that there were "enough Rooseveltian emendations and dictation, enough famous phrases that were his inventions, and enough consistency over time . . . that one could reasonably conclude Roosevelt's speeches had style and it was his" (p. 167).

If there is a weakness in this excellent addition to the Roosevelt scholarship,

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it is the less than complete presidential rhetorical package. In his eight documented chapters, bibliography, and two indices, Ryan concentrates mostly on those Roosevelt addresses before the United States's entry into World War II. In fact, Ryan combines the purge, isolationist fights, and the wartime rhetoric into one scant chapter. For the most part, he ignores those World War II addresses for morale building, progress reporting, bond loan drives, and allied unity.

BETTY HOUCHIN WINFIELD
Washington State University

The Republican Party in the US Senate 1974–1984: Party Change and Institutional Development *by Christopher J. Bailey. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988. 166 pp. $35.00.*

Until the 1980 election reversed party control in the United States Senate, most of our knowledge about the behavior of Senate Republicans was conditioned by minority status. The prime virtue of Christopher J. Bailey's book is that it traces the development of the Senate Republican party from minority status through majority performance during the first four years of the Reagan administration. The author, a lecturer in American Politics at the University of Keele, provides a balanced, objective overview of a critical period in Senate history.

Bailey launches his study in 1974, when the Republican party was attempting to recover from the Watergate crisis, President Richard Nixon's forced resignation, and the controversial pardon granted to him by President Gerald Ford. Republicans had not controlled the Senate since the first Eisenhower Congress, the 83rd (1953–1954). In the 1974 election they had suffered a net loss of four seats, reducing their numbers to 38. Bailey traces the rise of a younger, more conservative brand of Republican senators, many of them from the South and Rocky Mountain states, culminating in the landmark 1980 election. It brought Ronald Reagan to the White House and won them control of the Senate by a ratio of 53 to 47. As Bailey shows, individually-centered and television-dominated campaigns came to the fore. Bolstered by political action committee (PAC) money and refined electoral tactics, Republicans upset such senior Democratic luminaries as Birch Bayh of Indiana, Frank Church of Idaho, and George McGovern of South Dakota.

The core of Bailey's book deals with the changing composition of the Senate Republican party, the rise of right-wing as distinct from mainstream, Taft-Republicans, and more moderate northeasterners of the Jacob Javits, John Heinz, and Charles Mathias persuasion. Although the interpretation is sound and basically convincing, some of the data analyses are limited. For example, Table 4.3 treats ideological divisions within the Senate Republican party from 1974–1984, "compiled from the voting records, interest group ratings and policy statements of the senators concerned" (p. 65). However, no cutting-points are provided and only limited rationales are suggested.

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Bailey's treatment of party leadership is almost exclusively a study of floor leader Howard Baker of Tennessee, his early triumphs and later tribulations. Problems in shifting from minority status to majority responsibility for implementing President Ronald Reagan's legislative programs are conveyed by standard treatments of tax and budget policy and such foreign policy votes as the decision not to block AWAC sales to Saudi Arabia. Few new insights are uncovered in the concluding chapters dealing with presidential-senatorial relations (first Carter, then Reagan), and the rise of a "new individualism" among more junior senators, Democrats as well as Republicans.

On balance, Bailey is most comfortable and plausible working with individual characteristics and behavior such as juniority, ideology, and geographical classifications. As he moves from procedures to legislative strategy, party leadership styles, and presidential-congressional relations the themes grow looser and more amorphous. Relationships between the Republican-controlled Senate, the Senate Democratic minority, and the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives are all but ignored. One can also question his decision to terminate his study at the end of the first Reagan administration. The book's value would have been enhanced had it followed the Class of 1980 through its six year election cycle. Thus, we are left to conjecture about the reasons why Republicans were returned to minority status in 1986. While this book is not a definitive treatment, it is nevertheless a useful, competent contribution.

ROBERT L. PEABODY
The Johns Hopkins University

Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives: Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules *by Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1988. 154 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95.*

The U.S. House of Representatives, like any decision-making body, requires a set of rules and procedures in order to function. These rules and procedures, especially in the larger House as compared to the smaller and procedurally informal Senate, largely define how issues are debated and decided by the full House membership. This is certainly the case with most major and controversial measures; they will require a special rule (a simple resolution) from the House Rules Committee. Special rules grant bills' access to the floor and establish the conditions for debating and amending the legislation.

The Rules Committee, one of the comparatively few standing committees in either chamber about which books are regularly and deservedly written, and its role in shaping floor decision making is the topic of this excellent analysis by two sophisticated congressional scholars-practitioners. The Bach-Smith study examines and explains the rise and ramifications of a significant development in today's

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House—the formulation of unique and creative special rules that limit "amending activity on the floor without foreclosing it altogether" (p. 55). By controlling and limiting the amending process, these special rules "have helped to shape legislative outcomes by defining the alternatives from which members may choose and the strategic context in which their decisions are made" (p. 86).

The authors explore the evolution of innovative special rules from the 94th to the 99th Congresses (1975 through 1986), and highlight the reasons for their development—for instance, the 1970s dispersion of power in the House that produced more participation in floor decision making and also greater uncertainty for party and committee leaders in shaping or managing floor outcomes. In response to developments such as subcommittee government and multiple referrals (referring legislation to more than one committee), the Rules Committee formulated new special rules whose very names—"king-of-the mountain," "restrictive," or "self-executing"—highlight the parliamentary craftsmanship and imagination of Rules members. Chapter 3, aptly titled "Change and Creativity in Capitol Suite H313," describes well how the Rules Committee adapts to changing conditions and demands by fashioning special rules to fit the new circumstances.

Because the Rules Committee is tied closely to the majority leadership of the House—the Speaker since 1975 names the Democratic members including the chairman—it is not surprising that House Republicans lament the use of creative and partisan rules that restrict their floor amendment opportunities and skew the parliamentary playing field to the advantage of the majority party's agenda and objectives. Bach and Smith dispassionately examine whether the new forms of special rules favor the majority party and find that many enjoy bipartisan support. "But it is equally true," state the authors, "and undoubtedly more important, that the Rules Committee often has written special rules with a strong bias toward party and committee interests" (p. 71). Needless to say, the Rules Committee remains a target of criticism not only from Republicans but also rank-and-file Democrats who are precluded from offering floor amendments because of restrictive rules.

This is a readable account of the evolution of special rules and the important role that they play in the contemporary House. It is chock-full of examples, case accounts, tables, and quotations that bring to life the complexities and nuances of floor decision making. The authors have compellingly demonstrated why and how the Rules Committee plays such a strategic procedural role in the congressional process. Long known as a traffic cop, which regulated the flow of measures to the House floor, today's Rules Committee members "have added a new dimension to legislative strategy in the House" (p. 135). Students of Congress and citizens interested in the legislative process will find this a valuable and informative book. It is a study that merits a wide audience.

WALTER J. OLESZEK
Congressional Research Service

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The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics *by Jeffrey B. Abramson, F. Christopher Arterton, and Gary R. Orren. New York, Basic Books, 1988. 331 pp. $21.95.*

In their conclusion, Abramson, Arterton, and Orren state: "Now is the time to raise fundamental questions about how a democracy may best profit from the marvels of electronic communications." *The Electronic Commonwealth* provides a solid foundation upon which to raise and debate such questions.

The new media technologies (that is, computers, satellites, videotext, and interactive and cable television) are characterized by six properties: dramatic increases in the volume of information available; the ease of exchanging information across time and space; the increase in consumer control of information; the targeting of particular audiences; the decentralization of control over information; and the turning of television into an interactive medium. The authors see the new media working in conjunction with the old (especially television) in ways that have and will fundamentally alter the information environment in which we live.

The implications of these changes for democratic politics depend on one's definition of democracy. The authors, therefore, discuss three familiar models—plebiscitary, communitarian, and pluralist. They identify shortcomings in each model: plebiscitary democracy can lead to isolated individuals making hasty, unreasoned decisions; communitarian democracy can devolve into "closed and exclusionary communities" (p. 30), and pluralist democracy can lead to domination by groups already controlling the greatest resources. They conclude by acknowledging their own preference for a synthesis of the latter two, which they label "pluralism with a communitarian face" (p. 30).

The rest of the book describes the new technology, provides examples of how it might be used in theory and has been used in practice, and explicates how the new media furthers or subverts the three notions of democracy in elections (Chapter Three), governing (Chapter Four), and citizen participation (Chapter Five). In Chapter Six the authors compare media regulatory policy in the United States to that in Great Britain and the Netherlands. Chapter Seven examines press freedom in the United States, with an eye towards fitting the new media into the competing traditions of print, television, and common carrier regulations. Finally, Chapter Eight speculates on the future uses of the new media, the choices to be made regarding those uses, and the likely problems to be faced if they are to encourage a functioning "electronic commonwealth."

This book has much to recommend it. It provides informative overviews of the new technologies and excellent examples of how they have (and often have not) altered contemporary politics. The authors carefully distinguish between the new media's potential to enhance or subvert the democratic process and the evidence about what has actually happened. This sometimes means acknowledging that attempts to increase citizen deliberation (with interactive television) have been less successful than those encouraging less desired changes (the abuse of opinion polls, marketing of candidates, and inequitable access to the new technology). It also

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means noting that in many cases the new technology leads to very little political change. By focusing on the relationship between the new technology and competing theories of democracy, the authors are able to give a subtle appraisal of how the new media can encourage, discourage, or pervert the citizen's role.

The book is not without shortcomings. The authors occasionally end discussions too firmly in the middle, particularly when the empirical evidence conflicts with the promise of an electronic commonwealth. Because of their broad-strokes approach, the historical, legal, or technical discussions are occasionally cursory. In places there is more discussion of older media than new ones. And while the authors avoid the pitfall of technological determinism they often fail to fully consider the economic, social, and political reasons for the way in which the new media is used by elites and citizens, focusing instead on legal and regulatory explanations. True to the authors' view of democracy, however, *The Electronic Commonwealth* provides a wealth of useful information and a reasoned analysis, drawing the reader into the ongoing dialogue while ultimately allowing him or her to make an informed and independent decision concerning the promise or threat of the new media technology.

MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI
Barnard College

Hard Judicial Choices: Federal District Court Judges and State and Local Officials *by Phillip J. Cooper. New York, Oxford University Press, 1988. 374 pp. Cloth, $34.00; paper, $15.95.*

This book offers a major contribution to public law literature on United States district courts, the workhorses of the federal judiciary. It provides an assiduously researched and intriguing portrait of the often uneasy relationship between federal district court judges and state and local officials as they clash in the arena of remedial decree litigation. Indeed, Cooper's tome is a story of clashes that inevitably derive from federalism, separation of powers, and the constant tension between law and politics. These conflicts have occurred over some of the vexatious issues faced by the judiciary in the twentieth century—namely, open housing, school desegregation, busing, administration of mental health and penal institutions, and police conduct. Undaunted by the broad scope or turbulent history of these issues, Cooper wades into his study of each.

He first supplies his readers with a basic description of the nature of remedial decrees as they developed in the Anglo tradition of equity law. One of Cooper's most helpful contributions is his development of a remedial decree model, consisting of four phases: the trigger phase, in which an event or cumulative effect of historic policies prompts the initiation of a suit; the liability phase, in which

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the court determines whether there is a violation of law entailing a remedy; the remedy phase, during which solutions are prescribed by the court to alleviate the effects of the illegal activity; and the post decree phase, in which the remedy is implemented, evaluated, and refined.

Cooper's methodology is most impressive and effective. He is fully aware of the theoretical pitfalls of case studies, especially "the problem of uniqueness," as Theodore Lowi has described it. Thus, Cooper takes extra care in selecting the widest array of cases available to present as complete, accurate, and objective a picture as possible. For each issue that he uses to illustrate the courts' remedial decree response, he provides an historical chapter on the development of the controversy followed by another on the case itself.

Many of the decisions are already familiar to students of constitutional law; *Milliken v. Bradley*, *Wyatt v. Stickney*, and *Rizzo v. Goode* can be found in any standard casebook. But Cooper brings them alive with his vivid and sometimes poignant descriptions of the actors and politics involved in each dispute. His portrayals of the agonizing role played by the courageous judges in these cases are especially memorable. Yet therein lies the rub. Must judges take on such agonizing roles? Should they plunge so willingly into the political thicket, where remedial decree litigation inevitably takes them? What limits should be placed on judicially-created equitable remedies? Perhaps wisely, Cooper eschews these normative questions in his introductory remarks, pleading that they are unanswerable in the broad context in which they are posed. But the reader may be somewhat disappointed that Cooper did not essay a response based on the wealth of information that he so competently gathered and analyzed. Nevertheless, this work provides an invaluable empirical framework for improving our understanding of the less glamorous, yet so powerful trial courts in the federal judicial system.

BARBARA A. PERRY
University of Central Florida

National Security and the U.S. Constitution: The Impact of the Political System
edited by George C. Edwards III and Wallace Earl Walker. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. 340 pp. $39.50.

The purpose of this volume of essays is reflected in its title. The book is an attempt to assess the effects that the United States system of governance has on its national security policy. There are thirteen essays, with a valuable introduction and conclusion by the editors. The essays are grouped into four headings: statecraft, national defense, foreign relations, and economic policy. Subjects vary: conducting diplomacy, managing international economic policy, organizing the armed forces, and mobilizing political support for national policy. As with all such edited volumes, the essays are of varying quality, with the level ranging from competent but solid to highly perceptive. I found the essays by Bert Rockman ("Mobilizing Political

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Support") and Roger Porter ("Engaging in International Trade") to be the most engaging and informative; but that may very well reflect my own familiarity with most of the other subjects covered in this volume. There is much to recommend here for readers who wish a quick overview of the various aspects of American security policy broadly defined and who want easy reference to the most recent writings on the subject through footnotes at the end of each essay.

The strength of this volume is, therefore, in its survey nature. But in its analysis of the central question posed—how does the political system affect security policy—the results are more mixed. In his essay, Rockman put it best when he asked: " . . . what difference [do] institutions make? To that intriguing question there is no unambiguous answer" (p. 27). If there is one clear theme running throughout all the essays, however, it is this: The perspective of "separated institutions sharing powers," as Richard Neustadt put it nearly thirty years ago, is still the best prism through which to view policy making in the United States, whether it be domestic or foreign. But this is as we should expect. The constitutional structure of the United States has not changed, so why shouldn't the pervasive effects it has on policy making remain the same?

What we have in this volume is a contemporary reaffirmation of the long-standing verities of American governmental workings at the national level. The Defense Department is difficult to manage because Congress has preferred, until 1986, to keep the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff weak so as better to enhance its own influence over military policy. The dispersion of power between Congress and president is repeated in the fragmentation of authority within the Pentagon. Policy making in foreign economic policy, whether it be in trade or monetary affairs, is split among several executive agencies. There are no big winners or losers, because all share power over policy. Presidents can override congressional committee-executive bureau alliances only if they are able to go outside of Washington and mobilize public support for their policies. The result is that national security policies across the board are neither coherent nor sustained, but they are representative of the various interests involved and characterized by innovation. Efficiency in policy making and coherence in policy content are not virtues of a dispersed power structure. But consensus produced through representativeness is.

ROBERT J. ART
Brandeis University

John Paul Stevens and the Constitution: The Search for Balance *by Robert Judd Sickels. University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988. 203 pp. $19.75.*

Robert Sickels has very perceptively analyzed the judicial record of the least publicized justice on the current Supreme Court, John Paul Stevens. Owing his appointment to Gerald Ford, Senator Charles Percy, and Ford's Chicago-based At-

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torney General Edward Levi, Stevens was promoted from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to take the place of retiring Justice William O. Douglas in 1975. While Stevens has commonly been regarded as among the Court's liberals, Sickels presents Stevens not as an ideologue but as a "balancer." Balancing, Justice Hugo Black always contended, was a device for arriving at conservative decisions, but it has not worked out that way with Stevens. Sickels characterizes his method as "compound balancing"; it is a "fact-bound approach." Not an absolutist, Stevens wants "to learn what really lies behind and ahead of each case" (p. 152).

Sickels places Stevens in the company of the other four "moderates" with whom he has served (the study concluded in 1986)—Justices Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, Harry A. Blackmun, and Lewis F. Powell Jr. All are classified as "eclectics," open to experience and distrustful of fixed rules; "all render balanced, bounded judgments" (p. 153). The differences among them are "shadings," and consequently Sickels believes that his book presents a reasonably representative case study of the Court's "moderate center," as well as an analysis of Stevens's variations on moderate themes.

How is Stevens distinguished from the other moderates or balancers on the Court? Sickels examines Stevens's record in three broad areas—First Amendment, due process, and equal protection. On free speech issues, Stevens is found to distinguish between communications of greater and lesser value and to weigh each against the public interest in constraint, which varies according to context. Likewise, due process is not to be defined arbitrarily. As for equal protection, Stevens rejects both the "two-tier" and "three-tier" schemes of review. "There is only one Equal Protection Clause," he insists (p. 126). Of the five moderates, only Stevens takes a firm stand in favor of the rights of criminal defendants, "a reflection of his concern for fair and rational procedures" (p. 153). Stevens's differences with Blackmun are minor. Powell, with his ability to play the role of the conciliator, was more likely to be on the winning side than Stevens.

The statistics in the *Harvard Law Review* on voting alignments for the most recent term (1987) confirm Stevens's location at the center of the Court. He agreed with William H. Rehnquist in almost as many cases (71.2 percent) as with Thurgood Marshall (74.3 percent). He lacks, Sickels admits, a central ideological theme. But he offers "a thoughtful alternative to central themes, liberal or conservative" of the Warren and Burger Courts. "If nothing else, his work reaffirms an old conviction that there is deeper work to be done by the Court than the usual tug-of-war, depending more on numbers than on judgment, between the moral leaders of the right and the moral leaders of the left" (p. 163).

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
University of California, Santa Barbara

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Before the Civil Rights Revolution: The Old Court and Individual Rights *by John Braeman. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1988. 216 pp. $37.95.*

This book provides a detailed, balanced examination of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that treated what some earlier scholars often referred to as non-economic human rights—the civil rights and civil liberties cases which preceded 1937. The central thesis of the investigation is that the Court majorities (The Old Court) prior to the advent of a New Deal majority in the late 1930s, actually pioneered significant doctrinal innovations in individual rights decisions, innovations that provided a solid array of precedents available for post-1937 civil rights and liberties expansion. This theme is well supported by five sensitively analyzed chapters.

"Individual Rights in a Federal System" is both introductory and substantive. The well worn path of exploration of the origin and early applications of judicial review in *Marbury v. Madison* and *Dred Scott v. Sanford* is revisited. More important to the central theme is the general examination of the doctrines that inhibited development and application of a body of federal precedents supportive of non-economic human rights.

Chapter 2, "The Scope of Constitutionally Protected Rights," deals directly with the cases and doctrines that ultimately influenced the fuller development of major twentieth-century civil liberties and rights doctrines. The author candidly reports a number of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century decisions that negatively rejected such non-economic rights as the denial of Morman claims for religious freedom in *Reynolds v. The United States* and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's application of a restrictive standard for the scope of speech freedom in *Patterson v. Colorado.* Conversely, the landmarks of positive establishment of civil rights and liberties, whether in majority or dissenting opinions, are dutifully enumerated. Schenk, Abrams, Gitlow, Whitney, DeJonge, and Herndon represented expansions or proposed expansions of free speech; Pierce on religious freedom and the extremely slow development of doctrines committed to gender equality, among others, generally documented an often slow and very uneven doctrinal evolution toward greater emphasis on non-economic human rights.

Chapter 3 similarly examines the pre-1937 Court record on race-related constitutional issues. Chinese as well as black equal rights issues are assessed in the context of changing attitudes from the post-Civil War Reconstruction era to the 1930s. Here, of course, many of the earlier doctrines were negative, with the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, Plessy, and Cumming among a significant number of examples. The arduous and often uneven progression of doctrinal advances toward equality are well documented and sensitively interpreted.

Criminal procedure and the constitutional status of the criminal defendant are the substantive issues of Chapter 4. Early positive expansions such as *Brown v. Mississippi* and Powell were often outnumbered by restrictive or very cautious decisions. Here again the record is rather uneven.

"The Old Court and Individual Rights Reappraised" is the fifth and final chapter. It restates the original hypothesis and argues that the evidence to support it is com-

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pelling. This book does document the fact that the Old Court did pioneer many advances in civil rights and liberties doctrines before 1937. But Braeman claims more, asserting that this record has received "scant attention" (p. 1). Braeman's work is a fine, albeit very concise analysis. 124 pages of this 261-page work are devoted to treatment of the subject; the remainder consists of notes, a valuable select bibliography, and an index. The select bibliography itself contains many examples of excellent historical and analytical assessments of the Supreme Court's doctrinal treatment of civil rights and liberties, before as well as after 1937, such as the 1941 edition of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (the first edition was published in 1920), the more broadly based Richard C. Cortner, *The Supreme Court and the Second Bill of Rights* (1981) or Paul L. Murphy, *World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States* (1979).

JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER
University of Southern California

Bureaucratic Politics and Regulatory Reform: The EPA and Emissions Trading *by Brian J. Cook. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1988. 192 pp. $37.95.*

This is a rather focused book that describes the ways in which the current trends toward regulatory reform have been manifested in the internal organizational politics of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). During a period beginning in 1970, when Congress enacted the earliest legislation forcing a measure of regulatory reform at EPA, through the legislatively mandated reforms that occurred through 1987, the EPA has significantly transformed the nature of its regulatory activity.

For most of its existence the EPA has operated with a fundamental schism within its professional ranks regarding the agency's mission, purpose, and regulatory responsibility. In its earliest days its regulatory focus was clearly based on control of inappropriate behavior. Its bureaucracy strove to control the emission of pollutants that violated regulations grounded in legal reasoning. The agency emphasized vigorous enforcement of pollution control laws, strict standards of enforcement, and stern punishment for recalcitrant polluters. Over time, regulators who saw a different responsibility for EPA began to emerge. To their mind, economic factors such as efficiency had to play a more significant role in defining inappropriate behavior. Through the growing influence of these reformers, who emerged to play more meaningful roles at EPA, the agency has become much more sensitive to industry concerns about costs, efficiency, and flexibility, and also to the problems of central control versus decentralized decision making regarding pollution abatement strategies. In many respects EPA has become sensitive to those theories advanced in the name of the market place and which suggest that the way to control air and water pollution is to make high quality emission standards

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more cost effective. Such a system of economic incentives rather than legal sanctions will be, it is argued, more effective.

Brian Cook describes the process by which the EPA's regulatory standards were transformed. In his explanation Cook argues that political leaders within EPA have had a powerful effect upon the character of agency reform. For Cook, political leadership at the agency under President Jimmy Carter's appointees Douglas Costle and William Drayton was particularly effective as they advanced a scheme of regulation based upon an economically rational mechanism for enforcement and away from the traditional notions of pollution control. Their leadership, and that of Reagan appointees following Anne Burford, was responsible for compelling the EPA to put an even greater focus on economic reasoning. Thus EPA has become a very different agency as a result of both changes in the environment of regulation as well as changes within the agency itself. The rule makers and pollution program managers are more sensitive to industry concerns and through the development of principles of emission trading, have begun to see air and water pollution rights as commodities capable of being traded within tightly limited markets. While the transformation at EPA is not complete, a great deal of industry hostility has been eliminated in the process of EPA's transformation.

In Cook's treatment of EPA's reform, he gives a great deal of credit to the agency's political leadership as an instrument of that reform. By staking out such a position, he departs from the more conventional and traditional theories that see agencies as virtually captured by their bureaucracies and as largely insulated from any political leadership within the agencies themselves. In truth, Cook's analysis, while paying due attention to the internal dynamics within EPA, largely downplays the significant external influences that forced so many agencies such as EPA to develop strategies of deregulation. In essence, EPA was as much a subject of the popular and widespread hostility to government overregulation as it was a subject of reform generated by internal leadership. Thus, while Cook's analysis is informative and his research is creditable, his story is a partial one. The changes that occurred at EPA deserve a broader focus than Cook's treatment suggests.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
Columbia University

Sanctity vs. Sovereignty: The United States and the Nationalization of Natural Resource Investments *by Kenneth A. Rodman. New York, Columbia University Press, 1988. 403 pp. $45.00.*

Rodman persuasively uses primarily Latin American and Middle Eastern case studies to substantiate his analysis of the international regime that has managed Third World nationalizations of natural resource investments and statist and corporate preference models of U.S. expropriation policy.

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In Latin America after World War I and in much of the world for twenty years after World War II, the relatively few multinational corporations (MNCs) had a common interest in maintaining a foreign direct investment regime. The U.S. government could use its superior resources to help secure supplies of natural resources, as well as a liberal world economic order. Politically independent, but less developed and disunited, the Third World faced a unified opposition to any precedent that would threaten the principle of the sanctity of contract. International law guaranteed contracts under which often one or two MNCs in any single country would control a certain natural resource for up to ninety-nine years, with limited benefits for the less developed country (LDC). The U.S. government normally would accept expropriation of its nationals' property only under the principle of eminent domain. The action must have been nondiscriminatory and accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.

Sovereignty for many economic nationalists in the Third World has meant not autarky but more equal and beneficial participation in the global economy. This was made more possible by their taking advantage of changes in the international political and economic system, which diversified the relations between and within the MNC community and the U.S. government. Once the original MNC had made its fixed investment, it faced an obsolescing bargain in which the host country gained an increasingly strong negotiating position. The host country's growing knowledge about the operation could be useful when larger numbers of MNCs, often from West Europe or Japan after their recovery from World War II, offered the LDC more power to set prices, raise taxes, or set production levels. The Treasury Department and Congress would often insist that the original contracts could not be altered unilaterally, especially if the MNC had recourse only in domestic courts. The State Department argued in the 1930s that Axis threats and, after Castro's coming to power, Soviet threats in Latin America and other Third World areas made MNC adaptation to a new regime in U.S. national interests. The costs of interventionary force or economic reprisals frequently had escalated while their probability of success had decreased. Rodman argues, with perhaps inadequate attention to other factors, that U.S. economic reprisals led to military coups in Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1966, and Peru in 1968.

MNCs fitfully learned that the sanctity of contract and property could be sacrificed to Third World nationalism without removing opportunities for future profits. Indeed, nationalization would make the Third World government more likely to restrain labor and would lower the visibility of the MNC. Even compensation became less important as long as a working relationship between the firm and goverment followed nationalization. The former owner desired the right to buy the resources produced by the now state company for its "downstream" refining, manufacturing, and/or marketing; to sell its managerial advice or technology; or even to help arrange financing. In their new role, MNCs became concerned about restrictive economic policies, political instability, multiple exchange rates, remittance restrictions, inconvertibility, and inflation. Impersonal market forces were now usually sufficient to restrain LDCs after they nationalized a firm.

This is a worthwhile study of U.S. governmental and MNC adaptation to the

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changing international regime for natural resource investments. It seems to suggest the need for future research about how LDCs may try to respond to the changing international system in order to maximize their bargaining position against international traders and bankers.

LOWELL S. GUSTAFSON
Villanova University

When Government Goes Private: Successful Alternatives to Public Services *by Randall Fitzgerald. New York, Universe Books, 1988. 330 pp. $24.95.*

In this journalistic report on current efforts to privatize public services, Randall Fitzgerald, a *Reader's Digest* staff writer, tells us that privatization is sweeping the United States. While that picture may be exaggerated, Fitzgerald himself is certainly one of those who has been swept away.

The chief merit of *When Government Goes Private* is the range of cases that the author cites. He discusses privatization of housing, hospitals, schools, police, prisons, judges, social security, public lands, the postal service, bridges, roads, airports, air traffic safety, space exploration—and more—all with about equal enthusiasm and without any reservation. Moreover, perhaps as a result of an excellent clipping service, he tells heart-warming stories of privatization success from all across the United States. The minor disadvantage of the book is that one never knows whether to trust the stories that Fitzgerald tells.

For while the examples of privatization come from many points on the map, the perspective is always from one side. In Fitzgerald's account, virtually every privatization initiative has been a success, and every success illustrates the desirability of privatization. In a rare instance where he finds private contracting of public services did not succeed, he says the poor results prove only that government bureaucrats are incompetent at monitoring the contracts. Bolstered by such logic, no experience could possibly undermine Fitzgerald's faith, and none does.

In the areas that I know best, such as health care and Social Security, Fitzgerald has not made the slightest effort to present the evidence even-handedly. The proposals for privatizing Medicare and Social Security suffer from serious structural problems, but this book never acknowledges them. It sounds attractive, for example, to suggest that Medicare enrollees be offered the option of a voucher for private insurance, where the cash value of the voucher depends on per capita costs of Medicare enrollees under the existing public insurance plan. However, if private insurance plans successfully enroll a lower-risk elderly population—and they have every incentive to do so—Medicare could end up not only with a more costly population in the public program, but also higher costs for those who select the private option.

When Fitzgerald has a good case, he tests the reader's patience by failing to sense any limits. For example, he is probably right that the federal government could sell some valuable surplus government property, such as unneeded military

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bases. In the same chapter where he makes that argument, however, he also suggests that cities lighten the taxpayers' burden by selling roads and streets to the highest bidders. In support of this case, he cites the sale of streets by Laredo, Texas, where, for example, "A supermarket bought an adjoining street and closed it off to create more parking spaces" (p. 164). The possibilities here, I grant, are enormous: consider the value of land in Manhattan and the continuing fiscal needs of New York City.

Fitzgerald is also not entirely straightforward in his report of supporting data. For example, in a section of the book purporting to explain the deficiencies of public-sector management, he writes that "several studies contrasting differences in motivation between public- and private-sector employees have found 'public employees are more risk averse than those in the private sector, with risk aversion measured as an index of insurance owned, use of seat belts, and smoking and drinking habits'. . . ." In other words, we are to believe that people who do not smoke, but wear seat belts and carry insurance are exhibiting a general aversion to risk that also makes them poor managers of organizations. Curious about these results from "several studies," I checked out the quotation, which comes from an article by Walter F. Beber ("Privatizing Public Management: The Grace Commission and Its Critics" in Steve H. Hanke, *Prospects for Privatization* [New York, Academy of Political Science, 1985], 152–163). But in fact, Beber refers to only one study, provides no citation, and expresses some skepticism about this and other indices of risk aversion. Fitzgerald took the quotation out of context and misrepresented the evidence about differences in employee characteristics to be authoritative.

Nowhere in the book does Fitzgerald give any general view of the proper role of government. Moreover, he shows no recognition that politics has any positive function in a democracy, or that political judgment might take into account legitimate considerations that are underrepresented in the marketplace. Indeed, there is not a good word for democracy in the entire book.

In many ways, the new right-wing advocates of privatization are reminiscent of the old left-wing advocates of public ownership. One moment each blames powerful individuals (formerly capitalists, now bureaucrats and politicians); then they say the fault lies, not in individuals, but in the system, whose persistence they explain with a theory of false consciousness. For the Marxists, workers' false consciousness arises primarily from the short-term benefits provided by capitalism. For the new conservative advocates of privatization, the voters' false consciousness arises from the concentrated and visible benefits provided by government. What neither can acknowledge is that their remedy—total collective ownership or a radical shift in the direction of privatization—might be rejected because many people honestly and with good reason believe that these radical transformations would make them worse off.

PAUL STARR
Princeton University

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Managing Public Policy *by Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. Boston, Little, Brown, 1987. 282 pp. Paper, $12.46.*

A book stands up pretty well if the reviewer's main complaint is that it needs a subtitle, in this case something like *How Appointed Executives Can Make the Most of their Situations and Strategies*. Otherwise, potential readers might think they are getting a comprehensive overview of the policy process. Such a book would be not only unwieldy but probably dull. This work, fortunately, is more focused on the role and contributions (also on the shortcomings and pitfalls) of appointed executives. The analysis refers most often to heads of federal agencies, bureaus, offices, etc., but it applies just as well to appointed executives in state or city governments.

The author purposefully and skillfully treats the subject at a middle range of generality, with neither broad abstractions nor detailed case studies. Enough references are made to the experience of actual executives in specific situations that a reader feels the discussion has some real-life underpinnings. Most of the book is devoted to analyzing the policy process as it relates to the tasks of executives engaged in it, identifying what makes an executive more or less likely to succeed.

Once it was clear that this was not going to be a synoptic treatment of public policy, but rather an "existential" introduction thereto, I decided the best test of the book would be to ask: would I recommend it to a newly-appointed agency or bureau head in a Bush administration? Assuming that the person is literate enough to deal with more than legal briefs or reductionist opinion papers, the answer is yes. Although the book meets the norms of academic exposition and contains an excellent set of references, it is readable and concrete enough to help political operatives learn how to think about their organizations, to be able to proceed more effectively on offense and on defense.

Political and administration tasks are seen as involving concurrent mental and institutional processes. Lynn is a both-and thinker, getting away from the dichotomy between objective and subjective realities found in classical physics and derivative social science. This puts him in the emerging minority of social scientists who approach the world in a manner consistent with the insights of quantum physics and the new science of "chaos." It leads him to suggest, for example, what we know but have a hard time saying as social scientists, that there is no single right way to organize government and to see that "Life in organized anarchies can be full of promise" (p. 129). Such a view opens up welcome and needed degrees of freedom.

The popular rational choice model of political behavior ("analytic phantoms," a phrase Lynn borrows from David Mayhew) does not stand up in the existential realities of executive life. But the human relations school of organization theory, which challenged the mechanistic models derived from the writings of Weber, Taylor and others, does not fare so well either. The book, while a good review of the literature, makes some contributions of its own with sensible syntheses and reformulations, especially in dealing with important factors like personality and organizational culture.

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The book is capped off with a review of how five political appointees in the Reagan administration managed (or failed) to have an impact on public policy in agencies like the Forest Service and the Federal Communications Commission. This is based on Lynn's own research for the Urban Institute in 1983–1984 and brings to life many of the concepts and prescriptions laid out in the book. Probably many more academics than practitioners will read this book, but it is a good example of what the former can provide to the latter.

NORMAN UPHOFF
Cornell University

Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893–1928 *by Paul Kleppner. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1987. 263 pp. $35.00.*

The purpose of this carefully done book is to provide a detailed understanding of the so-called system of 1896. More generally, Kleppner starts by reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on party realignment, concluding that the notion of almost-immutable party identification that modern University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (SRC) research has created and nourished over the past thirty years has caused researchers in this area to mistake "one species of party identification for the entire genus" (p. 12) and, therefore, to downplay the possibly short-term influences of political circumstances in motivating the individual behaviors that in the aggregate produce a realignment.

Kleppner utilizes an appropriate variety of quantitative methods (including ecological regression and an interesting use of factor analysis) to describe the geographical and social bases of the 1890s realignment and the patterns of stability and change in voting behaviors that characterized the ensuing fourth party system.

This is a rich book, with a number of subarguments and interesting bits of data that will give scholars of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century politics a variety of research questions and directions. I think it has several particular strengths, all of which reflect Kleppner's concerns about developing a more general and specifically political theory of realignment—that is, one that takes into account the contexts of party organization and goals, elite behavior, and citizen evaluation of policy rather than being based simply on a mechanistic application of quantitative measures to vote patterns.

One such strength is the attention paid to party elites' electoral strategies. The idea that realignments (or any change in party coalitions) do not simply happen from the bottom up, but are in part a result of the decisions and appeals made by candidates and parties, is an aspect of James Sundquist's theory of realignment that I have always found appealing. Kleppner appears equally convinced of this (though other realignment scholars do not) and does a fine job of connecting elite choices to popular behavior. For example "Bryan and McKinley approached

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the campaign differently . . . because they faced different electoral tasks and developed different campaign strategies to address them" (p. 110).

Another and related strength is the importance placed on understanding the social and political context that shapes electoral choice. One such context is the structure of campaigns themselves, which changed during this period from a mobilizational to a "merchandising" style. Another aspect of context is geographical, and Kleppner pays close attention to regional variations in the way the 1890s realignment happened and in the way subsequent patterns developed. Context is also constituted by the meanings attached to words: there is a fascinating discussion of what people in this period meant when they talked about "corruption" and how this differs from our present understanding of the term.

Kleppner's discussion of the ways that the fourth party system represented changes in the rules of the game, although this is a point which has been made by others, is illuminating: although the argument is not new, there are interesting descriptions of state and local-level rule changes and good discussions of their effects. The author's claims about the nativist/classist motivations of the reformers who put these changes into effect are a bit too strong for my taste; but his argument is an important contribution to this and other ongoing debates.

KRISTI ANDERSEN
Syracuse University

The Politics of Education: Conflict and Consensus on Capitol Hill *by John Brademas with Lynne P. Brown. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1987. 134 pp. $14.95.*

In the preface, Brademas straightforwardly states that this book is not a detached observer's analysis of the federal education scene, but rather the "highly personal perspective" (p. xiv) of a former congressman who served twenty-two years in the House and is now president of New York University. And so it is—the personal, attached perspective of an astute politician and educator who played a major role in the passage of federal educational policy during the 1960s and 1970s.

For the scholar, this book is not a treasure trove of new analysis, but it does fill out the federal aid story with the thoughtful insights of a key actor buttressed by some illuminating tales. For the layperson and for those interested in an overview, this lively and breezy account is enlightening, particularly in arguing the case for federal aid to education.

The book is divided into three parts. The first and main part grows out of lectures Brademas delivered in 1983 at the University of Oklahoma. Brademas examines the origins of federal educational policy during his term in Congress and explores the dynamics of policy making, particularly in the House. Not surprisingly, Brademas defends the Congress, arguing that scholars have underestimated its con-

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structive role in policy making. He illustrates his point persuasively, at least during the Nixon and Ford years, with capsule accounts of education legislation. He further argues that it is hard to generalize about congressional behavior, and that the most difficult issue for lawmakers is not doing what is right, but knowing what is right—given the paucity of policy information.

Brademas also achieves what insider accounts often do better than detached scholarly analyses; to wit, providing a portrait of the personalities that dominate the congressional maze and recounting the behind-the-scenes anecdotes that capture its essence. We read thumbnail sketches of major legislative actors: the legendary Adam Clayton Powell, the dogged Carl Perkins, the prickly Edith Green. We witness the famous President Lyndon Johnson treatment, telephoning the young congressman on his birthday and twisting "Johnny's" arm—only LBJ called Brademas "Johnny." And we read about the everyday shenanigans of congressional life: Green's attempt to reorganize Brademas out of an important subcommittee seat, leading Brademas to quip, "I did not take it as a constructive contribution to the quality of our relationship" (p. 30).

In the second part of the book, Brademas shifts gears from past congressional processes to current educational policy. He analyzes today's debate, making a well reasoned—and impassioned—plea for a strong federal role that would ensure access to education for needy groups, promote research, target special-need populations, act as a catalyst for state and local action, and support critical national needs. Along the way, he artfully defends his congressional handiwork and attacks the logic and illogic of the Reagan education policies.

In the last part, Brademas shifts gears again, connecting education with the survival of democracy. Returning to a pet concern, international education, he provides a compelling analysis of our shortsightedness in educating U.S. citizens for a shrinking world. He then ends with a flurry of arguments about defense policy, about the importance of knowing more about how our government works, and about the need for able young people to join the rough and tumble of the congressional life. If this book is somewhat disjointed and repetitious, it is also the intelligent and informative ruminations of an influential and effective educator/politician.

JEROME T. MURPHY
Harvard University

Joseph McCarthy: The Politics of Chaos *by Mark Landis. Cranbury, N.J., Susquehana University Press, 1987. 171 pp. $26.50.*

The focus of this volume is to understand the significance of Joseph McCarthy's political style—its origins, psychological dynamics, and nature. As author Mark Landis acknowledges, McCarthy's life and unique political career have been the subject of numerous other analyses. What Landis seeks to accomplish is to dem-

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onstrate how McCarthy's political personality helps to explain the linkage between elite and mass politics in the American experience. In constructing what is essentially a political biography, Landis relies on the work of major biographers: McCarthy's private papers remain closed to the scholarly community. The initial account of McCarthy's background is somewhat hampered by conflicting views of the nature of McCarthy's family and adolescent experiences. Like Lyndon Johnson, however, it seems clear that McCarthy achieved intial success—and a taste for politics—while a student in college.

Landis utilizes James David Barber's work on the political personality—especially in the latter's emphasis on style—or the "quality and character of performance" and strategies for "adapting, protecting and enhancing self-esteem" (quoted on p. 22). According to Landis, utilizing Barber's terms, McCarthy was a quasi active/negative political personality whose love of power was ambivalent. But because this explanation is not totally satisfying, Landis turns to Abraham Maslow's model of "esteem seeker"—or power seeking as a means of repairing damaged self-esteem. Landis also points to the disassociation between McCarthy's public and private selves, suggesting that his belief system did not really support the rabid anticommunism that became his trademark. Political ideas in McCarthy's hands were "instrumental weapons" (p. 95) to be used as long as they could aid in attainment of private, primarily ego-enhancing aims. The portrait Landis provides of McCarthy is of an impulsive, noncoherent, and nonintegrated personality.

Landis concludes that "without an environment supportive of his activity, McCarthyism would not have flourished. But without McCarthy, there would have been no McCarthyism . . ." (p. 139). In the final analysis, this conceptualization is near tautology, which does little to advance our understanding of the political processes underlying the phenomenon of McCarthyism. While the portrait Landis draws of the psychological dimensions of McCarthy's personality is undeniably interesting and useful, perhaps the more interesting question for political scientists is how and why the goals of McCarthy and "those of his conservative Republican supporters were attuned" (p. 142). What were the specific conditions—electoral, ideological—that created the alliance Landis proposes between the Republican elite and the impulsive style of McCarthy?

Ultimately, this book is most satisfying as a study of McCarthy as a political personality and less satisfying in its attempt to examine elite/mass/leadership relationships. More use of comparative political biographies—of such figures as Lyndon Johnson and Huey Long—might help to further develop Landis's interesting analysis in a fruitful direction, as would efforts to integrate additional material related to mass political mobilization by demogogic leaders.

JOYCE GELB
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America Outside the World: The Collapse of U.S. Foreign Policy *by Louis René Beres. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1987. 172 pp. $19.95.*

Louis René Beres has written a peculiar and unsatisfying book. Presented as a work of scholarship, *America Outside the World* is instead a poorly argued polemic: with no evidence to support conclusions, most of his statements stand as mere assertions. Though admirably concise, Beres covers perhaps 20 percent of his pages with superfluous digressions on subjects he has already discussed in earlier books. Committed to the thesis that the United States burns an eternal flame of anti-Soviet hatred, he forfeits the ability to account for Ronald Reagan's popular post-1984 rush toward arms control and a renewal of détente. Ostensibly dedicated to a devolution of bureaucratic power into the hands of a revivified body politic, he parades a long string of insults about the American public (Americans "live in intellectual stupor" [p. 4]) on his way to an incredible, elitist solution. Most worrisome of all to this reader, in a manner analogous to Jonathan Schell's despairing view that only abandoning national sovereignty will stave off a nuclear holocaust (*The Fate of the Earth*, 1982), Beres utterly devalues politics in his repeated insistence that only if Americans transform themselves emotionally (breaking the shackles of a false prosperity paid for with blind herd-like obedience to a Sovietphobic state) will they prevent the United States, now "languishing at the abyss," from "apocalypse" and "annihilation" (p. 1).

In the body of the book, the author details his concerns about U.S. policy in South Africa, Central America, the Middle East (nothing on Western or Eastern Europe, on any part of Asia, or on the Soviet Union itself); and on terrorism and genocide. Although many of his preferences will appear unexceptionable to most readers (strive for the end of conflict in Central America, end genocide, avoid nuclear wars), his sense of priorities cannot escape the label of eccentric. For example, in his chapters on both Central America and the Middle East, he identifies the key issue as the danger of nuclear war. Consistent with his deprecation of politics, he completely neglects the cardinal issues of history, religion, territory, and power that dominate the Middle East. Nor, in the U.S.-bashing chapter on Central America, does he even hint at Sandinista imperfection or suggest that many capitals besides Washington hope to bring about a negotiated settlement that would require fundamental political changes in Managua. Equally unsatisfactory is his tendency to blame their victims for the activities of terrorists.

Beres's predictions (embedded in a retrospective chapter couched as though written in 2010) are overtaken by events. He describes an almost mad, militaristic, and Soviet-baiting Reagan administration that pushes to the brink of catastrophe by 1989. But somehow in later years a new president, imbued with "planetary consciousness" (p. 139), almost singlehandedly brings the United States back into the world, and an era of peace and tranquility begins. In the concluding chapter, Beres again states the necessity of having the individual American "transcend himself" (p. 152) if the nation is to survive; he does not satisfactorily reconcile such a view with his reliance on the transforming power of a single enlightened president.

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He never flags from lashing out against ordinary American citizens (their "passions are inauthentic" [p. 162]) or denouncing politics. "All politics is delinquency," he writes, "violating the rights of self-affirmation in favor of the herd. All politics are infantile, a game of Eros and Thanatos, of sex and war" (p. 159). To save themselves, all Americans must either (it is not clear which) transcend themselves (whatever that might mean) or, led by a vanguard of intellectuals, they must find a president whose leadership renders all the talk about moral and emotional transformation irrelevant.

ROBERT L. BEISNER
The American University

Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine *by Avi Shlaim. New York, Columbia University Press, 1988. 676 pp. $40.00.*

With the opening of Israeli, British, and American diplomatic archives from the 1940s and early 1950s, a new wave of studies on the initial phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is appearing. One of the most impressive is Avi Shlaim's *Collusion Across the Jordan*. Not for the first time, but in convincing detail, the story is told of the contacts between the Zionist movement and King Abdullah of Transjordan. The common ground between these supposed adversaries was their opposition to the emergence of an independent Palestinian state, especially one under the leadership of the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. The British, Shlaim shows, helped to engineer the deal whereby King Abdullah would seize the West Bank, while Israel consolidated its hold elsewhere in the former mandate of Palestine.

Shlaim is not a great admirer of Israel's first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, who is charged with missing a chance for a peace treaty with Abdullah by being unwilling to compromise. By contrast, Abdullah gets high marks as a shrewd and subtle politician, ready to deal realistically with Israel, while attentive to the pressures from his Palestinian constituents and the wider Arab world.

It has long been known that the Zionists and Abdullah were in frequent communication. But few have been aware of the full extent of the relationship, including regular subsidies paid by the Zionists to various Jordanian personalities. Nor have the divergent views within the Zionist establishment on how best to deal with the Arabs been so well described before.

One of the few problems with Shlaim's book is its title. The word "collusion" implies a tighter relationship between the Zionist movement and Abdullah than was the case. As Shlaim himself argues, the relationship went through several phases, and can better be described at some points as an "adversary partnership" based on "tacit understanding" (p. 235). At other times "collusion" is closer to the mark, but the complexity of the relationship from 1947 to 1951 is not adequately reflected in the title.

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To the extent possible, Shlaim has used Arabic sources in addition to the rich records from the Israeli, British, and American archives. But the Arab side of the story is inevitably most shrouded in mystery. We see Abdullah, with rare exceptions, through the eyes of his Israeli and British interlocutors. The lack of access to Arabic archival material continues to be a problem for historians of this period.

Despite these minor reservations, it should be emphasized that this is a remarkable book. The standard of scholarship is exemplary. No serious student of this period can afford not to read it. For those with a more contemporary bent, the book helps to explain the long-standing fixation of the Israeli Labor party on the so-called Jordan option. In light of the intimacy of the contacts with Jordan at the time of Israel's birth, it is no surprise that many Israelis have looked to Amman ever since as the most credible Arab partner for peace. Only gradually is it dawning on both Israelis and Americans that the Palestinians can no longer be left out of the equation, as both the early Zionists and King Abdullah had tried to do.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

The Japanese Way of Politics *by Gerald L. Curtis. New York, Columbia University Press, 1988. 301 pp. $30.00.*

As students of Japanese politics focused on the miracle of postwar economic growth and the puzzle of industrial policy, they allowed elections and party politics to get out of focus. Gerald Curtis helps correct this imbalance with a major work on Japanese politics proper.

The first chapter is a summary of postwar politics. Curtis distinguishes three phases of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule: polarization from 1955 to 1960; a period from 1960 to the mid-1970s in which the LDP lost votes and the opposition fragmented; and finally conservative resurgence. Chapter Two focuses on the question of how the conservatives managed to regain dominance. This is indeed the key mystery facing students of Japanese politics.

The third and fourth chapters deal with the two major Japanese parties, the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). These chapters contain valuable updates on party history and present data and arguments not otherwise available in English-language sources. The chapter on the Socialist Party is the best single source on the JSP in English and should find its way onto many syllabi.

Chapter Five addresses changes in campaign style and strategy, a continuation of Curtis's classic study, *Election Campaigning Japanese Style*. Here he documents the decline of the modern party model. Japanese conservatives are no longer interested in modernizing the party in the image of western parties. Chapter Six deals with the changing Japanese voter and returns to the question of conservative resurgence.

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While welcoming this major contribution, there are several worrisome aspects of this book. There is little in the way of new research. Curtis summarizes others' research. Nor do I find an overall theme, despite the book's title. Instead we find Curtis's position on a wide range of issues. On the great mystery of how the LDP has managed to halt what had seemed to be its irreversible decline, Curtis gives two answers.

First, Japanese public opinion has shifted toward support of deficit cutting and austerity. This argument makes a kind of prima facie common sense. During the era of high growth in which the LDP stood for growth and pork barrel spending, the party steadily lost votes. After the economy settled into low growth (by Japanese standards) and the LDP began to speak of fiscal responsibility, the decline was halted. If we assume that the electorate has been sending clear coherent messages, we conclude that Japanese voters did not like the pork barrel politics of the 1960s and have now come to appreciate the need for fiscal austerity. The problem is, of course, with the assumption that the electorate has been sending coherent messages. This is precisely the kind of common sense interpretation of elections that survey research, in Japan as elsewhere, has rendered implausible. Elections are not that simple and electorates are not that sophisticated. If Japanese voters dislike pork barrel but like austerity, they are unlike any others. It is telling that Curtis provides no survey evidence in this chapter.

Curtis's second argument is both more interesting and better supported. During the high-growth era, political analysts were confident that economic and cultural modernization would decrease conservative support. Instead, economic growth and the decline of traditional values have produced a remarkably homogeneous population and virtually destroyed the conservative-progressive cleavage, leaving the LDP as the natural party of government. Despite its weaknesses, this is indeed a welcome volume, because of its focus on electoral politics and as a starting point for dealing with the conservative resurgence.

STEVEN R. REED
University of Alabama

States and Collective Action: The European Experience *by Pierre Birnbaum. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 232 pp. $39.50.*

The point of departure for this wide-ranging collection of essays is a distinction between two basic types of state. One is a "strong" state (represented by France, and possibly Prussia) that has become highly differentiated from surrounding social groups. The "weak" state (typified by Britain or the United States) is poorly institutionalized and less clearly distinguishable from class, party, religion, or ethnicity. In ten essays combining theory with comparative historical sociology, the author sets out to show how each type of state is an important "independent vari-

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able" (p. 8) that "will account for the extraordinary diversity of forms of collective action" in European countries (p. 10). The scope of these essays is broad and varied. Birnbaum writes about mobilization for war and by workers, about strikes and corporatism, and on such subjects as ethnic regions, the National Socialist *Gleichschaltung*, policing immigrants in Britain, and the Zionist founders' debate. The opening chapters contribute to a "crucial debate" between "the advocates of a holistic approach" toward collective action and the proponents of "methodological individualism" (p. 9). The range of this searching survey is narrowed only by the author's disavowal of any claim to causal analysis. This is a work of reinterpretation, in which Birnbaum makes his point about the importance of the state by way of typology and illustration.

As a challenge to unexamined axioms of political sociology, Birnbaum's reflections are often insightful and thought-provoking. A short review cannot do justice to all his formulations (both satisfying and problematic). But for all his insistence on the state's pervasive significance, it must be said that his manner of choosing and defining topics has loaded the dice in favor of a "state-centric" perspective. In picking his "dependent variables" (various forms of collective mobilization), Birnbaum filters out those aspects of the phenomena in question that do not lend themselves to state theory. Alternatives to the state as an "independent variable" are not always accorded the explanatory stature they deserve.

In discussing corporatism and labor movements, for example, Birnbaum focuses on the difference between the French proclivity for political strikes and the British worker's preference for economic action. He is also intrigued by the difference between anarchism and reformism as the world views that caught on with French and British workers respectively. These distinctions dovetail nicely with the "strong state-weak state" contrast. But as a basis for revamping corporatist theory and the history of labor movements, comparisons like these exclude too much. Much recent research in the corporatist frame has tried to answer questions about macroeconomic performance, industrial policy, and the governing records of political parties. Comparative labor history has delved into relations between unions and parties (something Birnbaum does mention in passing), class solidarity, and the origins of welfare states, among other dependent variables. The universe of working class postures toward revolution or reform is not adequately defined by attitudes toward the state. On the independent variable side, there is also a broader set of factors commonly adduced to explain labor movements and the corporatist state. These include workplace organization, craft traditions, interest-group structure, expertise, citizenship rights, and the values or stratification patterns associated with old and new nations.

There is no need to incorporate all such categories into a survey like *States and Collective Action*. But Birnbaum never really engages those scholars (such as Lipset, Katznelson, and Zolberg on labor movements; Cameron, Scharpf, and Schmidt on corporatism) who integrate factors like these into ongoing research agendas that are empirical but have theoretical implications. He prefers a scholarly dialogue that abstracts selectively from settled theories and moves toward

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thematic reinterpretation. The erudite display of historical cases usually advances a new taxonomy of political action, not an alternative explanation. Mechanisms linking states to social action are not always explored, leaving the impression that each type of state suffuses its nation's political culture in a logical yet unspecified way. Finally, nothing is said about state formation or what "differentiation" looks like. Although some attention to origins might help the reader understand how strong and weak states interact with social collectivities, it is taken for granted that states have arrived on the scene fully formed.

JEREMIAH M. RIEMER
The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Inside the Philippine Revolution: People's Army and Its Struggle for Power *by William Chapman. New York, Norton, 1987. 288 pp. $18.95.*

Journalist William Chapman's account of the rise of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA) is the first book-length study of the Philippine movement. Although it is far from the definitive treatment of the subject, it is a major contribution to the understanding of Philippine communism.

Despite the parallel invoked on the book's dust jacket, Chapman has no ambition to write a Philippine version of Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China.* Chapman does not claim to be an insider with access to the national-level CPP/NPA leadership. His account is based on interviews during short trips into the NPA zone rather than on long residence in it. While it is short on the drama of first-person observation, it conveys an understanding of some of the inner dynamics of the movement, both in terms of interaction with the Philippine population and in terms of the party organization itself.

The author begins the difficult process of reconstructing a more detailed history of the formation and development of the CPP and NPA over nearly two decades through interviews with veteran cadres. He provides new insights into some of the key policy decisions along the way, especially the decision in 1980–1981 to divide political and military functions, which cleared the way for a much more rapid growth in armed strength in the early 1980s.

Inside the Philippine Revolution has more in-depth reportage on the political operations of the CPP than it does on the military operations of the NPA, reflecting the fact that only a small fraction of the revolution's strength is actually armed. Chapman sees the CPP as far from monolithic and has a good description of the intraparty dissension that erupted after its boycott of the February 1986 presidential election, which left the party out in the cold while the democratic opposition seized power in the "snap revolution" against Marcos.

Because this is an effort to view the revolutionary movement from inside rather than from the government side, Chapman must for the most part let the Com-

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munist cadres speak for themselves. That leaves questions about the role of coercion in tax collection and obtaining other forms of support unanswered. He freely acknowledges that he is unable to fully evaluate the negative side of the CPP/NPA organization through his interviews and short visits. Nevertheless, Chapman challenges conventional wisdom in dealing with the harsh reality of NPA killing of policemen, civilian officials, and military informers in the barrios, suggesting that they do not alienate the core constituency of the NPA in places like Davao City and Negros.

Closing his account as a ceasefire agreement was reached between the Aquino government and the CPP in November 1986, Chapman concludes with a brief discussion of the movement's strengths that may fail to give adequate weight to some of its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. He finds the CPP leadership more ideologically flexible than other revolutionary movements in the Third World. That may be, but CPP decisions in recent years, from the ill-fated boycott decision of 1985 to the half-hearted participation in the congressional elections of 1987, suggest that the party's tactical flexibility is limited to a rigid ideological commitment to Maoist theses about Philippine society and to the "Prolonged People's War" strategy. Along with its inability to find an external source of weapons for the NPA, this characteristic is likely to cause severe problems for the Philippine revolutionary movement in the coming years.

GARETH PORTER
The American University

Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge *by Karen Dawisha. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 268 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $12.95.*

Eastern Europe was heading for trouble even before Mikhail Gorbachev appeared on the scene. Now he has added a new dimension of stress by shifting the goalposts. Nobody knows where he has placed the new limits to change. The immediate effect has been to plunge the ruling bureaucracies of Eastern Europe into confusion. Most of them had found it convenient to use Moscow as an excuse for immobility. Deprived of this excuse, they have revealed their own fear of change. Only Hungary is exploring the new freedoms with any courage. Yet Hungary also exposes the awkward fact that reforms can create at least as many problems as they solve.

Thus the fundamental dilemma now confronting Eastern Europe is, as Dawisha says, whether Mr. Gorbachev can "improve the viability and stability of these regimes without unleashing societal forces which could threaten the reform movement in both Eastern Europe and the USSR" (p. 1).

The answer is still highly uncertain. Greater freedom could in theory bring greater prosperity and stability, which could gradually reduce antagonism to Moscow. But

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it could also expose acute social tensions and unleash old rivalries, including anti-Russian feeling, creating serious trouble for Gorbachev. Indeed, it is possible that his fate will be determined as much in Eastern Europe as in the Soviet Union.

In pursuing the answer, Dawisha offers much valuable analysis of the background. She examines the strong Soviet commitment to retaining control over the area, deriving not only from the sacrifices of World War II but from deeper historical roots. She judges that even under Gorbachev the Soviet Union is not ready to relinquish that control. Thus tension will persist, but not only because of Soviet domination. Dawisha lays out very effectively the vast political and cultural diversity of the area, its inner tensions, varied traditions, and widely differing responses to détente and now to the new challenge from Moscow.

Her broad analysis cannot be faulted. She has, however, a tendency to take the rulers of Eastern Europe too much at their face value, depicting them as socialists struggling to increase the viability of their own rule while hampered largely by their perceived dependence on Moscow. In fact, they are hampered as much as anything by the intrinsic inefficiency of the system and by their devotion to their own entrenched interests, which have little or nothing to do with ideology.

Nevertheless, Dawisha argues convincingly that western policy is better served by encouraging those elements that do seek genuine reform, rather than by exacerbating military confrontation or attempting to destabilize the bloc. To that extent her prescriptions are a useful counter to some of the wilder ideas that have circulated in the West from time to time.

But she does not really answer the question she poses—whether truly effective reforms can be introduced without appearing to threaten Soviet security. Perhaps no answer is possible at this stage. The evidence so far (mainly from Hungary) suggests that reforms are as likely to bring trouble as greater stability. Dawisha acknowledges the dangers but leans toward more optimistic scenarios. Her position rests more on hope than on any deep analysis of the dynamics of reform. Nevertheless, she has written a very valuable book, which illuminates a subject of growing importance and will greatly add to understanding of the area.

Unfortunately she did not include a sailor among her many advisors. He would have queried the final quotation from the Hungarian poet Gyula Illyes. Sailing boats in fact go slower, not faster, when they heel beyond a certain point.

RICHARD DAVY
Oxford Analytica

The Communist Party of China and Marxism, 1921–1985: A Self-Portrait *by Laszlo Ladany. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 588 pp. $44.95.*

Ladany brings together data from his 1953–1979 newsletter, *China News Analysis*, the shrewdest and most under-cited Kremlinological commentary on China. He

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brings the story up to 1985 and even goes back to 1921 to clarify how the Party conquered state power. Ladany makes good use throughout of post-Mao revelations.

Since he agrees with the post-Mao line that Mao Zedong had previously been mythologized, Ladany uses recent Chinese material to cut down Mao's contributions and foresight. Since he disagrees with the post-Mao line that a good Mao gave way to the bad Mao of the Cultural Revolution, Ladany depicts Mao throughout as a destructive and repressive Stalinist. For Ladany, Mao's main innovation was expanding Stalinist terror from the secret police to pervasive vigilantism. Sometimes Ladany finds that post-Mao rulers have broken with that horrible heritage, sometimes not.

Explaining Mao as merely a Stalinist, however, cannot explain why so many anti-Stalinists embraced Mao. For Ladany, Mao's problem with Stalinists Wang Ming and Gao Gang was only their loyalty to Joseph Stalin. Mao is said to have taken Stalinism more seriously than Moscow and to have tried to make Mao's China the leading Stalinist nation. Dismissing the scholarship that explicates Mao's heresy (or originality) in opposition to the traditional Soviet path, Ladany relies on "the 'grand master' of Marxism, Professor Karl A. Wittfogal" (p. 87), "the greatest authority on Marxism in the Western world" (p. 172).

Relying singularly on his prodigious energies and works of those sharing his ideological predispositions, Ladany slights scholarship far more solid than his sketchy readings on numerous matters—Mao's rise, the Xian incident, the Emergency Salvation Campaign, the fall of Gao Gang, Lysenkoism, Peng Dehuai in 1965, the campaign to ferret out May 16th elements, etc. His erroneous invocation of "Professor Roxanne Witke of Boston" (p. 389) suggests Ladany does not know the scholars or the scholarship.

Ladany argues that Mao's Party won power by hiding its Stalinist purposes and fooling people like Edgar Snow into thinking Mao was an agrarian reformer. A small, isolated band of Stalinists proved masters of mass deception. Only the peasantry was not fooled. Even in 1949, there was no "sign among the peasants that they would welcome the new regime" (p. 138). Land reform was pure brutality (p. 177). In contrast, the defeated Guomindang on Taiwan concluded that not carrying out land reform facilitated loss of power on China's mainland. On Taiwan the Guomindang, therefore, implemented an excellent land reform, the start of Taiwan's economic miracle.

In addition to his ideological fixations, Ladany has an idiosyncratic view of Beijing's foreign policy. He blames the "divergence" of China from the Soviet Union mainly on Nikita Khrushchev's alleged 1958 refusal "to support China in an attack on Quemoy Island" (pp. 254–55). Ladany's explanation of Beijing-Washington rapprochement is even more peculiar (p. 341).

Whatever is debatable in his analytic framework or views on foreign policy, Ladany remains a superb Kremlinologist with a sure grasp of Maoist political realities (for example, "The army had been a state within a state. It had its own in-

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dustry, its own universities, and the best hospitals in the country" (pp. 496–97). Ladany's book makes a major contribution through copious translation of some of the massive post-Mao documentation of the violence, terror, and murder which were integral to Mao's Communist Party.

EDWARD FRIEDMAN
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Correction: In the article "The ANZUS Dispute: Testing U.S. Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics" by William T. Tow in the Spring 1989 issue, the statement on p. 146 that Japan has recently increased its military spending "to exceed 19 percent of its gross national product" should have read "to exceed one percent."

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

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